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ABSTRACT
THE SATRAPS OF WESTERN ANATOLIA AND THE GREEKS
Eyal Meyer
Jeremy McInerney
This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies
originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal
centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth century BC. I begin by establishing that the
Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I,
which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative
infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was
embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and
that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which
allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the
extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were
supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office.
After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and
the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of GrecoPersian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on a particular challenge
the Persians faced in western Anatolia. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in
the middle of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of
mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor, while on the other, Xerxes’
failure to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward
expansion to a policy of entrenchment. The focus of chapter five is the limited interest of
Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC) in respect to the western satrapies. The last chapter deals with
the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger. I show
that the alliance between Persia and Sparta was the outcome of satrapal action rather than
royal initiative or intent. Accordingly, the satraps sought to exploit the power struggle
between Athens and Sparta for their own favor while King Darius played a relatively
secondary role in this conflict.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................... v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... vii
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
1. THE REFORMS OF DARIUS I ..................................................................................... 8
1.1 The Main Sources...................................................................................................... 8
1.2 The Reformation of the Tributary System .............................................................. 10
1.3 Centralization of Power ........................................................................................... 16
1.4 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire I: Separatist Factions .......................... 17
1.5 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire II: Powerful Satraps............................ 20
Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 32
2. ACHAEMENID ROYAL SUPERVISION .................................................................. 34
2.1 Royal Personnel in the Satrapies ............................................................................. 34
2.2 Yearly Royal Review .............................................................................................. 44
2.3 The Achaemenid Surveillance Service ................................................................... 47
Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 55
3. SATRAPAL DUTIES AND RESOURCES ................................................................. 56
3.1 Satrapal Duties ........................................................................................................ 56
3.2 Satrapal Financial Resources .................................................................................. 63
3.3 The Achaemenid Conscription System ................................................................... 71
3.4 Satrapal Military Capacity ...................................................................................... 78
Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 89
4. IONIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST....................................................................... 90
4.1 Ionians and Greeks .................................................................................................. 90
4.2 Ionian Appeals for Help .......................................................................................... 93
4.3 The Greek Counter-Offensive in the 470s .............................................................. 99
4.4 Pausanias, Xerxes and Artabazus .......................................................................... 104
4.5 Xerxes’ Campaign from the Persian Viewpoint ................................................... 106
4.6 The Battle of the Eurymedon River ...................................................................... 110
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 119
5. DISINTEREST AND EQUILIBRIUM ...................................................................... 121

vi
5.1 The Disinterest of Artaxerxes I ............................................................................. 122
5.2 Equilibrium............................................................................................................ 126
5.3 Satrapal Initiative and Royal Indisposition ........................................................... 132
5.4 The Archidamian War ........................................................................................... 137
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 144
6. THE SATRAPS AND THE IONIAN WAR .............................................................. 146
6.1 The Peace of Epilycus ........................................................................................... 146
6.2 Enter Tissaphernes ................................................................................................ 147
6.3 The Appeal to Sparta as a Satrapal Initiative ........................................................ 152
6.4 Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians ................................................................... 154
6.5 Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet.................................................................. 161
6.5 War in the Hellespont............................................................................................ 168
6.6 Turning the Tide .................................................................................................... 171
Conclusion................................................................................................................... 175
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 176
BIBLIOGRAHPY ........................................................................................................... 180

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AD

Driver, Godfrey R. 1957. Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century BC.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.

AP

Cowley, Arthur E. 1923. Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century ВС.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.

ATL III

Meritt, Benjamin D., Henry T. Wade-Gery, and Malcolm F. McGregor.
1950. The Athenian Tribute Lists III. Princeton: The American School of
Classical Studies at Athens.

BE X

Clay, A.T. 1904. Business Documents of Murashu Sons of Nippur Dated
in the Reign of Darius II (424-404 B.C.). Philadelphia: The University
Museum.

BM

British Museum (siglum for tablets in the British Museum)

CAD K

Oppenheim, A. Leo, Erica Reiner, and Robert D. Biggs. 1971. The
Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of
Chicago: Volume 8 K. Chicago: The Oriental Institute.

DAE

Grelot, Pierre. 1972. Documents arameens d'Egypte. Paris: Éditions du
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INTRODUCTION
The encounter of the ancient Greeks with the Achaemenid Persian Empire had an enduring
effect on the trajectories of Greek and Persian histories and their legacies. From the middle
of the sixth century BC, following the Persian conquest of the Greek city-states of Asia
Minor, the Greeks interacted, collaborated and at times waged war against the Persians.
But while Greco-Persian relations have been explored from as early as the 19th century, our
knowledge on the history of ancient Persia has improved dramatically only in recent
decades. This most welcome achievement occurred primarily due to the Achaemenid
History Workshop series, which began in the early 1980s and centered on various facets of
the Persian Empire.1 The overarching goal of this scholarly effort was to adopt an
interdisciplinary approach to the study of Achaemenid Persia instead of the predominantly
Greek-centered approach. Consequently, distinguished scholars from various fields of
study, e.g. Assyriology, Egyptology, archaeology, Biblical studies, and more, have
broadened and deepened our understanding of the history, economy, administrative
mechanism, ideology, along with numerous other aspects and themes of the history of
ancient Persia.
The Misconception
But despite the outstanding work that has been done, a vast majority of seminal studies on
Greco-Persian relations were produced at a time when our knowledge on the nature and
character of the Persian Empire was incomplete. As a result, a particular misconception
gained prominence in Achaemenid studies, whose origin can be traced back to the biased
ancient Greek literary traditions. It is widely held that the Great Persian Kings were the
driving force behind instances in which the Persians intervened in Greek affairs, both in
Asia Minor and mainland Greece. This assumption, however, fails to take into
consideration the nature of the Persian administrative mechanism and is predicated on a
faulty understanding of the attitude of the Achaemenid Kings toward the western periphery
of their Empire. On the one hand, the considerable reliance on the comparatively abundant
literary sources, which originated almost exclusively from the Greek world, has obscured
the fact that the western provinces of Asia Minor constituted a relatively unimportant
frontier region, situated on the most western edges of the Persian Empire. On the other
hand, Persian royal ideology, as articulated in royal inscriptions commissioned by the
Persian Kings and put on display in Achaemenid royal capitals, demonstrates that the
Persian Kings’ interest in the regions beyond the Persian heartland was limited to and
centered on the demand for unquestioned obedience and tribute. Albeit these shortcomings,
1

These workshops were organized by Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Amélie Kuhrt. So far nine edited
volumes has been published: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1987; SancisiWeerdenburg and Kuhrt 1988; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1990; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Drijvers
1990; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1991; Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Drijvers 1991; SancisiWeerdenburg, Kuhrt, and Root 1994; Henkelman and Kuhrt 2003. In addition, five monographs on specific
topics are affiliated with the Achaemenid History Workshop series: Garrison and Root 1996; Briant 2002;
Kaptan 2002 (2 vols.); Henkelman 2008; Waerzeggers 2010.
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the above mentioned misconception continues to function as an underlying assumption in
numerous studies concerned with Greco-Persian relations, and as such has facilitated the
production of inaccurate interpretations of the motives, aims, and interests of the Persian
Kings and their officials in western Anatolia.
The Aim
Consequently, the present study endeavors to challenge and correct this misconception and
to offer a reappraisal of Greco-Persian relations in the fifth century BC. In order to do so I
suggest a different model for the power-dynamics between the Great Persian Kings and
their satraps. While the relations between the Persians and their subject nations had been
thoroughly explored,2 the extent of satrapal independence has been acknowledged but has
yet to be systematically studied.3 Accordingly, my primary goal is to explore and assess
the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the satrapal
capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian
heartland.
The Model
The model offered herein assumes that the satraps of western Anatolia had the prerogative
to effect foreign policy as long as it acted in accordance with the interest of the Great
Persian King. The satraps are envisioned as much more than obedient and unimaginative
administrators who blindly followed royal directives. On the contrary, those appointed by
the Persian King to administer the provinces were ambitious members of the Persian elite
who wielded great power, economically and militarily, and sought to win over and maintain
the King’s favor while promoting their own interests. The Great Persian Kings, on their
part, were far from indifferent in respect to the state of affairs in the provinces. As we shall
see, royal intervention, i.e. a scenario in which the Great King actively directed the
particulars of a certain action, occurred when the satrapal authorities proved to be
inadequate or incapable of solving a particular problem. Royal directives issued by the
Great King were to be followed without hesitation. But royal decrees, more often than not,
did not always specify the manner in which the Great King wanted a certain issue to be
resolved. The scenario in which a certain satrap received orders which entailed specific
aims but empowered the satrap to figure out how to accomplish his mission had been
termed by Waters as ‘applied royal directive’.4 This term can be used to explain
independent satrapal conduct at times when a royal directive was issued. Therefore,
satrapal initiatives could occur whether a royal decree was issued or not. Therefore, as long
as the tribute kept flowing and the King’s authority remained unchallenged, the satraps
enjoyed considerable leeway which enabled them to act independently.
The Approach
In order to substantiate the suggested model for King-satrap relations, I apply a novel
approach, one which places the satraps and their own particular viewpoint at the center.
Such an approach allows us to differentiate the satraps’ viewpoint from that of the Great
2

E.g. Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1990; Frei and Koch 1996; Frei 2001; Briant 2003; Fried 2004; Dusinberre 2013.
Cf. Grote 1852, 92, 290; Lewis 1977, 58; Weiskopf 1982, 41; Cook 1983, 176; Petit 1990, 168–69;
Hornblower 1994, 58; Dusinberre 2003, 4 n. 4; Allen 2005, 100; Cawkwell 2005, 153; Rung 2008, 33.
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King instead of treating them as similar if not identical. The view from the satrapal seats
at Sardis and Dascylium was very different from that of the royal court at Susa and
Persepolis. We should not forget that the Great Persian King ruled a gigantic kingdom
which stretched from the Indus Valley to western Asia Minor. The Persian Kings must
have been preoccupied with problems in other parts of their vast empire which were not
recorded by the ancient sources, and their attitude to events which occurred in the western
fringes of his vast domains was almost certainly different than that of officials who
governed these regions. It cannot be denied that the satraps shared similar goals with the
Persian central authorities, i.e. the Great King and those at the royal court who advised him
on matters of policy and strategy. Still, the local circumstances of each satrapy must have
created particular challenges which with the satraps had to grapple. Nevertheless, the Great
King had presumably little interest in or patience for a satrap who failed to fulfill his duties,
regardless of the conditions of his office.
The Western Satrapies
The validity of the suggested model is demonstrated by a thorough analysis of the conduct
of the satraps of western Anatolia in the fifth century BC. The Persian governors of the
western satrapies, i.e. Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia, had to cope with a particular
challenge. While western Anatolia was situated on the western fringes of the vast Persian
Empire, its coastal districts were inhabited by subject Greek communities which shared a
bond of kinship with the dwellers of mainland Greece. Interestingly, the ties of kinship
between the Asiatic and European Greeks were the main cause, or justification, for
interventions of the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia, which undermined Persian
authority in the region. As a result, the Persian governors of the western satrapies were
expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while containing incursions staged by mainland
Greeks with minimal support from the relatively unconcerned central authorities. Such
particular geopolitical circumstances encouraged and at times forced the satraps to become
more proactive by formulating and executing policies which were either independent or
elaborations of Persian royal policies. In essence, the distinct conditions of western
Anatolia provide us with an ideal case-study to examine King-satrap relations and the
extent of satrapal independence.
The Chronological Timeframe
The chronological purview of the present study spans from the foundation of the Persian
Empire by Cyrus the Elder to the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. Since the first
three chapters endeavor to delineate and define satrapal prerogatives and royal supervision
over the satrapies, it became necessary to utilize traditions which recount the history of the
Persian Empire from its inception. The decision to end the discussion in 404 BC stems
from the design to demonstrate a continuation in the attitude of the Persian central
authorities toward the western satrapies throughout the fifth century BC. Accordingly, the
last three chapters are devoted to the reign of a specific Achaemenid King, namely Xerxes,
Artaxerxes I, and Darius II. I argue that the failed attempt to subjugate mainland Greece
led Xerxes and his two immediate successors to abandon Persian imperialistic aspirations
in the west, a strategic decision which had a profound impact on the conditions in which
the satraps of western Anatolia operated. But the attempt of Cyrus the Younger to seize the
throne in 401 BC must have triggered a change in the attitude of Artaxerxes II toward the
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western satrapies. Therefore, since the rebellion of Cyrus constitutes an internal Persian
affairs which was not the product of the circumstances in western Anatolia, I decided to
end the present study before this watershed moment in Achaemenid history. Even still, I
do draw on events and episodes which fall well outside the stated chronological scope, but
it is done only in instances in which the particular historical context of the fourth century
is not dominant.
The Sources
The formidable source problem with which modern historians of the Achaemenid Empire
cope should also be addressed.5 Since there is no extant continuous Persian historical
narrative, if such ever existed, we are compelled to rely on other imperfect categories of
evidence. A good number inscriptions, which were commissioned by the Achaemenid
Kings and inscribed in Old-Persian, Elamite, and Akkadian, have been preserved. In
addition, we have at our disposal a rich archeological data, which derives primarily from
the palatial complexes at Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, Ecbatana, and the royal necropolis
at Naqsh-i Rustam. On the one hand, the Achaemenid royal proclamations, palaces, and
awe-inspiring tombs constitute and an invaluable source on Persian royal ideology. On the
other hand, there is little that that these monuments were used by the Achaemenid Kings
as a medium to disseminate royal propaganda. Therefore, we have to be cautious when
mining them for information. Furthermore, the available Achaemenid epigraphic record as
well as the relevant archeological discoveries reveal very little on satrapal prerogatives or
King-satrap relation.
The discovery of thousands of clay tablets inscribed in Elamite and Aramaic, better
known as the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury, has enabled the reconstruction of
Achaemenid imperial institutions, protocols, and practices, including the office of satrap.
The knowledge contained by the administrative documents found in Persepolis is
supplemented by additional private archives discovered in Babylonia, namely in the cities
of Babylon, Nippur, Sippar, and Borsippa, as well as papyri in Aramaic from Egypt,
especially the documents discovered at the site of the Jewish garrison of Elephantine.
While these documents, which record commercial transactions, allocation of resources, and
various other administrative interactions, reveal that the Persian imperial administration
exercised a high degree of control over the provincial periphery and as such are
indispensable for a better understanding of the interaction between the Persian authorities,
royal and satrapal, with the subject peoples, they offer little information on the extent of
satrapal authority and independence.
The biblical sources are also a useful source for Ancient Persia. The books of Ezra,
Nehemiah, I Esdras, Haggai, and Zechariah cover a considerable period of Persian
dominance in ancient Yehud. Accordingly, these sources allow us to learn how the Persians
were perceived by the Jewish community of Yehud and the manner in which the local
ruling class interacted with the Persian King and his representatives. But while the satraps
are mentioned on several occasions, the information that can be gleaned on their relations
with the Persian central authorities is fairly limited.
5

For a succinct survey of the extant sources on the Achaemenid Persian Empire, see: Wiesehöfer 1996, 7–
28.
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The Greek sources are by far the primary literary source on the Persian Empire. But
the image of the Persians in the ancient Greek traditions is predicted on prejudice, lack of
knowledge, and numerous misconceptions. Even the meaning of the term ‘satrap’ varies
from one source to the other,6 which underlines the limited knowledge of the ancient
Greeks when it came to Persian customs, traditions, and institutions. But despite these
shortcomings, any scholar who takes upon himself to study the history of Achaemenid
Persia is compelled to base his reconstruction on the testimony of the ancient Greeks.
Therefore, I follow Briant who suggests that “in reading the classical authors, we must
distinguish the Greek interpretative coating from the Achaemenid nugget of information.”7
But when seeking those nuggets of information, one must be cautious. In some
cases the information provided by the Greek sources is partially corroborated by non-Greek
accounts. But the similarities should not overshadow the differences, and it is necessary to
carefully evaluate not only the extent to which the Greek account constitutes a distorted
version of its Near-Eastern parallel but also the biases and limitations of the Near-Eastern
source itself. When an episode which is recounted by the Greek sources cannot be
corroborated by a non-Greek parallel, several factors must be taken into consideration: (1)
the subject matter of the discussed episode, (2) the temporal proximity of the author to the
event which he recounts, (3) the manner in which the author could have obtained
knowledge on Persian matters, and (4) how the particular perspective and biases of the
author may have distorted his account. For instance, Herodotus may have conversed with
several witnesses who shared their own knowledge on Persian matters, while Xenophon
had the opportunity to learn much about Persian institutions and customs when he
accompanied the pretender Cyrus the Younger. But both authors provide extensive and
fanciful accounts on the upbringing, rise to power, and reign of Cyrus the Elder. Therefore,
it seems best to assess the historicity of any given episode on the basis of the
aforementioned considerations and to adopt a minimalistic interpretation when the account
seems probable but external validation is lacking. Fortunately, since I focus on the western
satrapies, the information that can be gleaned from the biased Greek sources on the deeds
and exploits of the satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia is considerably more reliable
and could be validated, in some case, by non-Greek traditions.
It should also be noted that the Greek authors show a general tendency to ascribe
agency to the Great Persian Kings whenever the Persians assumed an active role in the
events which they recounted. The ancient Greeks, mainly due to their Hellenocentric
perspective and limited understanding of the power dynamics between the Great King and
the satraps presupposed that any Persian action was the outcome of a royal directive.
Therefore, it is imperative, on the one hand, to tread carefully when consulting the Greek
traditions and to be mindful of the agendas, biases, and intentions of each Greek author as
well as the historical, political, and cultural contexts in which he composed his account on
Persian affairs. On the other, when the King is mentioned, one must examine the evidence

6

On the various terms employed by the ancient Greek authors to designate the satraps, see: Schmitt 1976,
379–83; Weiskopf 1982, 5–12; Petit 1990, 15–20; Tuplin 1987a, 114 with n. 22; Klinkott 2005, 28–37;
Dusinberre 2013, 34–35.
7
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available to discern whether the King is mentioned since he was actually involved in the
discussed episode or because the Greek author assumed that he was.
Summary
I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand
reform initiated by Darius I. This massive overhaul of the imperial administration, I argue,
was a response to the chaos which engulfed the Persian Empire in the early years of Darius’
reign and was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative
infrastructure. The new measures applied by Darius had a profound impact on the power
dynamics between the Great King and his satraps, since the aforementioned reforms were
also aimed at ensuring satrapal fidelity.
In the following chapter I demonstrate that the Persian central authorities invested
considerable resources and manpower in monitoring the satrapies. The Great Persian King
kept a close eye on the state of affairs in the provinces through various means, e.g. the
presence of military and civic officials of royal status in the satrapal courts and key strategic
locations, regular inspections of the satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy agents,
and a network of royal informants. These measures facilitated a flow of reliable
information from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the
satrapies and allowed to Persian King to know whether royal directives were followed or
not. The royal mechanism of provincial supervision enabled early detection of any signs of
insubordination not only among the subject nations but also among the satraps.
In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility, and
resources. The overarching aim of the chapter is to obtain a better understanding of the
Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and the categories by which satrapal
performance was evaluated. By establishing the standard point of reference by which
satrapal conduct can be compared and assessed, we can explain (1) why a certain satrap
preferred a specific course of action or policy over another and (2) why the consequences
of such actions were perceived as failure or success by the Persian royal authorities. In
essence, I conclude that a satrap who wanted to garner and preserve royal favor had to
maintain the peace, protect the King’s land, keep the tribute flowing, and pay the soldiers
and administrators serving in his domain. In order to fulfill these duties, the satraps were
furnished with considerable financial resources in addition to substantial civic and military
manpower.
After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial
governors and the nature of the office of satrap have been analyzed, I begin a diachronic
scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on two
opposing processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western
satrapies. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century
BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the
affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Ionian brethren. On the other hand, Xerxes’ failure
to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward
expansion to a policy of entrenchment. Consequently, the satraps of western Anatolia were
expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while grappling with incursions staged by mainland
Greeks with minimal support from the disinterested Persian central authorities.
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The focus of chapter five revolves around the continuation of the Achaemenid royal
policy of disengagement in respect to the state of affairs in the west during the reign of
Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC). The limited nature of the Great King’s responses to the
Athenian involvement in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign
demonstrates that Artaxerxes’ interest in western Anatolia continued to be confined to the
issues of peace and tribute. Moreover, I argue that the conclusion of the peace treaty
between Athens and Persia in 449 BC (the so-called Peace of Callias), which is envisioned
as an unofficial agreement, resulted in a modus vivendi in western Anatolia. The truce
between the Great Persian King and the Athenians endured throughout the reign of
Artaxerxes I, albeit the attempts of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, to exploit political
rivalries in several Ionian city-states to increase his influence, and small scale Athenian
incursions.
In the sixth and final chapter I argue that the detachment of the Persian royal
authorities of to the affairs of western Anatolia in the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I
provided the satraps with considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies which
were either independent or elaborations of Persian royal policies. I maintain that the limited
scope of Persian royal interventions in Greek affairs serves as an indication that King
Darius II, just like his predecessors, was unconcerned in regard to the western frontier of
his empire. Accordingly, I demonstrate that the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes,
Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger, who inserted themselves into Greek politics by
promising to provide financial assistance to the Peloponnesians in their war against the
Athenians, were satrapal initiatives through and through.
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1. THE REFORMS OF DARIUS I
The Achaemenid Empire came into existence through the conquests of Cyrus the Great.
The ancient sources, however, name Darius I, son of Hystaspes, as the great reformer who
consolidated the Empire and devised its administrative apparatus. But this grand reform
occurred only after Darius eliminated his immediate rival Gaumāta, whether the true
brother of Cambyses or not, and ruthlessly suppressed numerous rebellions in the core
regions of the empire.8 In what follows I demonstrate that the massive overhaul of the
imperial mechanisms was the outcome of Darius’ struggle for supremacy and that it had a
profound impact on the power dynamics between the Great King and his satraps. More
importantly, I argue that this pivotal and tumultuous period shaped and molded the nature
and character of satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives.

1.1 The Main Sources
The Account of Herodotus
The main source for the measures and regulations enacted by Darius is Herodotus. The
Halicarnassian historian ascribes the establishment of the imperial tributary system and
satrapal division to Darius, claiming that under Cyrus and Cambyses there had been no
fixed assessment of tribute.9 He then provides what seems to be a catalogue of satrapies
coupled with the enumeration of the annual tribute of each unit.10 There are, however,
many discrepancies between the Herodotean catalogue and the list of tributary peoples in
Darius’ Bisitun inscription.11 Therefore, the reliability of Herodotus’ Persian sources is at
least questionable.12 It has been suggested that Herodotus derived his information directly
from a written text of the Bisitun inscription rather than an oral tradition.13 This postulation
The main sources concerned with Darius’ rise to power are the famous Bisitun inscription, in which Darius
himself recounts the events which led to his accession, and the colorful report of Herodotus (3.61-87). Darius’
accession and the Gaumāta/Bardiya/Pseudo-Smerdis affair have received ample scholarly attention, e.g.:
Bickerman and Tadmor 1978; Wiesehöfer 1978; Balcer 1987; Dandamaev 1989, 83–113; Zawadzki 1994;
Briant 2002, 107–38, 895–97; Shayegan 2006. For the publications of the various versions of the Bisitun
inscription, see: Old-Persian: Kent 1950; Schmitt 1991; Elamite: Cameron 1960; Grillot-Susini,
Herrenschmidt, and Malbran-Labat 1993; Vallat 2013; Babylonian: Von Voigtlander 1978; Aramaic:
Greenfield and Porten 1982. See also the recent translation of Brosius (Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007,
528–37) and the comparative analysis of all versions of the Bisitun inscription of Bae 2001. Regarding the
spelling of Old-Persian names, I follow Schmitt 1991 and Schmitt 2000.
9
Hdt. 3.89.1-2.
10
Hdt. 3.88-97. It is widely held that Herodotus provides a list which represents a fiscal division into tributary
or taxation districts rather than political units. See: Toynbee 1954, 583–84; Hornblower 1982, 19 n. 108;
Graf 1985, 86–87; Balcer 1988, 1–2; Balcer 1989, 4; Stolper 1989b, 293; Descat 1989a, 79–80. In contrast,
Cook (1983, 77–81) assumes that the Herodotean catalogue contains satrapies in a political rather than a
fiscal sense.
11
DB §6/1.12-17. For a comparison between Herodotus’ catalogue of satrapies and the Lists of peoples in
Achaemenid royal inscriptions, see: Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 538–9 with references to previous
scholarly discussions.
12
For an analysis of the discrepancies between the Bisitun inscription and the account of Herodotus, see:
Dandamaev 1976, 135–44; Armayor 1978; Wiesehöfer 1978, 115–22; Balcer 1987; Briant 2002, 99–101,
895–96.
13
Dandamaev 1976, 123; Köhnken 1978, 39–42; Balcer 1984, 3–4; Lewis 1985.
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is at least possible since copies of Achaemenid royal inscriptions were certainly in
circulation, as we know of two Neo-Babylonian copies of the Bisitun inscription that were
discovered on stelae in Babylon along with two fragmented Aramaic copies which were
found in the Jewish military colony of Elephantine in Egypt.14 Nevertheless, due to the
aforementioned discrepancies it is more likely that Herodotus obtained the information
recounted in the Bisitun inscription indirectly, relying on oral traditions conveyed by
informants who had access to official Achaemenid documents.15 A Persian exile named
Zopyrus might have constituted such a valuable source. This Zopyrus was the son of
Megabyzus, the Persian general who defeated the Athenians in Egypt,16 and grandson of
another Zopyrus, who aided Darius in his recapture of Babylon. 17 The younger Zopyrus,
as reported by Herodotus,18 fled to Athens, probably because he had joined his father’s
rebellion against Artaxerxes I.19 If a high ranking member of the Persian elite such as
Zopyrus was willing to share his own experience and knowledge with Herodotus, it
probably enhanced Herodotus’ accuracy in regard to Persian matters, 20 assuming that
Herodotus’ critical capacity drove him to utilize all of the available sources to produce a
more reliable account of Darius’ rise.21
The Account of Darius in Bisitun
In any case, the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius but preceded his accession.
Two satraps are mentioned in the Bisitun inscription,22 and the overall impression is that
these officials were already in office when Darius seized the throne, and had dutifully
followed Darius’ directives in squashing the many uprisings against Persian rule. We are
also informed that Hystaspes, the father of Darius, suppressed a revolt in Parthia,23 and it
is possible that his actions against the rebel forces were probably because of his capacity
as the satrap of the region.24 This assumption is partially corroborated by Herodotus, who
states that when Darius joined the conspiracy against the Magi, Hystaspes was the ὕπαρχος
of Persis, a designation which, in this instance, denotes a satrap.25 Similarly, Nicolaus of
Damascus, who probably derived his information regarding Eastern affairs from the
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For the copy of the Bisitun inscription found in the form of a fragmentary stele in Babylon, see: Seidl 1999.
For the Aramaic copy found in Elephantine, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982. The wide circulation of the
text of Bisitun inscription is noted by Darius himself (BD §70), who says that the text of the inscription was
copied onto clay tablets and parchment for the purpose of distribution. Shortly before (BD §60-61) Darius
encourages his reader to spread the content of the inscription among his subjects.
15
Balcer 1987, 22; Briant 2002, 896; Tuplin 2005, 236 with n. 47.
16
Thuc. 1.109.3-4.
17
Hdt. 3.150-159.
18
Hdt. 3.160.
19
Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §45.
20
Burn (1984, 109) believes that Zopyrus was Herodotus’ main source for Persian affairs.
21
For a recent assessment of Herodotus’ account on Persian matters, see: S. R. West 2011; Rollinger 2012.
22
DB §38/3.13-14 (Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria); DB §45/3.55-6 (Vivanā, the satrap of Arachosia).
23
DB §35/2.92-8.
24
Koch 1993, 33–34; Briant 2002, 926.
25
Hdt. 3.70.3. For Herodotus’ usage of the term ὕπαρχος to designate satraps, see: Tuplin 1987a, 127–28;
Tuplin 1987c, 184; Petit 1990, 17; Klinkott 2005, 25–26.
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account of Ctesias,26 states that Cyrus appointed Darius’ father, whose name was Artadates,
as the satrap of all the Persians.27 In addition, Herodotus names two additional satraps who
were appointed by Darius’ predecessors, Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, who was appointed
by Cyrus,28 and Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, who was appointed by Cambyses.29
Therefore, it seems almost certain that the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius
but predated his rise to power.

1.2 The Reformation of the Tributary System
Darius’ Primacy
Darius’ primacy in the establishment of the imperial tributary system is asserted by a slew
of ancient sources.30 As mentioned above, Herodotus claims that Darius was the first to
exact tribute according to a fixed assessment.31 Polyclitus of Larissa, a historian who
flourished in the fourth century BC, states that Darius was the first to exact tribute.32
According to Plato, it was Darius who divided the Achaemenid Empire into seven parts
and regulated the collection of tribute.33 Similarly, Polyaenus claims that Darius was the
first Great King to impose taxes on the subject nations and casts Darius as a moderate and
just monarch who, after the taxes had been collected by the satraps, gave back half of the
sum to his subjects.34 Lastly, according to the Chronicon Paschale, a work dated to the
first half of the seventh century AD, Darius was the first to impose tribute.35

26

Cf. Jacoby 1926, 251; Wacholder 1962, 67; Drews 1974, 391; Bigwood 1976, 5 with n. 17; Bigwood 1980,
196 n. 9; Stronk 2007, 29–31; Stronk 2010, 73–84.
27
Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F66 §10.
28
Hdt. 3.120.1.
29
Hdt. 4.166.1.
30
The terminology used in Greek sources for tribute is somewhat nuanced. The term φόρος denotes tribute
paid by subjects (as a collective) to a ruling state which constitutes an acknowledgment of submission. The
designation δασμός signifies a compulsory payment, e.g. taxes, which was usually imposed by a certain
authority upon individuals for public purposes. ταγή should be understood as a stipulated amount which is to
be delivered. The Old-Persian term for tribute is baji, which is defined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1998, 23)
as the ‘King’s share’, a definition which comprises (1) taxes for the maintenance of Persian officials and
garrisons in the satrapies and (2) tribute and gifts, which were addressed to the Great King. Waters (2014,
99) adds that tribute may include additional elements such as troop levies for satrapal or royal armies.
31
Hdt. 3.89.3.
32
FGrH 128 F3a [=Strabo 15.3.21]: τὸν δὲ διατάξαντα τοὺς φόρους Δαρεῖον εἶναι. Polyclitus also provides
an elaborate description of the ways in which the Achaemenids stored the collected revenues.
33
Pl. Leg. 696c-d: καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὃν ὑπέσχετο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει. Plato adds that
Cyrus had made a promise to regulate the tributary system but apparently failed to fulfill his promise. Thus,
I agree with Tuplin (1987a, 140) who states that in spite of the fact that Plato is not as explicit as Herodotus,
he implies that Darius was responsible for the first tribute assessment in the history of the Persian Empire.
34
Polyaen. Strat. 7.11.3. A similar tradition is recorded by Plutarch (Mor. 172f), who claims that Darius
summoned the senior officials in the provinces (τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἐπαρχιῶν), presumably the satraps, and
asked them whether his tribute assessment was fair. After they replied that it was a moderate demand, he
ordered them to reduce it by half.
35
Chronicon Paschale [=Dindorf 1832, I 272]: Δαρεῖος φόρους ἔταξεν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις πρτῶρος.
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The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cyrus the Great
In spite of the dominant tradition which claims that Darius was the first to impose tribute,
there is considerable evidence that a tributary system existed under Cyrus.36 In the famous
Cyrus Cylinder, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire claims that while in Babylon he
received tribute from the kings of all the subject nations,37 and as such indicates that a
tributary system was in effect before the reign of Darius. 38 But a different interpretation
can be made in respect to Cyrus’ claim when taking into consideration the Babylonian
context. For instance, Harmatta points out that the royal protocol employed by Cyrus and
the titles he claims for himself rely heavily on the traditions and royal ideology of his
Babylonian predecessors, especially Ashurbanipal.39 Moreover, Kuhrt maintains that the
physical shape, the literary genre of Mesopotamian building text and the tradition of royal
inscriptions, all position the Cyrus Cylinder well within Babylonian tradition.40
Accordingly, Tuplin convincingly argues that Cyrus presented himself as the king of
Babylon, and that his demand for universal acknowledgment, which was articulated
through the payment of tribute, followed a preexisting Mesopotamian tradition.41
Another source which attributes such a system to Cyrus is Xenophon. The Athenian
historian credits Cyrus not only with the establishment of the tributary system but also with
the appointment of satraps and garrison commanders, the setting of customary etiquette of
both royal and satrapal courts, the institution of a royal inspection service and the
establishment of the famous relay postal service.42 To ward off any doubts that Cyrus was
the founder of the Achaemenid imperial apparatus, Xenophon declares time and again that
the numerous institutions and regulations which were established by Cyrus were still in
effect in his own time.43 In spite of Xenophon’s confidence regarding the role of Cyrus in
the establishment of the various imperial institutions, his claim is probably far from
accurate. First of all, Xenophon himself reluctantly acknowledges the possibility that the
sources which claim that the present regulations go all the way back to Cyrus might be
36

The Achaemenid taxation and tribute system, of course, was not an ex nihilo creation, but rather relied
heavily on preexisting Near Eastern traditions and practices. On the forms of taxation the Persians inherited
from their imperial predecessors, see: Zaccagnini 1989a; Zaccagnini 1989b.
37
Cyrus Cylinder, lines 29-31. For the Babylonian text, See: Schaudig 2001, 550–56; Finkel 2013. English
translations: Brosius 2000, no. 12; Kuhrt 2007, no. 3.21.
38
Ehtécham 1946, 92.
39
Harmatta 1971.
40
Kuhrt 1983, 88–9.
41
Tuplin 1987a, 140.
42
Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1-16. It should be added that Xenophon (Cyr. 8.1.9.) states that Cyrus appointed the taxcollectors as well.
43
Reisert (2009, 307–8) complied a catalogue of Achaemenid institutions and practices which Xenophon
claims to have been innovations of Cyrus the Elder and endured until his own days: the equipment of the
Persian cavalry (Cyr. 7.1.46); the usage of scythe-bearing chariots (Cyr. 6.1.30, 7.1.47); golden eagle with
outspread wings as the mark of the Great King (Cyr 7.1.4); the employment of eunuchs as the King’s
bodyguard (Cyr 7.5.70); the obligatory presence of courtiers at the royal court (8.1.6, 26); a daily sacrifice to
the gods directed by the Magi (Cyr. 8.1.23-4); the custom in which the King’s favorites sat closest to him at
the table (Cyr. 8.4.5); the custom in which the King gives a portion of his food to his favorites (Cyr. 8.2.4);
the royal practice of giving with extreme generosity (Cyr. 5.21, 8.2.7); the procession from the royal palace
(Cyr. 8.3.34); the appointment of garrison commanders in the satrapies (8.6.4); the establishment of a yearly
inspection of the satrapies (Cyr. 8.6.11-16).
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wrong.44 Second, the historicity of Xenophon’s account on the upbringing and exploits of
Cyrus is doubtful. Since Cyrus is presented as a wise and just king, who was deeply
concerned with the wellbeing and prosperity of his subjects, several scholars have argued
that Xenophon fashioned a Greek model of ideal kingship, even at the expense historical
accuracy.45 Therefore, Xenophon was probably more inclined to cast Cyrus as the founder
of the Empire and author of its institutional regulations, whether it was true or not.46
Further evidence can be found in Arrian’s Indica. The Nicomedian historian reports
that the Indians paid tribute to Cyrus.47 This seems to be an explicit attestation that tribute
was exacted by Cyrus. Arrian’s account, however, is dubious since the Achaemenid
conquest of the Indus valley took place during the reign of Darius.48
The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cambyses and Bardiya
In the case of Darius’ immediate predecessors, Herodotus seems to contradict himself when
he notes that Cambyses imposed tribute on the Libyans and Cyreneans and even demanded
gifts,49 and that the usurper Bardiya, upon his accession, proclaimed that all of the subject
nations were exempt from tribute and military service for a period of three years. 50 These
attestations seem to establish once again that an Achaemenid tributary system existed
before the rise of Darius.51
Solving the Discrepancy: Revision rather than Creation
How could one resolve the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding the identity of the
founder of the Achaemenid tribute system? Herodotus’ lack of consistency might reflect
two separate traditions that found their way into his account,52 and it is possible that later
sources ascribed the imposition of tribute to Darius simply because they followed the more
explicit tradition in Herodotus’ account.53 Be that as it may, the apparent discrepancy can
be resolved by envisioning the emergence of a tributary system as the result of a long
Xen. Cyr. 8.6.16: κατενοήσαμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὅτι Κύρου κατάρξαντος, ὥς φασι, καὶ νῦν ἔτι διαμένει.
On the aspect of ideal kingship in the Cyropaedia, see: Knauth 1975, 8–31; Due 1989, 147–84; Gera 1993,
280–300; Mueller-Goldingen 1995, 195–200; Nadon 2001, 26–27, 131–32; Gruen 2011, 53–54; Tuplin 2013,
68–69.
46
Tuplin 1987a, 140; Petit 1990, 107–8. Conversely, Briant (2002, 62–63) suggests that the Achaemenid
institutions described by Xenophon may have been a timeless outline of the imperial apparatus and as such
could be attributed to the actions of Cyrus the Elder.
47
Arr. Ind. 1.3: καὶ φόρους ἀπέφερον Κύρῳ τῷ Καμβύσεω ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφῶν, οὓς ἔταξε Κῦρος.
48
Tuplin 1987a, 140. The Indians (Sind) are absent from the catalogue of nations in the Bisitun inscription
(DB §6/1.12-17), but they begin to appear regularly in later inscriptions (DPe §2/17-18, DSe §24, DMa §10,
and DNa §25). Darius’ Indian campaign is mentioned by Herodotus (4.44), and Briant (2002, 140) suggests
518 BC as the year in which the Indus Valley was subjugated by the Achaemenids, though he notes that it is
unknown whether Darius himself led the expedition.
49
Hdt. 3.13.3, 4.165.
50
Hdt. 3.37.3.
51
Ehtécham 1946, 92–93.
52
Tuplin 1987a, 141.
53
For instance, Petit (1990, 104) argues that this is exactly the case in regards to the reports of Polyaenus and
the Chronicon Paschale. This argument is somewhat problematic since the later sources contain content
which is absent from Herodotus’ account. It is possible that this additional information is the product of
embellishment or rationalization, but it remains equally possible that there were other independent and now
lost sources who credited Darius with the consolidation of the imperial mechanism.
44
45
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process rather that a creation ex-nihilo. Cyrus, it should be noted, forged a new political
entity in a relatively short time span. His new domain constituted an amalgam of NearEastern kingdoms (e.g. Media, Babylon) in addition to numerous other regions, each with
its own preexisting domestic traditions, inter alia the obligation of royal tribute. The
subject nations probably acknowledged the supremacy of the Persian Great King by paying
tribute, but they may have done so according to the various local customs.54 Consequently,
some have argued that up until the reign of Darius, the Achaemenids received unregulated
gifts rather than tribute in the form of precious metals,55 while others have claimed that the
tribute exacted by the Persians consisted of both gifts and taxes.56
If that was the case, it is reasonable that Darius was remembered as the creator of
the tributary system because it underwent large scale reforms during his reign. Cook
suggests that there must have been “some fiscal innovation” in the reign of Darius, though
he provides no explanation regarding the nature of such innovation.57 Tuplin argues that
Darius’ main contribution was in asserting uniformity between the various districts of the
empire by setting a fixed assessment of tribute.58 This interpretation is shared by Briant,
who adds that this action led Herodotus to claim that Darius was the first to establish a
tributary system.59 Similarly, Sancisi-Weerdenburg claims that Darius brought into effect
a shift from “an economic system as 'embedded' in personal relations under Cyrus and
Cambyses” to “a more 'economic' form.”60 In sum, it seems likely that later sources
inaccurately acknowledged Darius as the founder of the tributary system rather than the
first Achaemenid King who regulated the tribute and imposed uniformity.
The notion that Darius’ reign was marked for its revision of the tributary system is
corroborated by a colorful comment made by Herodotus. On the basis of his anonymous
Persian sources, Herodotus claims that while Cyrus received the epitaph ‘father’ (πατήρ)
and Cambyses was branded as ‘despot’ (δεσπότης), Darius was known as the ‘shopkeeper’
(κάπηλος).61 How can we explain the origin of Darius’ reputation? Burn suggest that
Darius’ awareness to economic matters was detrimental to his reputation among the
Persians.62 Similarly, Tuplin claims that the term suggests an unfavorable view of Darius,
since it equates the reciprocal relationship between a king and his subjects to a process in
which the king sells something to his clients, possibly protection, in exchange for a fixed
price.63 Conversely, Olmstead maintains that this moniker indicates that the Greeks
perceived Darius as an excellent financier.64 A more neutral interpretation is offered by
Wallinga, who maintains that the Greeks deemed the negotiations between Darius and the
54

Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980, 173; Wiesehöfer 1987, 120; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130.
Junge 1941, 5; Tuplin 1987a, 140.
56
Murray 1966, 150; Dandamaev 1976, 135; Wallinga 1984, 411.
57
Cook 1985, 271.
58
Tuplin 1987a, 140.
59
Briant 2002, 60.
60
Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130–3 with n. 5.
61
Hdt. 3.89.3: λέγουσι Πέρσαι ὡς Δαρεῖος μὲν ἦν κάπηλος, Καμβύσης δὲ δεσπότης, Κῦρος δὲ πατήρ, ὃ μὲν
ὅτι ἐκαπήλευε πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ὁ δὲ ὅτι χαλεπός τε ἦν καὶ ὀλίγωρος, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἤπιός τε καὶ ἀγαθά σφι
πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο.
62
Burn 1984, 108.
63
Tuplin 1997, 374–82.
64
Olmstead 1948, 185.
55
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subject peoples regarding the final assessment of tribute equal to the commercial
interaction between a trader and a client.65 In a similar fashion, Descat postulates that
Darius was envisioned as a shopkeeper because he gave value to tribute, i.e. he monetized
the tributary system.66 In any case, Tuplin connects Darius’ reputation to his reforms by
stating that “the description of the king as a kapêlos is probably sufficiently striking and
unexpected to guarantee that it is a response to a real perception of change.”67 Moreover,
since this tradition groups Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius while differentiating their reigns
by particular attributes, it seems plausible, as Briant concludes, that though the
establishment of the Achaemenid administrative apparatus is ascribed to Darius, one
should recognized that he was building on the efforts of Cyrus and Cambyses, who created
a system which combined the various local traditions of the subject nations.68
The Causes for Darius’ Reform of the tributary system
One wonders why such a reform was needed. Dandamaev argues that prior to Darius’
reforms taxes were exacted, whether in kind or coin, without taking into consideration the
economic potential and output of the fiscal districts. A disproportional burden of taxes
inevitably resulted in discontent among the subject nations. Dandamaev even posits that
the aforementioned exemption from tribute and military service granted by the usurper
Bardiya was not a pure act of demagoguery. While there is no doubt that the rival of Darius
sought ways to garner support by generous benefactions, the substantial tax relief could
have been motivated by a desire to alleviate tax-related dissent among the subject
peoples.69 Similarly, Wallinga suggests that the above mentioned flaw in the tributary
system was identified by Cambyses, who sought, apparently without success, to monetize
the tributary system by attaching cash value to gifts presented as tribute.70
Therefore, the available evidence render it plausible that a tributary system existed
before Darius, a system that was inefficient. The actions of Cambyses and Gaumāta to
enact reforms probably encountered a certain degree of resistance and were probably
incomplete when Darius rose to power. It seems that, as Tuplin states, it was up to Darius
to find a more permanent solution to ensure economic and political stability.71
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Wallinga 1984, 411.
Descat 1989a, 80. In a later study Descat (1994) adds that Darius’ reputation as a retailer signifies that he
was perceived as someone who extracted profit from an operation of exchange.
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Tuplin 2011a, 53.
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Briant 2002, 62.
69
Dandamaev 1976, 134–35. This act was not a novelty since, as Wiesehöfer (1989, 184) points out, Gaumāta
could have followed a preexisting royal custom in which the new king demonstrated his benevolence by
waiving all debts owed to his predecessor.
70
Wallinga 1984, 409–10. The monetization of the tributary system entailed a particular challenge. As
outlined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989a, 131–41), there are two aspects of gifts given as tribute. The first is
the obligatory character, which is common with tribute paid in precious metals and possibly with gift-giving,
while the other is the social value attached to the gift itself, which is absent when taxes are paid in cash. In
other words, the monetization of the tribute system meant that the social value of the tribute was lost. The
strongest attestation for gifts being given to the Great King as tribute are the reliefs in Persepolis, cf.: Walser
1966, 20–26; Root 1979, 282–84; Cahill 1985. For further reading, see: Briant 2002, 191–94, 932; J. L.
Wright and Hollman 2014.
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Wiesehöfer 1989, 184.
66

15
When did Darius’ Reform Took Place?
Another important aspect of Darius’ reforms is the date in which the aforementioned
regulations were brought into effect. Scholar have offered several suggestions in regard to
the date in which the reforms began has been made, e.g. 520 BC, 72 519 BC,73 and 518/17
BC.74 But despite the disagreement regarding the exact date in which the reforms were
initiated,75 it is widely acknowledged that their implementation took several years.76 This
interpretation has been elaborated by Balcer who argues that Darius put into motion an
extensive reorganization program which began in 519 BC and went through a process of
development and change. He adds that the unique circumstances in each regions resulted
in a different pace in which the new regulations were applied. For instance, Balcer argues
that in Egypt the application of Darius’ reforms was completed in 503 BC and only three
years later in Babylon, while the organization of the satrapy of Lydia was completed only
in 493 BC, in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt.77 Though it is difficult to assess when
Darius’ reforms began and the dates when they were finalized in the numerous satrapies,
it seems reasonable to assume that it was indeed a long process.
Darius as the First and Only Reformer
Darius is not only the first but also the last Achaemenid King who is known for executing
a large scale overhaul of the imperial apparatus.78 Accordingly, it is possible that the
Achaemenid administrative apparatus, both the tributary and satrapal system, which was
set up or at least reorganized by Darius endured until the end of fifth century BC and
perhaps even until the end of the Achaemenid Empire.79 Even though we have ample
evidence that the satrapal territorial division underwent continuous changes and that
taxation systems in certain regions were reformed,80 these modifications occurred on a
local scale, were probably the outcome of domestic circumstances, and were by no means
a part of a grand reform on the imperial level.81 The notion that Darius’ imperial machinery
long endured is accepted by Petit, who points out that though later sources might evoke
72

Petit 1984, 35–46; Petit 1987; Petit 1990, 108–9.
Dandamaev 2005, 271.
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Poebel 1939, 121–31; Junge 1941, 5 n. 3.
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contemporary conditions when describing the institutions of the Persian Empire, some
traits reflect earlier times.82 Consequently, the Achaemenid tributary system and probably
the imperial administrative apparatus as a whole, after they had been refashioned and
reformed by Darius, saw only minor adjustments throughout the existence of the
Achaemenid Empire.
Conclusion
Despite the scarcity of evidence several points can be made in regard to the origins of the
administrative apparatus of the Persian Achaemenid Empire. First, a large scale reform was
initiated by Darius after he cemented his position as the new Great King and reasserted
order throughout the Empire. Second, Darius’ measures probably constituted a
reorganization on a grand-scale, whose implementation took a decade and perhaps even
more before it was finalized. Third, the application of the new regulations was gradual and
probably dependent on the various local traditions and customs, which offered different
degrees of resistance to the changes enacted by the Persian authorities. Fourth, a tributary
system of some capacity operated under Cyrus and Cambyses, but Darius introduced, or at
the very least, regulated the collection of tribute. Fifth, due to his effort to consolidate his
kingdom Darius was remembered as the reformer and consolidator of the Persian Empire.
This is definitely the case regarding the Greek traditions, and there is no reason to think
that it did not correspond with the Persian perspective.

1.3 Centralization of Power
The Unknown aspects of Darius’ Reform
As we have seen, the lack of uniformity and regulation rendered the Achaemenid tributary
system before the reign of Darius defective. These deficiencies, however, were resolved
by Darius who became known as the Great King to reorganize and consolidate the
institutions of the Achaemenid Empire. But are we to believe that such a grand operation
focused solely on the economic sustainability of the Achaemenid Empire? The
contemporary ancient sources make no explicit remark regarding further regulations and
measures employed by Darius. For instance, the Bisitun inscription and other royal
inscriptions commissioned by Darius do not mention Darius’ reforms. Nevertheless, a hint
can be found in Herodotus’ account, when the Greek historian admits that he glossed over
other issues which were pertinent to the reorganization of the Achaemenid Empire.83
Herodotus, so it seems, chose to focus on the satrapal division and the tributary system
while omitting additional aspects of Darius’ grand enterprise. Presumably, Darius
identified other defects and shortcomings in the imperial institutions and made the
necessary adjustments to rectify them. Despite the limitations of the ancient sources, these
supplementary measures can be reconstructed by taking into consideration the challenges
Darius faced during and after his struggle for supremacy. There is little doubt that the
numerous threats and challenges to Darius’ rule posed by powerful men, either local
dynasts or Persian satraps, made it apparent that a centralization of power was crucial not
only for the survival of Darius’ regime but also for the endurance of the Empire as a whole.
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When Darius was confronted with the threat of political fragmentation, he must have
realized that it was imperative to design a mechanism which would enforce obedience and
loyalty to the Great King.

1.4 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire I: Separatist Factions
The Rebel Kings
In spite of eliminating his main rival Gaumāta fairly quickly, Darius’ position as the new
Great King was far from secure. The succession war encouraged separatist sentiments
among the conquered nations, which resulted in multiple and at times simultaneous
rebellions led by those who proclaimed to be the descendants of the numerous dynasts and
kings deposed by Cyrus and Cambyses.84 Darius, with the assistance of his generals and
satraps, managed to suppress revolts in Persia (twice), Elam (thrice) Babylon (twice),
Media, Armenia, Sagartia, Parthia, Hyrcania, Margiana, and Arachosia.85 All in all, Darius
boasts that he defeated no less than nine kings who dared to stand against him.86 These
leading men must have had considerable influence within their respective domestic
political spheres, which allowed them to rally substantial support against Persian rule. It is
not unreasonable to assume that these local dynasts might have held some sort of position
within the imperial apparatus, perhaps as a reward for their willingness to cooperate with
the previous regimes of Cyrus and Cambyses. If that was that case, Darius must have
realized that conferring great power and influence upon non-Persians was too dangerous,
especially at times when the Persian central authorities were weak and vulnerable.
The Jewish Revolt against Darius
The dangers of relying on local dignitaries is recounted an expanded upon in the biblical
sources. By the power of a royal decree, issued by Darius no later than 520 BC, 87 a group
of Jewish exiles travelled to Achaemenid Yehud.88 The leaders of this expedition were
Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel and Joshua son of Yehozadak, the former was appointed as the
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civic governor, i.e. paḥat () ַּפחַּת, while Joshua was to preside as the High-Priest.89 Although
the seniority of Zerubbabel’s office remains ambiguous, it is certain that he was a Persian
appointee.90 Even more revealing is the fact that the identity of the High Priest was decided,
or at least sanctioned, by the Persian authorities.
The Jewish community in Jerusalem was reinvigorated by the new arrivals, and
soon after the building of the temple in Jerusalem commenced. The construction works,
however, were disrupted by Tatnai, the Persian governor of the satrapy Beyond-the-River
() ַּפחַּת ֲעבַּר נַּה ֲָרה. Tatnai, we are told, arrived with a cavalry squadron and a multitude of
infantry and tried to hinder the builders.91 The satrap demanded to know who sanctioned
the construction of the temple and who the overseers of the project were. 92 Since he was
unable to bring the works to a complete stop, Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to inform him
about the situation in Yehud. In response, the Jews dispatched an embassy of their own to
the royal court. When the Jewish ambassadors were given audience with Darius, they
claimed that they had the right to build the temple, stating that it was commanded by God,
and that a Jewish temple stood in that location many years before, having been built by the
great king of Israel, i.e. Solomon, though it was later destroyed by the Babylonians. The
Jewish representatives added that Cyrus himself gave his permission to the construction of
a new temple via a royal decree, and even promised to restore the golden vessels that were
robbed by the Babylonians. Darius, so it seems, was more impressed by the mention of
Cyrus’ name than the directive of the Jewish god or the history of the Jewish people. He
ordered his secretaries to locate Cyrus’ decree, and a copy was found in Ecbatana ()ַאחְמְתָא.
It corroborated the Jewish claim and Darius instructed his subordinates to facilitate a
speedy completion of the temple.93
In spite of the fact that the episode ends with Darius sanctioning the construction
of the temple, it had been suggested that the intervention of the Persian authorities was due
to a revolt led by Zerubbabel. It is quite possible that the Jewish community in Yehud, like
many other subject nations throughout the empire, recognized the apparent weakness of
the Persian central authorities and saw an opportunity to liberate itself from Persian rule.
Zerubbabel, a descendant of King David according to the biblical sources, seems like the
ideal candidate to exploit the chaotic circumstance surrounding the rise of Darius by
proclaiming himself as the legitimate king of Jerusalem.94
This hypothesis is predicated on three lines of argumentation. First, it has been
argued that the prophecies of Haggai (2.22-3) and Zechariah (4.9), which advocate the
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overthrow of kingdoms, should be interpreted either as a call for a revolt against the
Persians or as a universal call for political independence. As such, it does not reflect the
contemporary political background in Yehud.95 Since Haggai and Zechariah were zealous
supporters of the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem,96 the intervention of the Persian
authorities can be perceived as a response to subversive activities which were somehow
associated with the restoration of the religious and political center of the Jewish community
in Yehud.
Second, it is quite possible that the disorder that surrounded the construction works
in Jerusalem was due to seditious activity. We should not forget that despite being
accompanied by a considerable force, Tatnai was unable to bring the construction works
into a halt. Moreover, in his letter to Darius, Tatnai states that the project was formidable
and that the construction was proceeding quickly. This description seems to reflect a sense
of urgency and perhaps even anxiety due to the state of affairs in Jerusalem.97 In addition,
the Jewish ambassadors who were sent to Darius claimed that the temple was once built by
a king, in an era when Yehud was politically independent. This statement could be another
implicit indication of a Jewish attempt to overthrow Persian rule. Lastly, despite the
amicable response of the Persian central authorities, the temple was completed only in the
sixth regnal year of Darius, i.e. 515 BC. Such a delay may indicate that the project suffered
a considerable set back before it was finalized.98
Third, the involvement of Zerubbabel in anti-Persian activities can explain his
sudden disappearance of from the ancient sources. It has been suggested that Zerubbabel
vanished because he died of natural causes,99 or that he was assassinated by a priestly party
led by the aforementioned Joshua.100 But it seems likelier that he was eliminated by the
Persians or at least removed from office due after the Persian authorities heard rumors
about his role in the political unrest in Yehud.101
The amicable resolution of the tension in Yehud makes it difficult to assert with
certainty if an actual rebellion transpired in Yehud, its extent, and the manner in which it
was suppressed.102 If a revolt actually occurred, it seems that Darius preferred leniency,
either because he wanted to avoid being perceived as opposing the policies of Cyrus, the
founder of the Achaemenid Empire,103 or since he aimed at ensuring the future support and
obedience of the Jews.104 When taking into consideration the available evidence and the
contemporary political context, there are two plausible reconstructions. First, the
succession struggle had an impact on the state of affairs in Yehud, and rumors of subversive
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activities reached the satrapal court of Tatnai. Since the empire was engulfed with
rebellions, Tatnai acted swiftly to suppress a revolt which was still in an early stages.
Second, the disturbances in the construction of the temple might have been caused by an
administrative miscommunication between Tatnai and his subordinates. In the chaos that
followed Darius’ ascension, such misunderstanding seems understandable, as does the
relatively harsh reaction of the satrap. In any case, the confusion was easily resolved by
royal intervention.
In sum, the circumstances in Yehud seems similar to those in the regions which
revolted against Persian rule: the perceived weakness of the Persian authorities, the
presence of a local dignitary with royal blood, and a mild response of the Persian central
authorities to purported disobedience. All of these may have encouraged separatist
sentiments. But while the rebellions in the core regions are poorly documented, the
necessity of quelling multiple revolts must have taught Darius that if his reign was to
endure, his hold on the provinces must be tighter.

1.5 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire II: Powerful Satraps
Oroites, Satrap of Lydia
A real and immediate threat to Darius’ position as the new Great King was posed by
ambitious and powerful satraps who oversaw vast resources and exercised considerable
influence under Cyrus and Cambyses. The exploits and grim end of Oroites, the satrap of
Lydia who was reluctant to acknowledge Darius’ supremacy, demonstrate the dangers of
unchecked satrapal power.105
Insubordination I: Oroites’ Refusal to assist Darius
According to Herodotus, Oroites’ was reluctant to side with Darius in his war against the
Magi. When a royal envoy came to Sardis, carrying a message from Darius, Oroites
responded positively in public, but later on the satrap had the ambassador assassinated and
erased all traces of his treacherous deed.106 Herodotus’ account is not detailed and many
questions remain unanswered. For instance, Herodotus is silent about the content of Darius’
message. Tuplin points out that just before we are informed about the arrival of Darius’
ambassador at Sardis, Herodotus mentions the war between Darius and the Magi. He
maintains, therefore, that at this point the Magi were still in control and that Darius sought
Oroites’ assistance against them.107 Similarly, Immerwahr postulates that Darius asked
Oroites to come to Susa to participate in the conspiracy against the Magi.108 Others assume
that the struggle against the Magi and their supporters was already public, and that Darius
sought Oroites’ military support against rebel forces in Media and Armenia,109 or possibly

Hdt. 3.120.1. Herodotus employs the term Σαρδίων ὕπαρχος, a term which Herodotus uses to designate
satraps. Petit (1990, 41, 83) suggests that Oroites was the first satrap of Lydia, appointed in c. 545 BC after
the conquest of Asia Minor was carried out by Mazares (Hdt. 1.156-57, 160-61) and finalized by Harpagus
(Hdt. 1.162, 164, 168-71, 174-76). Conversely, Briant (2002, 351) posits that Oroites began his term in office
in 525 BC, i.e. under Cambyses.
106
Hdt. 3.126.1.
107
Tuplin 1997, 393.
108
Immerwahr 1966, 33 n. 57.
109
Burn 1985, 298.
105

21
in eastern Anatolia.110 Conversely, Burn and Petit speculate that Oroites, thinking that
Darius was still too weak to enforce his will, withheld taxes, and that Darius’ envoy came
to urge Oroites to renew the flow of tribute.111 Another suggestion was made by Briant,
who claims that Oroites was summoned to the royal court, an invitation which was meant
to test Oroites’ loyalty.112 All of the above mentioned explanations have one thing in
common, namely that Darius wished to obtain Oroites’ acknowledgment of his position as
the new Great King and support.113 When considering that Oroites exhibited deference in
public while ordering the assassination of the royal ambassador in secret, it seems evident
that Oroites was determined to oppose Darius, but, at least at this point, wished to refrain
from publicly defying him.
One wonders, then, why Oroites was unwilling to acknowledge Darius as his
superior. As mentioned above, the succession struggle have shaken the control of the
Persian central authorities in the Persian heartland and probably even more so in frontier
satrapies such as Lydia. Therefore, it is possible that when Darius’ envoy arrived, Oroites
had already made up his mind to secede and establish his own principality.114 Alternatively,
under the assumption that the whole Gaumāta affair is a product of Darius’ propaganda,
Vargyas argues that Oroites sided with Gaumāta, who was Cyrus’ son Bardiya and the
legitimate Great King against the usurper Darius.115 Either way, Oroites became a threat
from Darius’ viewpoint.
Insubordination II: Oroites and Mitrobates
Another possible act of defiance on Oroites’ part was the elimination of Mitrobates, the
high-ranking Persian official who governed Daskyleion. It is not clear whether it happened
before or after Oroites had Darius’ envoy murdered, since Herodotus simply notes that
Oroites took advantage of the tumult caused by the succession struggle and had Mitrobates
and his son Cranaspes assassinated.116 The problem with Herodotus’ account is that it
contains an anachronistic detail, namely the mention of the satrapy of Hellespontine
Phrygia, which did not exist as a separate administrative entity until the 470s BC.117 How
could Mitrobates govern a satrapy that did not exist in the last quarter of the sixth century
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BC? This anachronism led Petit to argue that Mitrobates was invented by Herodotus, but
in a more recent study he accepts that historicity of Mitrobates while maintaining that he
was not a satrap but a viceroy of Oroites.118 Vargyas adds that even if an anachronistic term
was used to designate the position of Mitrobates, it does not necessarily mean that he was
a figment of Herodotus’ imagination.119 Therefore, it seems prudent to follow Briant’s
injunction, namely that we should accept the possibility that extensive satrapies were
divided into smaller administrative units, even if there is no undisputed evidence for such
subdivision.120 In sum, Mitrobates was probably the chief official of an administrative subunit, whose center was in Daskyleion and a subordinate of Oroites.
But what drove Oroites to eliminate his underling? It has been suggested that the
assassination of Mitrobates facilitated the absorption of his domain into that of Oroites.121
But such a suggestion fails to realize that Mitrobates’ domain was already a part of Oroites’
satrapy. An alternative explanation is offered by Vargyas, who claims that while Oroites
sided with Gaumāta, Mitrobates joined forces with Darius, for which he was murdered.122
Alternatively, if Oroites was aiming at secession, Mitrobates might have been a victim of
his loyalty to the Great King since the rogue satrap must have sought ways strengthening
his hold over his satrapy by eliminating Persian officials who refused to profess their
loyalty. In any case, the seemingly unsanctioned murder of a fellow Persian nobleman and
his son must have been perceived as an act of defiance by Darius.
Insubordination III: Oroites and Polycrates
The episode in which Oroites eliminates the Samian tyrant Polycrates reveals another
possible aspect of Oroites’ pattern of insubordination. In essence, Herodotus reports that
the satrap of Lydia lured Polycrates to Magnesia under false pretenses, where the latter was
seized, tortured, and executed.123 Herodotus proposes two possible motives for Oroites’
actions against Polycrates. According to one of his sources, Oroites was taunted by the
above mentioned Mitrobates, who pointed out that while Oroites had failed to subjugate
Samos, Polycrates managed to do so with a force of fifteen hoplites.124 Alternatively,
Herodotus recounts an incident in which Polycrates, either on purpose or by accident,
offended Oroites by insulting the satrap’s envoy.125
Personal grudges, which are key in Herodotus’ account, probably played a minor
role in the downfall of Polycrates. Balcer argues that the elimination of Polycrates was a
preliminary step in an Achaemenid attempt to subjugate Samos and perhaps additional
islands in the Aegean.126 Indeed, the notion that under Cyrus and Cambyses the satraps
were expected to expand their domain through conquest is implied in the sarcastic remark
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of Mitrobates.127 Hence, it is possible that Oroites “slew Polycrates to prove himself a
worthy expansionist of the empire in the Persian tradition.”128 Since Samos was eventually
conquered by the Persians,129 it is reasonable that the actions of Oroites against Polycrates
were in accord with the expansionist Persian policy in the west.130
In contrast, the increasing power of the Samian tyrant may have led to his demise.
Herodotus claims that Polycrates aspired to establish his own thalassocracy by asserting
his dominance not only on the islands of the Aegean but also on the coastline of western
Anatolia, i.e. Ionia.131 Polycrates’ ambition is implicitly corroborated by Diodorus, who
says that several Lydians fled from Oroites’ grasp and found refuge in Samos, an insult
that provoked Oroites to seek ways to eliminate Polycrates. 132 Briant assumes that these
Lydians were in fact aristocrats who were unhappy with the overbearing policies of
Oroites.133 If that was the case, Oroites was acting as a dutiful satrap who was mindful of
the growing power of the adjacent Samian tyranny and sought ways to keep Polycrates’
power in check. The execution of Polycrates, therefore, was meant to protect Persian
interests in the west.134 If we accept that Oroites was aiming at blocking Samian expansion,
one wonders why the assassination of Polycrates is presented by Herodotus as a hasty act
of a proud, cruel and overly ambitious satrap. It is possible that even if Oroites got rid of a
dangerous neighbor his action was not sanctioned by Darius. As a result, he incurred the
hostility of the Great King, who deemed the Lydian satrap as too independent and perhaps
a potential challenger.135
There are several potential challenges to this interpretation. First, there is no record
for a Persian attempt to capture Samos after Polycrates was eliminated. Second, even if
Samos was ready to fall, it is difficult to believe that the subjugation of a single island at
the fringes of the gigantic Persian Empire disheartened Darius. Surely, the resources of the
former Lydian kingdom, which were at the disposal of Oroites, vastly overshadowed those
of Samos. Third, there is no mention of trouble in Lydia in the royal inscriptions
commissioned by Darius. This silence does not necessarily mean that all was quiet in the
west, but that any event that took place in Lydia was of minor importance. Moreover, the
silence of the official Persian records in regard to Oroites indicates that Herodotus had to
rely on alternative sources when seeking to recount the downfall of Polycrates.
Accordingly, since the reign of Polycrates was a formative period in Samian history, it is
more likely that Herodotus derived his information from Samian informants and traditions,
though he might have embellished his account during the process of composition.136
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Moreover, the portrayal of Oroites, as Vargyas convincingly argues, was shaped by
Herodotus’ focus on the murder of Polycrates and the desire to demonstrate that the Lydian
satrap committed additional crimes which led to his just demise.137 In other words,
Herodotus’ Samian sources and his literary intentions can explain the negative portrayal of
Oroites’ actions rather than Darius’ propaganda.
Polycrates as a loyal Persian vassal
An alternative suggestion stipulates that Polycrates was a Persian vassal rather than a threat
to Persian interests. This argument is predicated on the military contingents Polycrates
supplied to Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign.138 But how did Polycrates become a servant of
the Great King? Mitchell suggests that the ambitious Polycrates exploited the turmoil in
Ionia during the Persian conquest, as he managed to seize control of several islands in
addition to urban centers on the coastline, including Miletus. In the end, however, the
Persians were able to recapture the Ionian cities, thus curtailing Samian influence in the
region.139 Balcer adds that after his failed attempt to establish a thalassocracy, Polycrates
had no choice but to acknowledge Persian supremacy by paying tribute and supplying
military levies to the King’s campaigns. In exchange his tyranny was allowed to continue
under Persian suzerainty.140 Polycrates’ vassal status is implicitly corroborated by the
abrogation of the alliance between Samos and Egypt. According to Herodotus, an alliance
was forged between the Egyptian king Amasis and Polycrates,141 but it was soon dissolved
when Amasis, having noticed the good fortune of the Samian tyrant and dreading his
inevitable downfall, decided to end the alliance.142 Balcer, however, rejects Herodotus’
fanciful explanation for the sudden break between Egypt and Samos and argues that
Polycrates ended the alliance since Amasis became an enemy of the Persians. The new
state of affairs dictated that there could be no collaboration between a Persian vassal state
and a nation which was branded as an enemy of the Great King.143 Conversely, Rahe argues
that when Polycrates realized the magnitude of the Persian preparations for the imminent
expedition against Egypt, he defected to the Persian side.144 Either way, if Polycrates was
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in fact a vassal of the Great Persian King, his elimination by Oroites constituted a rebellious
act.145
The Resources of Oroites
The available evidence prevents us from reaching an irrefutable conclusion concerning the
motives and intentions of Oroites. Nonetheless, it is certain that the conduct of the satrap
of Lydia led Darius to contemplate and finally bring about his death. When taking into
consideration that Oroites was the overlord of a vast satrapy which comprised Phrygia,
Lydia and Ionia,146 it is only expected that any hint of insubordination on the satrap’s part
caused much anxiety at the royal court. To begin with, we are told by Herodotus that
Oroites had at his disposal 1,000 Persian soldiers,147 a fighting force which may have
constituted the core of the military contingents under his command, as the satrap was
probably able to levy troops from the numerous subject nations which dwelled within his
extensive domain.148 Next, Oroites’ military might was augmented by his access to
considerable funds. The revenue of the Lydian satrapy was relatively high. Lewis points
out that according to Herodotus (3.90), the income of Oroites’ domain constituted the 500
talents of the second nomos, and probably the greater part of the 400 talents of the first
nomos.149 Further implicit indication for the wealth of Oroites can be found in his ability
to deceive Polycrates by promising financial support for the tyrant’s ambitious endeavors.
The whole ruse is predicated on the notion that the satrap was, or at least had the reputation
of being, a man of considerable means.150 In the same vein, Diodorus mentions that the
Lydians who were displeased with the policies of Oroites, fled from Samos to Polycrates
and brought with them considerable wealth, so considerable that the tyrant had them
executed and their possessions confiscated.151 It is possible that it was the burden of taxes
which drove the wealthy individuals to seek asylum on Samos, which renders it possible
that Oroites had garnered extensive funds through taxation in the period which preceded
his elimination. Furthermore, if Oroites had stopped sending tribute to the royal treasury
while Darius was distracted by the numerous rebellions in the core satrapies, the satrap
may have been able to accumulate substantial wealth. Lastly, the succession struggle and
the suppression of multiple rebellions must have brought the military capacity of Darius
into a state of exhaustion.152 Hence, it should not come as a surprise that, as Herodotus
recounts, Darius was well aware of the considerable resources at Oroites’ disposable and
must have realized that the satrap of Lydia had the potential of becoming a formidable
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enemy if openly challenged.153 A failure in suppressing Oroites could have exposed Darius
as weak, which might have reignited multiple rebellions throughout the Empire.154
The Elimination of Oroites
But, as noted above, Oroites was himself reluctant to openly challenge Darius and preferred
to show deference in public while undermining Darius’ authority in secret. Nevertheless,
one can only assume that if Herodotus knew about the treachery of Oroites, so did Darius.
The hesitation of Oroites, so it seems, created the opportunity for Darius to ensnare the
rogue satrap. Herodotus reports that the Great King made an appeal to his loyal Persians,
asking for a volunteer to kill or capture the rebellious satrap. Thirty men stepped up, and
after lots were drawn, the task was given to Bagaius son of Artontes. 155 Shortly after
Bagaius arrived at the satrapal court in Sardis. Herodotus says that the King’s envoys
brought with him letters bearing the Great King’s seal which he ordered to be read out
loud, thus turning the Persians present at Oroites’ court against the satrap.156 The exact date
in which Oroites was eliminated is disputed, but it is widely agreed that it occurred before
Darius initiated his grand reform.157
The Shortcomings of Herodotus’ Account
Since Herodotus is our only source for Oroites’ exploits, it is difficult to assess his
reliability on this matter. Balcer, for example, deems Herodotus’ account as “confused and
historically unreliable and fitting more readily into his pattern of literary form and thought
rather than historical cause and effect.”158 Similarly, Wallinga concludes that we cannot
trust Herodotus in respect to Oroites’ motives in eliminating Polycrates or his policies
during Darius’ rise to power.159 These caveats are valid but should be qualified. As stated
above, the Polycrates episode is probably based on fairly reliable Samian sources and on
Herodotus’ familiarity with the history of western Anatolia. It is safe to assume, therefore,
that we have trustworthy information regarding the historicity of Oroites and the nature of
his office.160 Furthermore, though we can only speculate about the motives and aims of
Oroites and Darius, there is no reason to deem the account of the satrap’s actual deeds and
actions, along with the historical framework within which he operated as unreliable.
Explaining Oroites’ Absence from Bisitun
One of the main arguments that is used to undermine the historicity of the exploits of
Oroites as recounted by Herodotus is the absence of any trace of trouble in Lydia in the
Bisitun inscription. This argument is even more compelling when taking into consideration
that Darius included a report about the grim end of Âçina, a Persian rebel who had been
seized by his own partisans and delivered to Darius.161 Vargyas points out the similarities
between this Âçina and Oroites and wonders why Darius omitted another example which
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could have demonstrated the Great King’s capacity to garner loyalty and to eliminate
powerful challengers, thus enhancing his own prestige while deterring other ambitious
satraps from imitating Oroites.162 Several cogent solutions have been offered. Balcer claims
that Oroites is not mentioned in the Bisitun inscription due to Darius’ inability to suppress
the dissent in Lydia within his first regnal year, the chronological framework of the
inscription, and because the subjugation of Judah and western Anatolia was not as critical
as the pacification of the core regions of the Empire and the adjacent regions. 163 A
supplementary explanation is predicated on the fact that the Bisitun inscription deals
exclusively with vanquished rebels who proclaimed themselves as kings. Accordingly, the
rebellion of Oroites, a Persian satrap, did not fit into this category and was thus omitted.164
Conversely, it is possible that Darius omitted any mention of Oroites since he wished to
conceal the fact that he eliminated a highborn Persian and an old companion of Cyrus, a
problematic act for the new Great King who wanted to present himself as a legitimate ruler
rather than a usurper.165 All in all, though we cannot know with certainty why the
elimination of Oroites does not appear in the Bisitun inscription it should not be used as an
argument against the historicity of Herodotus’ account.
Conclusion
Whether Oroites was contemplating political independence or merely refused to
acknowledge Darius as the new Great King, his actions were clearly deemed by Darius as
subversive, and thus had to be dealt with. As such, the case of Oroites constitutes a
paradigmatic demonstration of the potential threat posed to the Great King’s authority by
powerful satraps. It is also an excellent example of how the King’s authority was restored
and upheld by royal representatives in the satrapal court.166 Although the dire consequences
of Oroites’ insubordination are evident, it seems that the solution employed by Darius was
based on Persian loyalty to the Great King rather than a preexisting mechanism of royal
control. Therefore, it seems likely that after Darius consolidated his power, the reforms
which he initiated included measures which were aimed at reducing satrapal power in order
to deter overly ambitious satraps, now and in the future, from challenging the Great Persian
King.167
Aryandes, Satrap of Egypt
Aryandes’ Initial Loyalty
Another satrap who defied Darius was Aryandes, the governor of Egypt. Like Oroites,
Aryandes was appointed by a predecessor of Darius I, this time Cambyses. 168 But unlike
his colleague, Aryandes chose to accept Darius as his new master. This is exemplified by
the fact that Aryandes suppressed an Egyptian uprising on Darius’ behalf. According to
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Polyaenus, it was the cruelty of Aryandes which drove the Egyptian to rebel, 169 but the
rebellion was brought to an end by Darius, who won back the loyalty of the Egyptians by
showing homage to the Apis Bull.170 While Polyaenus’ claims concerning the causes of the
Egyptian revolt and the manner in which it was suppressed cannot be corroborated, the
historicity of the rebellion is beyond any doubt. Egypt is listed among the rebellious nations
in Darius’ Bisitun inscription,171 and an Egyptian hieroglyphic text inscribed on the
naophorous statue of Udjahorresne mentions unrest in Egypt dated to the reign of Darius.
This inscription recounts the exploits and achievements of Udjahorresne, an Egyptian
courtier, scholar, and priest, who served the last two Egyptian kings, Amasis (570-526) and
Psammetichus III (526-525), and witnessed the Persian conquest. After Egypt lost its
independence, Udjahorresne managed to maintain his lofty position under Cambyses and
Darius I.172 Interestingly, Udjahorresne claims that during a great disaster, which affected
not only his nome but the entire land, he did whatever he could to save and protect his
compatriots.173 Though it has been suggested that Udjahorresne is referring to the Persian
invasion,174 Cameron points out that Darius is mentioned by Udjahorresne immediately
after he recounts the aforementioned hardships, and concludes that the calamitous event he
notes was therefore the rebellion recorded in the Bisitun Inscription.175
A number of suggestions have been made regarding the date of the Egyptian
uprising. Several scholars argue that the Egyptian revolt erupted in the winter of 522/1 BC,
when Darius was still scrambling to put down revolts in the Persian heartland.176 It seems
logical that the Egyptians, like many other subject peoples throughout the Persian Empire,
saw the apparent weakness of the Persian central authorities as an opportunity to liberate
themselves from Persian rule. Supposedly, the revolt ended sometime in 520 BC, after
Darius pacified the empire.177
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There is, however, a chronological difficulty in such a reconstruction. Darius’ visit
to Egypt is mentioned by Polyaenus (7.11.7), Herodotus (2.110) and Diodorus (1.58.4).
Polyaenus notes that Darius’ arrival happened at the same time as the death of the Apis
Bull. Coincidently, the Apis Stele commemorates the death and burial of the Apis Bull in
the fourth year of Darius reign, i.e. 518 BC.178 Hence, Darius probably came to Egypt in
518 BC, i.e. too late to subdue the uprising in person. Moreover, with the exception of
Polyaenus, the accounts of Darius’ visit to Egypt fail to mention any sort of disturbances,
while the actions of Darius in Egypt indicate that he aimed at cementing Persian rule due
to the recent uprising by exhibiting his deference to Egyptian traditions and customs.
Polyaenus emphasizes Darius’ piety by stating that the Great King promised to give a
hundred talents to the man who would produce a new Apis.179 Herodotus recounts how a
priest of Hephaestus refused to set up a statue of Darius in front of the statues of the
Egyptian king Sesostris and his wife, presumably since the Persian King, unlike his
Egyptian predecessor, had failed in his attempt to conquer Scythia.180 While Herodotus
remains silent regarding Darius’ response, Diodorus claims that Darius was pleased with
the honesty of the priest and asked to be judged again when he reached the age of Sesostris
and later on he even joined the Egyptian priests in learning about the ancient kings of Egypt
so he could imitate their righteous conduct.181 Even when Darius encountered resistance to
his directives, there is no sign for coercive measures.182 Furthermore, Tuplin argues that it
is difficult to believe that an Egyptian rebellion lasted until 518 BC and that such an event
was unknown to Herodotus.183 This problem can be resolved by accepting the possibility
that it was Aryandes rather than Darius who squashed the rebellion with the satrapal
contingents under his command.184
The Aryandic Coins
The loyalty of Aryandes was not everlasting. Herodotus recounts that the satrap of Egypt
lost Darius’ favor after he had minted coins of the purest silver, an imitation of the royal
daric, hence positioning himself as equal to the Great King.185 Shortly after, Herodotus
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claims that Darius had Aryandes executed on a different charge, namely that he rebelled
against his master.186 Nevertheless, several scholars argue that the elimination of Aryandes
is connected to the Aryandic coins. For instance, Milne maintains that Aryandes exploited
the fact that that ratio of silver to gold was thirteen to one throughout the Empire, but
significantly higher in Egypt. Therefore, Aryandes used his silver coins to purchase the
King’s golden darics, which he had melted and sold as bullion. As a result, the satrap made
a considerable profit. The problem was, Milne argues, that melting the King’s coins was
perceived as an act of treason, since Aryandes was mindfully destroying the royal figure
which was imprinted on the royal daric.187 Contrarily, it has been suggested that by minting
his own satrapal coins, which supposedly bore the satrap’s image rather than the King,
Aryandes incurred the animosity of Darius by usurping what was apparently a royal
prerogative. In addition, these coins, presumably fashioned according to Egyptian values,
weights, and designs, created unnecessary difficulties to the imperial financial system.188
Briant sums it up by stating that “the king wished to punish the excesses of a satrap who
had tried to become his rival in the very area Darius considered the defining characteristic
of his reign and his power.”189 Yet, the emphasis on the role the Aryandic coins played in
the execution of the satrap who minted them is problematic. Cameron observes that
according to Herodotus Aryandes was condemned to death not for minting satrapal coins
but for staging a revolt.190 Similarly, Tuplin maintains that the issuing of coins was not
necessarily beyond satrapal authority and was probably far from a critical matter from
Darius’ viewpoint, even if Aryandes imprinted his own image on the coins for selfglorification.191 It seems, therefore, that the connection between Aryandes’ satrapal coins
and his death as a traitor is fairly weak and probably coincidental.
The Libyan Campaign
An alternative explanation for the condemnation of Aryandes as a rebel was the supposedly
unsanctioned campaign the satrap launched against the Libyan Greeks. Herodotus recounts
how Arcesilaus III, who received Cyrene as a reward for his services to Cyrus and
Cambyses, was murdered by his political rivals in Barce. His mother Pheretime fled to
Egypt and asked Aryandes to avenge her son’s death, since, so she claimed, he was
murdered because of his loyalty to the Persians. Aryandes was convinced and soon after
he began gathering forces. Soon after, the Persians besieged Barce and eventually captured
it through trickery.192 Petit argues that Aryandes, in a similar fashion to Oroites’ attempt to
subjugate Samos, was expected to expand the territory of his satrapy with the resources at
his disposal.193 In fact, Herodotus notes that if the campaign had succeeded the Libyans
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cities would have been added to the empire or at least became tributary, which suggests
that Persian imperialism was the real driving force behind Aryandes campaign and that the
murder of Arcesilaus provided the pretext for Persian expansion.194
In contrast, several scholars have argued that the Libyan campaign was not
approved by Darius, and that its successful conclusion led Darius to deem Aryandes too
independent.195 There are, however, two objections to this interpretation. First, the success
of the rebellion was not as complete as it seems. Boedeker points out that while Pheretime
got her opportunity to exact vengeance against those who murdered her son,196 Aryandes’
forces were harassed by the Libyans on their return journey to Egypt. 197 It seems that
Persian authority was reasserted in Cyrene and its immediate environs, but the adjacent
regions remained independent.198 Second, Menecles of Barce notes that Pheretime not only
persuaded Aryandes to assist her but that she also acquired an army from the King.199 While
it is highly unlikely that Pheretime travelled to the royal court, the mention of the King
may imply that he sanctioned the campaign.
When Was Aryandes removed?
The available evidence does not allow us to conclude whether it was the Aryandic silver
coins, the allegedly unsanctioned Libyan expedition, or some unknown event which led to
the unnatural death of Aryandes. We only know that Aryandes was charged and executed
for unknown subversive activities. It is also uncertain when Aryandes was eliminated and
how. The only concrete evidence is three Demotic texts dated to 493 and 492 BC which
commemorate an exchange between Pherendates, the contemporary satrap of Egypt, and
the local priests in the sanctuary of the god Khnum in Elephantine.200 Accordingly, it has
been argued that Aryandes was eliminated by Darius when the latter came to Egypt in 518
BC and replaced by Pherendates.201 This interpretation is predicated on two assumptions.
First, that the Egyptian uprising mentioned by Polyaenus continued until 518 BC. Second,
that it was a satrapal revolt led by Aryandes rather than a domestic rebellion against Persian
rule. As we have seen above, both assumptions are highly unlikely, and, therefore, the
removal of Aryandes probably took place later on. Tuplin and Briant speculate that
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Aryandes was removed from office sometime during the last decade of the sixth century202,
while Descat proposes a later date, namely during the first decade of the fifth century BC.203
Conclusion
Though much remains confused in respect to the circumstances regarding the rebellion and
elimination of Aryandes, it seems clear that even after the immediate resistance to Darius’
accession was squashed, his rule was not unchallenged. The similarities between the rise
and fall of Oroites and Aryandes are revealing. Both were powerful governors of frontier
satrapies and both were appointed by Darius’ predecessors. The common theme is
excessive satrapal independence which was perceived as a threat by the Great King.
Consequently, the necessity to maintain obedience, especially among the satraps stationed
far away from the royal court, must have been apparent to Darius.

Conclusion
The scarcity and brevity of the contemporary evidence on the imperial system which
emerged during Darius’ reign renders it almost impossible to reconstruct each and every
aspect of the measures and regulations which constituted Darius’ grand reform. We have
seen, however, that numerous sources recount a watershed moment in the history of the
Achaemenid Empire. For instance, when analyzing the site of Pasargadae, Stronach
concludes that the contributions of Darius to the complex were probably “more drastic than
has hitherto been realized”,204 and it seems that the same can be said regarding the
Achaemenid imperial mechanism as a whole. We can conclude with confidence that Darius
“revitalized the earlier controls to produce a strong imperial centralization”, and that this
new apparatus was “more vibrant and intricate than that of Cambyses or Cyrus.”205
The circumstances under which the satrapal system emerged were unique. Darius
was the new Great King, whose status was far from undisputed. There is little doubt that
disobedience among the subject nations and the aforementioned satraps, whether only in
appearance or in actuality, was a direct outcome of Darius’ precarious position.
Consequently, it seems highly likely that a central aspect of Darius’ reforms was a response
to the chaos that engulfed the Persian Empire in the first years of his reign and that Darius’
aim was to ensure deference to the central authorities. This should not be interpreted as if
there was a vacuum before Darius. I completely agree with Briant, who notes that “neither
Cyrus nor Cambyses had the simple aim of ruling in name only over some sort of loose
federation.”206 Nevertheless, as noted by Cook, there are no indications for the existence
of a uniform infrastructure of Achaemenid rule in the satrapies or a tributary system.207
The revolts in Egypt and Lydia made it clear that satrapal power must be limited to
prevent further instances of disobedience.208 This should be taken into consideration when
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seeking to assess the nature and character of the office of satrap and the royal measures
which were aimed at securing satrapal fidelity. Such an assessment is difficult to achieve
due to the scarcity of evidence dated to the reign of Darius. Nevertheless, we have seen
that the Achaemenid institutions which were established by Darius persevered, as only
minor changes took place in the subsequent generations. Thus, later sources, such as
Xenophon’s Oeconomicus and the Cyropaedia to name two, are of the highest importance
to the study of the imperial mechanism established by Darius in general, and the satrapal
duties, responsibilities, military and financial capacity along with additional aspect of the
office in particular.209 Of course, while broadening the documentary base is essential, we
must follow Briant’s injunction, as we “must be mindful of the diachronic perspective, and
see that any piece of evidence should “fit into a logical and coherent whole.”210 A careful
analysis of sources dated to the fifth centuries BC can produce a valid reconstruction of the
powers and maneuverability granted to the satraps by the Achaemenid Kings.
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2. ACHAEMENID ROYAL SUPERVISION
The satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes exposed a critical flaw in the Achaemenid
imperial mechanism. The possibility that an overly ambitious satrap might exploit his
access to the considerable resources which were at his disposal to challenge the Great King
became a reality. Darius, therefore, must have realized that it was too risky to rely solely
on the loyalty of the Persian elite and that additional measures were needed to ensure
satrapal obedience. As we shall see, the Persian central authorities kept a close eye on the
state of affairs in the satrapies through various means, e.g. the presence of military and
civic officials in the satrapies who were appointed by the King, regular inspections of the
satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy representatives, and a network of royal
informants. It is difficult to reconstruct the exact timeframe in which these regulations and
institutions were inaugurated. Nevertheless, the challenges Darius faced during his rise to
power and the subsequent reforms he implemented serve as a suitable framework for the
emergence, or at the very least expansion, of the Achaemenid royal surveillance network
in the satrapies.

2.1 Royal Personnel in the Satrapies
Garrison Commanders
Xenophon’s Model
One way to effectively monitor the satrapies was the placement of royal personnel in the
satrapal administration. According to Xenophon, the Great King himself appointed the
garrison commanders in the provinces. This practice, Xenophon claims, began with Cyrus
the Elder, who, having installed garrisons in citadels, urban centers, and strategically
important locations throughout the Empire,211 personally appointed the garrison
commanders, namely phrouarchs and chiliarchs, along with the soldiers under their
command.212 Xenophon also states that the purpose of this royal policy was to ensure
satrapal compliance with royal directives since these officers were expected to inform the
King whenever one of the satraps was growing too powerful or engaging in treasonous
activities. In addition, if a satrapal revolt had erupted, the royal contingents in the satrapies
were instructed to offer immediate opposition to the rebel forces. 213 Cyrus, Xenophon
continues, was well aware that the presence of independent military forces in the satrapies
was likely to be interpreted by the soon to-be-satraps as a sign of distrust. Therefore, he
sought to mitigate the anticipated disaffection by informing his newly-appointed governors
about the conditions of their office before they were dispatched to their respective
satrapies.214 In essence, Xenophon envisions this measure as a way to curtail satrapal
military power.215
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In the Oeconomicus, Xenophon claims that the Great Persian King was first and
foremost concerned with the economic well-being of the satrapies and the readiness of the
military satrapal contingents. To this end, he appointed two classes of officials with discrete
areas of responsibility:216
[9] καὶ εἰσὶ δ᾽ αὐτῷ οἱ ἄρχοντες διατεταγμένοι ἐφ᾽ ἑκάτερον οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν
ἄρχουσι τῶν κατοικούντων τε καὶ τῶν ἐργατῶν, καὶ δασμοὺς ἐκ τούτων ἐκλέγουσιν, οἱ δ᾽
ἄρχουσι τῶν ὡπλισμένων <τε καὶ τῶν> φρουρῶν. [10] κἂν μὲν ὁ φρούραρχος μὴ ἱκανῶς
τῇ χώρᾳ ἀρήγῃ, ὁ τῶν ἐνοικούντων ἄρχων καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιμελούμενος κατηγορεῖ τοῦ
φρουράρχου, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται ἐργάζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀφυλαξίαν, ἂν δὲ παρέχοντος τοῦ
φρουράρχου εἰρήνην τοῖς ἔργοις ὁ ἄρχων ὀλιγάνθρωπόν τε παρέχηται καὶ ἀργὸν τὴν
χώραν, τούτου αὖ κατηγορεῖ ὁ φρούραρχος. [11] καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν τι οἱ κακῶς τὴν χώραν
ἐργαζόμενοι οὔτε τοὺς φρουροὺς τρέφουσιν οὔτε τοὺς δασμοὺς δύνανται ἀποδιδόναι. ὅπου
δ᾽ ἂν σατράπης καθιστῆται, οὗτος ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐπιμελεῖται.
And the officers who are appointed to each of these [areas of responsibility] are not the
same men. On the one hand, there are those who govern the inhabitants and the workers,
and they exact tribute from them. On the other hand, there are those who command the
men-at-arms and the garrisons. If the garrison commander fails to adequately secure the
land, the civic governor who is in charge of the workers files a complaint against the
garrison commander, because, due to lack of defense, it is impossible to cultivate the land.
If, however, the garrison commander provides peace for the workers, while the civic
governor has a thinly populated land and scarcely toiled fields, the former can lodge a
complaint against the latter. Generally, those who cultivate the land ineffectively can
neither maintain the garrisons nor pay tribute. But whenever a satrap is appointed, he is
responsible for both.

The historical accuracy and even authenticity of the information Xenophon provides on
various aspects of the Persian Empire has been rightly criticized.217 Nevertheless, it is
generally accepted that while Xenophon’s statements on Persian matters are imperfect they
still constitute a useful historical source for Persian traditions, institutions and practices.218
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In regard to the information provided by Xenophon in the Cyropaedia and the
Oeconomicus on the satrapal administrative apparatus, Tuplin observes that it is “far from
identical but quite consistent.”219 Such consistency suggests that this passage was not a
mere figment of Xenophon’s imagination but his own understanding of the satrapal
administrative institutions gained during the time he spent in the court of Cyrus the
Younger and on his march to and from the Persian heartland. As such, it should be taken
into consideration.
It is evident that Xenophon describes two specific offices in the satrapal hierarchy:
the civic governor, who was responsible for effective exploitation of the agricultural
potential of royal domain; and the garrison commander, who functioned as the commanderin-chief of the satrapal military contingents and whose primary duty was to protect to
King’s land. Xenophon’s final remark in the cited passage seems to contradict his
statements in the Cyropaedia, namely that the garrison commanders were appointed by and
directly responsible to the Great King.220 A cogent explanation is offered by Pomeroy, who
argues that Xenophon says that not all of the regions in the Persian Empire were
administered by satraps, (e.g. Cyprus) but whenever a satrap was appointed, he was
responsible for the civic and military aspect of the satrapal administration.221 In fact, it is
widely held that the aforementioned specialized officers reported directly to the satrap
rather than the King.222
Royal Garrisons
Nevertheless, since Xenophon’s description of the satraps’ position of the vis-à-vis the
garrison commanders is unclear, it becomes imperative to seek additional evidence. The
only explicit instance of a garrison commander being appointed by the Persian Kings is
recounted by Arrian, who reports that Hegesistratus, the garrison commander in Miletus in
334 BC, was appointed by Darius III. 223 Yet, royal affiliation can be found in other
instances. Xenophon, for example, states that the garrison on the Syrian side of the Cilician
Gates in 401 BC was under royal authority.224 Xenophon also claims that Orontes, the
commander of the garrison in Sardis, was following Artaxerxes II’s orders when he
attempted to hinder the eastward advance of Cyrus the Younger, the satrap of Lydia who
rose in revolt and presumably Orontes’ superior.225 The loyalty of Orontes to the Great
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King has led some to argue that his actions suggest that he answered directly to the King
rather than to Cyrus.226 Indeed, his machinations correspond with the aforementioned
protocol according to which royal forces in the satrapies were expected to oppose a
revolting satrap.227
The presence of non-local levies in the satrapies might be an implicit indication of
the existence of garrisons which were under direct royal authority. For instance, Herodotus
states that the Achaemenid garrison stationed in Memphis was composed of Persians and
their allies.228 The Persian spearmen in the satrapal court of Oroites, who eventually turned
against him, were probably a part of the garrison of Sardis.229 The grave goods from the
cemetery in Deve Hüyük, which was in use in the first quarter of the fifth century BC, revel
that it was used predominantly by Persian soldiers rather than native Syrians.230 But the
foreign element in Achaemenid garrisons was not limited to soldiers of Persian origin. The
numerous documents discovered at Elephantine in Egypt reveal that the soldiers serving in
the local Achaemenid garrison consisted of troops of local descent, i.e. Jews and
Egyptians,231 as well as foreigners, e.g. Arameans,232 Caspians,233 Medes,234
Chorasmians,235 Babylonians236 and Persians.237 Doubtlessly, these soldiers were
transported from their homelands by the Persian central authorities and installed in foreign
territories to ensure obedience to the Persian authorities. Thus, it is not out of the question
that these were the royal garrisons described by Xenophon and that their officers were
appointed directly by the King.238
according to Xenophon (An. 1.6.6-8), Orontes admitted time and again that his actions against Cyrus were
not caused by the satrap’s mistreatment of his garrison commander.
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Garrisons Commanders as Satrapal Appointees
Despite the above, there are several known instances in which garrison commanders were
appointed by satraps. According to a trilingual inscription from Xanthus dated to c. 337
BC, Pixodarus son of Hecatomnus, the satrap of Lycia, appointed a certain Apollodorus as
the επιμελητής of Xanthus Artemelis, a term which, in this context, should be understood
as a garrison commander.239 Moreover, in the second half of the fifth century BC
Nehemiah, the governor (peḥā) of Yehud, appointed his brother Hannaniah as the overseer
of the newly fortified city in Jerusalem (sar habira), a position which probably denotes the
chief of the castle, i.e. the garrison commander.240 In Egypt, several documents recovered
from the site of the Achaemenid garrison at Syene-Elephantine contain the term rab-ḥaylā
(‘chief of the army’), which corresponds with the Greek phrouarch.241 The rab-ḥaylā is
described as a subordinate of the frataraka (‘superintendent’),242 a deputy of the satrap
whose post combined military and civil prerogatives.243 In a similar fashion to the biblical
sources, the garrison commander is described as a subordinate of the satrap’s viceroy,
which suggests that he was under satrapal authority. Furthermore, a letter dated to the late
fifth century BC contains a response of Arsames, the satrap of Egypt, to a complaint issued
by one of his subordinate clerics ( )פקדיאPsamshek, an Egyptian, against a garrison
commander named Armapiya.244 It seems that Armapiya and the soldiers under his
command refused to follow the orders of Psamshek, and for that the officer was reproached
by the satrap. This correspondence serves as another indication that the garrison
commander in Elephantine was responsible to the satrap. All in all, these instances give the
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impression that the garrison commanders, whether appointed directly by the Great King or
not, were under the authority of the satrap.245
Solving the Discrepancy
The discrepancies regarding the status of the garrison commanders in the satrapies have
led to various scholarly interpretations. Several scholars have simply accepted the notion
that the Achaemenid Kings exercised direct control over the garrison commanders.246
Others, mindful of the inconsistency in the ancient sources, offered alternative
explanations. Petit, for instance, argues that satrapal military authority gradually increased
during the fifth century BC and by the end of the century the satraps exercised full control
over military affairs in their respective provinces. In addition, he postulates that Xenophon,
who was mindful of the contemporary state of affairs, refers to an earlier period when
satrapal military power was still limited.247 Such interpretation, however, seems
problematic since Xenophon explicitly says that garrison commanders were appointed by
the Persian King in his own time.248 Therefore, even if satrapal authority increased during
the fifth century BC, the Achaemenid kings continued to personally appoint garrison
commander well into the fourth century BC. An alternative explanation is offered by
Dandamaev and Lukonin, who argue that it was Darius I who stripped the satraps of their
military command by personally appointing the garrison commanders in the satrapies. But
Darius’ new protocol was not strictly observed by the Great King’s successors, which
caused the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding satrapal military authority.249 A
more cogent explanation, in my view, is offered by Lewis, who convincingly argues that
the inconsistency in the ancient sources demonstrates that there was no uniform procedure
and that there is no reason to expect that all Achaemenid garrisons were under direct royal
authority.250 Similarly, Hornblower argues that Xenophon’s account is not false but rather
too schematic, and as such provides a rigid description of Achaemenid practices. 251 It is
quite possible, as Briant suggests, that the Achaemenid Kings appointed garrison
commanders, who presumably reported directly to the central authorities, only in critical
locations as satrapal capitals and treasury deposits.252 Moreover, several scholars have
Even if there were garrisons which were nominally under the King’s authority, the fact that the satraps
functioned as paymasters (e.g. Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3, 11; Oec. 4.5-6, 11) meant that they had considerable leverage
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had the authority to levy troops for the protection of their satrapy (e.g. Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10-11; Xen. An. 1.1.6),
which suggests that these forces answered directly to the satrap.
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pointed out that neither Xenophon nor any other source explicitly claims that the garrison
commanders, even when they were appointed by the Great King himself, were exempted
from satrapal directives.253 One must admit that it would have been very difficult for any
satrap to carry on his duties with success if the garrison commanders were not obligated to
follow his commands.254 Therefore, it is more than plausible that while in theory the
garrisons were under royal authority, in practice they were still obligated to follow satrapal
orders,255 though the garrison commanders probably had the discretion to disobey a satrap
if it was apparent that his actions were against the King’s interests. 256 In sum, the Persian
protocol regarding the garrisons in the satrapies was fairly flexible. Notwithstanding the
obligation of the garrison commanders and their soldiers to follow satrapal orders, they
were ultimately expected to safeguard royal interests. Accordingly, royal appointments
were clearly designated to enhance loyalty to the King, and as a result rendered it
considerably more difficult for any satrap to rally sufficient military might to challenge the
Great King.
The Origin of the Measure
While we can neither refute nor corroborate Xenophon’s claim that this practice was
established by Cyrus the Elder, the satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes probably led
Darius to the conclusion that it was imperative to curtail satrapal military prerogatives.257
Indeed, the cautious conduct of Bagaius when appearing before Oroites reveals that Darius
and his emissary had their doubts regarding the fidelity of the Persian officials present at
Sardis to their new Great King. Therefore, these circumstances may have prompted a
change in the manner in which garrison commanders were appointed, but despite the
official change in policy, in actuality it may have been implemented only in regions which
demanded tighter royal control.
Royal Chancellors
Royal personnel in the satrapies were not limited to the military hierarchy. Ample evidence
demonstrates the presence of royal chancellors and scribes in the provinces. Herodotus, for
example, notes the presence of a royal secretary (τῷ γραμματιστῇ τῷ βασιληίῳ) in Oroites’
court and adds that each satrap had a royal scribe at his disposal. 258 According to
Xenophon, during his stay in the Cappadocian city of Dana, Cyrus the Younger put to death
a Persian named Megaphernes, a wearer of the royal purple (φοινικιστὴν βασίλειον),259
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and it has been argued that this title designates a royal scribe. 260 Official documents from
Achaemenid Egypt corroborate the existence of a satrapal chancellery, which was
apparently supervised by an official who might have been the royal chancellor mentioned
in the Greek sources. For example, three officials are named in the subscript of a Demotic
letter dated to 492 BC, which was sent by the satrap of Egypt Pherendates to the Wab
priests of Khanum at Elephantine. The first, a Persian named Satibar, was “cognizant of
this order”, the second, an Egyptian named Peftuaneith, was “the one who wrote (the
letter)”, and the third, another Egyptian by the name of Wahipre, “wrote (this letter)”.261
Satibar probably presided as the satrapal chancellor, and as such had the authority over
routine business and the satrap’s official correspondence, while Peftuaneith and Wahipre
functioned as secretaries in the satrapal chancellery responsible for translating official
documents into Aramaic and Demotic.262 A similar administrative protocol is attested in
two Aramaic letters dispatched by Arsames, also a satrap of Egypt. The first letter,
addressed to Armapiya, an Anatolian man who was an officer commanding a company of
troops, is signed by Bagasravi, a Persian who presided as the chancellor, and Ahpepî, an
Egyptian who functioned as the scribe.263 The second letter is signed by the chancellor
Anani, a Hebrew name, and Nabuaqab, the scribe.264 Though we are not explicitly told that
these official were of royal status, their senior position and foreign origin has led scholars
to identify them as a royal element in the satrapal government.265
Similarly, there is a Babylonian clay tablet signed by Liblut and Gadalama, who
are recognized as sepiru, scribes who wrote Aramaic on parchment, and bēl ṭemi, i.e.
chancellors.266 This dual title, which clearly designates a high ranking official in the
satrapal hierarchy,267 seems to be equivalent to the chancellor mentioned in the Egyptian
sources. Moreover, the biblical sources mention two Samaritans, Rehum and Shimshai,
who wrote to King Artaxerxes I against the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem. Rehum
was acting as  ְבעֵל ְטעֵם, the Aramaic equivalent of the Akkadian bēl ṭemi, i.e. chancellor,
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while Shimshai was the  ָספ ְָרא, which is translated as scribe.268 The formulation and titles
suggest that the chancellery of the satrapy Across-the-River resembled that of Egypt in
structure and procedure.269 More importantly, the fact that the addressee of their petition
was the Great Persian King himself indicates that they were prominent officers who had
direct access to the royal court. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the satrapal
chancelleries were supervised by senior officials who were either appointed by the King or
were affiliated in some way with the royal court.270
The chancellor, it seems, had considerable power and influence. In spite of the
technical nature of the functions and duties of the satrapal chancellery, namely reading,
writing, and dispatching official documents, the chancellor held a critical position in the
administrative hierarchy.271 He was probably a permanent member of the satrapal
entourage whose duties included management of the administrative and financial day-today affairs in the satrapy a well as supervising official correspondence, including letters
sent from the royal court.272 Accordingly, they could and probably were expected to inform
the King when a certain satrap was not fulfilling his duty or even plotting against the great
King.273 As a result, it must have been extremely difficult for any satrap to keep the central
authorities in the dark regarding the true state of affairs in his province.
Royal Judges
Royal judges constituted another class of royal administrators who were present in the
satrapies. According to Herodotus, these royal judges (βασιλήιοι δικασταί) were
exclusively Persian, appointed for life, and members of the royal entourage.274 Their duties
Ezra 4:8-9. Rehum is also mentioned in 1 Esdras (2:17, 27) and in Josephus’ Antiquities (11.26), where
he is described as he who records/writes down the affairs that happen (Ράθυμος ὁ τὰ προσπίπτοντα).
269
We have seen before how the satrap Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to complain about the allegedly
unauthorized construction of the temple in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the sources provide only the gist of his
accusations, but one can speculate that the letter was signed by two of his aides who held similar positions to
Rehum and Shimshai’s.
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included interpretation of ancestral ordinance and institutions and giving judgement when
asked.275 But the responsibilities of these officials were not limited to the royal court. An
Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine dated to 495 BC notes the presence of royal judges ( דיני
 )מלכאin the region, which demonstrates that the Royal judges travelled to the satrapies.276
The impetus for sending the royal judges to the provinces is clarified by several documents
from Babylon which mention the office of dayyānu ša rēš šarri, also abbreviated as ša rēši,
a term which means ‘judge of the king’.277 These officials, who were clearly of royal
status,278 had various areas of responsibilities, e.g. members of the royal, satrapal and
military administration in addition to tax collection duties.279 Furthermore, in the book of
Ezra we are told that Artaxerxes II sent a letter to Ezra which granted him the power to
appoint judges for all the peoples of the satrapy Beyond-the-River.280 The fact that these
judiciary officials were appointed not by the satrap but by a special delegate empowered
by the King implies a royal status of some sort,281 and even if these officials were obligated
to obey the satrap,282 the presence of an independent judiciary authority must have come
and his sister, there was a law which stated that the Great King of the Persians was allowed to do whatever
he wanted. Kuhrt (2007, 604 n. 7) observes that a similar episode occurs in Plutarch’s biography of
Artaxerxes II (Art. 23), in which Parysatis persuaded her son to marry his daughter Atossa by arguing that it
was the divine prerogative of the Great King to judge what is good and bad.
275
Hdt. 3.31.3. Diodorus (15.8.3-5, 10-11) adds that they presided as judges in high-profile trials and bring
as an example the trail of Tiribazus, the former satrap of Lydia. It should be noted that royal judges were
harshly punished by the Great Kings for accepting bribes, see: Hdt. 5.25, 7.194; Diod. 15.10.1.
276
AP no. 1; TADAE II B5.1. For an English translation, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982, 106–7; Kuhrt
2007, no. 17.29. The royal status of these judges becomes even more evident in light of evidence for other
officials in Egypt who bore judiciary titles which lacked any royal affiliation. For instance, a fragmentary
Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine, dated to the reign of Artaxerxes I, which mention ‘provincial judges’
()דינא מדנתא. See: AP no. 16; TADAE I A5.2. For an English translation, see: DAE no. 18; Kuhrt 2007, 14.36.
In addition, two Aramaic fragments from Saqqara dated to the fifth century BC mention the title ‘judges’ or
‘law-officials’ (Ar. d]tbry᾿ = OP dātabara) without mentioning any royal affiliation. See: Segal nos. 13-14.
277
The component šarri means ‘of the king’ or ‘royal’.
278
Dandamaev 1992a, 54; Bongenaar 1997, 99–100; Fried 2004, 31. For instance, in the archives of the
temple of Eanna in Uruk the title ša rēši šarri bēl piqitti Eanna is well attested throughout the duration of the
archive. Two of these royal officials presided as the treasurer (ša muḫḫi quppi ša-šarri ina Eanna) and as the
supervisor (ša-rēš šarri bēl piqitti ša Eanna) of the temple. Fried (2004, 31) notes that the title of ša rēši šarri
bēl piqitti appears in documents dated to the reigns of Cyrus the Great, Cambyses and Darius I, and therefore
it is certain that this office was adopted by the Achaemenids when Babylon was converted from an
independent kingdom into a Persian satrapy. For the ša-rēš šarri as a member of the Eanna temple
administration in the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, see: Jursa 2011a, 161–63. For the reign of Darius I,
see: BM 25660, Borsippa, dated to 494 BC (see: Jursa and Waerzeggers 2009, 256 with n. 104); BM 31572,
Babylon, dated to 497 or 496 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 30980, Babylon, dated to 496 BC (see:
Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 3059, Babylon, dated to 487 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 16).
279
Jursa 2011, 163. On the Neo-Babylonian origin of this office along with a survey of the available evidence
and their duties, see: Holtz 2009, 27–47, 55–62; Holtz 2010.
280
Ezra 7:25.
281
Fried 2004, 217. Grabbe (1994, 293) postulates that Ezra may have been appointed as the governor of the
satrapy Beyond-the-River. Such reading seems a bit too far reaching since Ezra’s area of activity was clearly
confined to Yehud and, to our best knowledge, those who were appointed as satraps were exclusively of
Persian origin.
282
Grabbe 1994, 293; Fried 2004, 217. For further reading on the judiciary institutions and protocols of the
Achaemenid Empire, see: Fried 2001.

44
at the expense of the authority of the satrap.283 Since these officers were royal agents, they
were probably predisposed to observe the actions of the satrap and inform the central
authorities about any satrapal misconduct.284

2.2 Yearly Royal Review
Periodic inspections constituted another measure designed to facilitate effective royal
supervision. Xenophon claims that an annual royal review (ἀπόδειξις) was instituted by
Cyrus the Elder.285 This inspection focused on two primary aspects. The first was the
readiness of the satrapal military contingents. Xenophon says that the Persian central
authorities assigned a fixed quota of horsemen, archers, slingers, and light-armed troops to
each satrapy for the protection of the King’s land,286 and every year the King conducted an
inspection of the preparedness of these forces.287 The review took place at the place of
muster (σύλλογος), a specific location which functioned as a mobilization center for
satrapal forces.288 During the review the troops marched in full battle gear before the great
King, who inspected the condition of the various regiments. Garrison commanders,
chiliarchs and satraps whose troops were well-equipped were rewarded, while those who
neglected their duties were punished.289 The yearly royal review of the satrapal military
contingents as described by Xenophon is not mentioned elsewhere, but there are two
instances which illustrate the mechanism of this practice. Xenophon reports that while
Cyrus the Younger camped in Cilicia, he held a review of his army. The armed forces
marched in battle array, while Cyrus gazed upon them from his war-chariot.290 A similar
description is provided by Herodotus, who recounts the manner in which Xerxes reviewed
his army and navy at Doriscus. The infantry and cavalry were inspected as he rode through
the camp on his chariot. Then, he boarded a Sidonian ship and surveyed the fleet.291
The second aspect of the yearly review focused on the economic well-being of the
satrapies. The aforementioned civic governors and their immediate superiors, the satraps,
were punished if their domain was insufficiently cultivated and thinly populated due to
poor judgment or excessive severity. But additional territory, gifts and various other honors
were given to those whose domain flourished and prospered.292
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However, the effectiveness and extent of these yearly royal reviews must have been
limited. Xenophon claims that the garrison troops were not obligated to present themselves
for inspection at the muster place.293 On the one hand, there is little doubt that leaving
numerous key strategic positions unguarded at the same time meant that the satrapy was
unnecessarily exposed. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that the garrison troops
were not liable for inspection. Tuplin suggests that the King or his proxy could have
reviewed the readiness of the garrison troops in situ.294 Yet, reviewing each and every
garrison post in a given satrapy was an arduous and probably unfeasible task. Perhaps
Xenophon’s description is again too schematic, and only important garrisons were visited
on site. Conversely, since Xenophon does explicitly list the garrison commanders and their
troops among those who appeared in full battle gear for inspection295, one can speculate
that each garrison sent a delegation headed by an officer to the muster place to participate
in the royal review, while a sufficient number of troops was left behind to guard the King’s
land.
The Circuit Commissioners
A more serious challenge was offered by the vastness of the Achaemenid Empire.
Xenophon states that the royal circuit was limited to the regions adjacent to King’s
residence, doubtlessly the royal capitals in the core satrapies, and the regions which he
passed through in his travels.296 The satrapies further away, Xenophon adds, were visited
by trustworthy proxies,297 designated as the circuit commissioners (οὗτοι τῶν ἐφόδων),
royal agents who inspected the condition of the satrapies on the King’s behalf. Their
responsibilities were as follows:298
ἐφοδεύει γὰρ ἀνὴρ κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀεὶ στράτευμα ἔχων, ὡς ἢν μέν τις τῶν σατραπῶν
ἐπικουρίας δέηται, ἐπικουρῇ, ἢν δέ τις ὑβρίζῃ, σωφρονίζῃ, ἢν δέ τις ἢ δασμῶν φορᾶς
ἀμελῇ ἢ τῶν ἐνοίκων φυλακῆς ἢ ὅπως ἡ χώρα ἐνεργὸς ᾖ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τεταγμένων
παραλίπῃ, ταῦτα πάντα κατευτρεπίζῃ: ἢν δὲ μὴ δύνηται, βασιλεῖ ἀπαγγέλλῃ: ὁ δὲ ἀκούων
βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ ἀτακτοῦντος. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις λεγόμενοι ὅτι βασιλέως υἱὸς
καταβαίνει, βασιλέως ἀδελφός, βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός, καὶ ἐνίοτε οὐκ ἐκφαινόμενοι, οὗτοι
τῶν ἐφόδων εἰσίν: ἀποτρέπεται γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὁπόθεν ἂν βασιλεὺς κελεύῃ.
For on a yearly basis a man would visit (the satrapies) with an army. If a certain satrap is
in need of assistance, he provides him with such, but if a satrap becomes arrogant, he
corrects him. Moreover, if anyone might be careless regarding the collection of tribute, the
protection of the inhabitants, the cultivation of the land or any other area of responsibility
that was assigned to him, [the commissioner] restores everything back into order. But if he
is unable to do so, he reports to the King, who, after learning about the situation, devises a
solution regarding the one who is insubordinate. Often times there are those who say that
the King’s son is coming or the King’s brother or the King’s eye. Sometime the circuit
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commissioners would not make an appearance, for each of them would return [to the royal
court] whenever he is summoned by the King.

In essence, the circuit commissioners saw that the satrapies were administered effectively
and with good judgement. In addition, these inspectors travelled with an army, which was
presumably deployed whenever a satrap needed assistance to counter potential external
threats or in times when a satrap failed to adhere to royal command. In addition, Xenophon
notes a possible scenario in which a circuit commissioner found himself unable to restore
order in a given satrapy, which would result in direct royal intervention. Xenophon might
refer to a satrapal revolt or a local uprising which proved to be too much for the forces
which accompanied the royal inspector and as such demanded direct royal intervention.299
Interestingly, Xenophon says that the advent of the ephodoi was preceded by
rumors that the King’s immediate kin or the King’s Eye was en route.300 According to this
passage, the office of royal inspector, doubtlessly a highly sensitive position, was manned
by the closest confidants of the Great King.301 We know of several high-profile dignitaries
who visited the western satrapies, and they may have done so in the capacity of a circuit
commissioner. For instance, after being accused of conspiring against his brother, Cyrus
the Younger did all he could to win the loyalty of the dignitaries who were sent to his
satrapy from the royal court.302 One or more of these senior delegates might have been one
of Xenophon’s commissioners. Another plausible member of the ephodoi is Tithraustes,
who was sent to Sardis by Artaxerxes II to eliminate Tissaphernes and restore order in the
western satrapies. Tithraustes initiated peace talks with Agesilaus303 and sent Timocrates
of Rhodes to bribe several Greek cities to declare war on the Spartans. 304 The actions of
Tithraustes suggests that his mission was to resolve the military crisis in the west, which
corresponds with the duties of the circuit commissioners.305 In addition, we know that
Tithraustes did not stay long in the west since Xenophon notes that by 392 BC Tiribazus
was the satrap of Lydia,306 and there is no indication that he ever assumed the office of
satrap after the execution of Tissaphernes. Furthermore, while we are not explicitly told
that Tithraustes was accompanied by an army, the fact that Agesilaus was willing to accept
the terms offered by Tithraustes after the decisive Persian defeat at the battle of Sardis
suggests that the Persian forces were quick to recover, perhaps due to the fresh forces
Tithraustes brought with him from the Persian heartland. In short, the limited time
Tithraustes spent in the west, the absence of any indication that he assumed the office of
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satrap, and his actions to restore order in the Lydian satrapy suggest that he may have
presided as one of the circuit commissioner on his mission in western Anatolia.
The Satrapal Inspection Service
It should be noted that the existence of an Achaemenid inspection service on the satrapal
level is well attested in non-Greek sources. Officials designated as gaušaka (‘Listeners’)
are attested in an official document from Egypt,307 and Briant argues that they conducted
inquiries when summoned by local communities.308 In the Book of Ezra were are told about
the existence of the treasurers (gyzbria)309 and the inspectors (aphrskia)310 of the satrapy
Beyond-the-River. The Persian King addressed these officials directly through a decree,
which should be seen as an indication of their importance and that they may have been
affiliated with to royal court in some way. Tuplin argues that their title suggests that they
held responsibility over the entire satrapy, though it is impossible to know if they were a
part of the central satrapal treasury or spread throughout the satrapy’s treasuries. 311 In
essence, these officials monitored the activities in the satrapies on the King’s behalf while
being an integral part of the satrapal administrative machinery. Their area of responsibility
was clearly limited to a particular administrative aspect rather than the wellbeing of an
entire satrapy, and as such supplemented the more general periodic reviews which focused
on the wellbeing of an entire satrapy.
In sum, the evidence for the existence of royal inspectors, on the satrapal and intersatrapal levels, reflects another measure which allowed the Achaemenid Kings, through
loyal agents who reported directly to the King, to acquire a real and accurate picture of the
condition in the satrapies and ensuring that royal interests are safeguarded.

2.3 The Achaemenid Surveillance Service
The King’s Eye
The King’s Eye in the Greek Sources
One of the most intriguing institutions which facilitated royal surveillance is the elusive
King’s Eye. The Greek sources provide various descriptions of this Achaemenid office.
Aeschylus mentions the King’s Eye as the one who reviewed the Persian forces that took
part in Xerxes’ expedition,312 a responsibility which depicts the King’s Eye as a senior
official who functioned as a muster officer or the King’s chief-of-staff.313 Herodotus
recounts how during a game of pretend Cyrus the Elder assumed the role of king and
assigned various offices and tasks to his playmates. One of them was given the title of the
King’s Eye.314 Apart from the fact that the office was held by a single official, Herodotus
does not include any additional information regarding the function or importance of this
office.
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Another reference to the King’s Eye is found in Aristophanes’ Acharnians. In a
scene which takes place at the Athenian Pnyx, Pseudartabas, the Eye of the Great King, is
given audience.315 Pseudartabas, who presumably came to Athens on a diplomatic
mission,316 is described as wielding a gigantic eye while mumbling gibberish and being
accompanied by two eunuchs, who turn out to be a pair of debouched Athenians in disguise.
There is little doubt that Aristophanes chose to depict this Persian ambassador as the King’s
Eye not due to his actual prerogatives but rather due to the playwright’s desire to gain the
most effective impact on his audience through word puns and the absurd presentation of a
Persian dignitary wielding a huge eye.317 Therefore, besides the possible existence of such
an office, nothing can be deduced with regard to the character and nature of the King’s
Eye.
In the biography of Artaxerxes II Plutarch recounts how Artasyras, who is identified
as the King’s Eye, discovered the body of Cyrus the Younger in the aftermath of the battle
of Cunaxa.318 This passage stands out, as noted by Hirsch, since it is the only known
reference the King’s Eye in a proper historical context.319 Artasyras son of Aroandus, of
Bactrian origin, was the satrap of Armenia who became a member of the Achaemenid
household after he married Rhodogoune, the daughter of Artaxerxes II. 320 Thus, one can
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infer from this passage that the King’s Eye was a close associate of the King and possibly
an Achaemenid by blood or marriage.321
The common feature in all of the aforementioned sources is the depiction of the
King’s Eye as a single high ranking official in close proximity to the Great Persian King.322
This representation is challenged by Xenophon, who provides a lengthy account
concerning the King’s Eye:
[10] κατεμάθομεν δὲ ὡς καὶ τοὺς βασιλέως καλουμένους ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τὰ βασιλέως ὦτα
οὐκ ἄλλως ἐκτήσατο ἢ τῷ δωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ τιμᾶν: τοὺς γὰρ ἀπαγγείλαντας ὅσα καιρὸς
αὐτῷ εἴη πεπύσθαι μεγάλως εὐεργετῶν πολλοὺς ἐποίησεν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ὠτακουστεῖν καὶ
διοπτεύειν τί ἂν ἀγγείλαντες ὠφελήσειαν βασιλέα. [11] ἐκ τούτου δὴ καὶ πολλοὶ
ἐνομίσθησαν βασιλέως ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ πολλὰ ὦτα. εἰ δέ τις οἴεται ἕνα αἱρετὸν εἶναι
ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλεῖ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴεται: ὀλίγα γὰρ εἷς γ᾽ ἂν ἴδοι καὶ εἷς ἀκούσειε: καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ὥσπερ ἀμελεῖν ἂν παρηγγελμένον εἴη, εἰ ἑνὶ τοῦτο προστεταγμένον εἴη: πρὸς δὲ
καὶ ὅντινα γιγνώσκοιεν ὀφθαλμὸν ὄντα, τοῦτον ἂν εἰδεῖεν ὅτι φυλάττεσθαι δεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ
οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φάσκοντος ἀκοῦσαί τι ἢ ἰδεῖν ἄξιον ἐπιμελείας παντὸς βασιλεὺς
ἀκούει. [12] οὕτω δὴ πολλὰ μὲν βασιλέως ὦτα, πολλοὶ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμοὶ νομίζονται: καὶ
φοβοῦνται πανταχοῦ λέγειν τὰ μὴ σύμφορα βασιλεῖ, ὥσπερ αὐτοῦ ἀκούοντος, καὶ ποιεῖν
ἃ μὴ σύμφορα, ὥσπερ αὐτοῦ παρόντος. οὔκουν ὅπως μνησθῆναι ἄν τις ἐτόλμησε πρός τινα
περὶ Κύρου φλαῦρόν τι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς πᾶσι καὶ ὠσὶ βασιλέως τοῖς ἀεὶ παροῦσιν
οὕτως ἕκαστος διέκειτο.
[10] In addition, we have observed that [the Persian King] acquired those who are called
the King’s eyes and the King’s ears exclusively by conferring gifts and honors. For, since
he rewarded greatly those who reported the things which were advantageous to him to be
aware of, he encouraged many men to eavesdrop and to spy so that they could provide the
King with a useful report. [11] Consequently, many are acknowledged as the eyes and ears
of the King. And if anyone thinks that the King chooses a single eye, his is wrong. For a
single man would see and hear very little. And if this responsibility was assigned a single
individual, it would be just like ordering the others to be negligent. Moreover, if people
would come to know that there was a certain Eye and who he was, they would surely guard
themselves. But this is not the case, but instead the King listens to all those who say that
they heard or saw something of value. [12] Thus, the King’s eyes and ears should be
regarded as numerous. And people are afraid of saying anything which is detrimental to
the King, as if he could hear them, or doing anything subversive, as if he could see them.
Therefore, being in a state of mind as if each and every one of those present were the King’s
eyes and ears, no one dared speaking disparagingly of Cyrus.

It is evident that Xenophon is describing an Achaemenid policy of rewarding informants,
a practice which brought about an informal surveillance network by which the Great King
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tightened his control over the satrapies.323 Apparently, this network of informants was so
effective that the King’s subjects did not dare making seditious utterances in fear of being
reported to the Persian authorities.324 More importantly, Xenophon seeks to refute a
contemporary communis opinio that the King’s Eye was an office held by a single
individual.325 Xenophon, however, makes another reference to the King’s eye. When he
describes the duties of the circuit commissioners Xenophon says that whenever one of
ephodoi was about to visit a province, rumors circulated regarding the identity of the
dignitary who was about to arrive, whether the King’s son, brother or the King’s Eye.326
On the face of it, Xenophon seems to contradict himself, because instead of a great many
‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, the King’s Eye is described as a single office holder who functioned as
one of the royal inspectors.327 Conversely, Hirsch argues that Xenophon’s ephodoi were
simply high ranking royal dignitaries whose arrival was preceded by rumors. Hence, he
asserts that there is no discrepancy since Xenophon’s intention was to refute popular
misconceptions concerning the King’s Eye, and that the unsubstantiated rumors which
preceded the advent of the circuit commissioners were probably predicated on such false
beliefs.328 Such interpretation is compelling but the ambiguity of Xenophon’s remark
renders is difficult to determine with certainly whether the appellation ‘the Eye of the King’
signifies an actual office or a misplaced honorary title.329
The King’s Eye in the Old-Persian Record
In addition, the King’s Eye is absent from the Old-Persian record. Nevertheless, several
attempts have been made to suggest a plausible Old-Persian term which might have
corresponded with the Greek ὀφθαλμός βασιλέως. Schaeder, for example, postulates that
the hypothetical Old-Persian term spaθāka (‘observer’, ‘overseer’, ‘watcher’) existed in
the fifth and fourth centuries BC as an equivalent to the Greek King’s Eye. 330 Eilers
suggests the term kasaka (‘good seer’), which is derived from the Ossetic (eastern Iranian
language) term kāsag, as a possible parallel.331 Ehtécham advocates that the Old-Persian
term spadak (‘supervisor’) designated a chief official who presided over numerous agents,
whose duty was to monitor and regularly inspect the administrative departments in the
satrapies.332 Under the assumption that the Sassanid kings sought to revive the glories of
the Achaemenid Empire, Pagliaro suggests the term patyaxš (‘supervisor’, ‘procurator’,
‘overseer’), a designation which is based on a title of a senior official in the Sassanid court
323
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who bore the title bitaxš/bidyaxš.333 Another alternative is offered by Hinz, who notes that
the Elamite tablets in Persepolis refer to an official called ti-ti-kaš or ti-ti-ya-kaš-be, and
suggests the hypothetical Old-Persian term ditaka or didiyaka (‘one who sees’ or
‘overseer’).334 Such imaginative and at times ingenious reconstructions are more than
impressive. They remain, however, in the realm of conjecture.335
The gaušaka
Interestingly, a royal ‘Ear’ is attested in a petition dated to 410 BC addressed to Arsames,
the satrap of Egypt.336 This document, written in Aramaic, includes the plural masculine
noun gaušaka ()גושכיא, which resonates with the Old-Persian verb gūš (‘to hear’) and the
noun gauša (‘ear’), hence translated as ‘listeners’. Cowley argues that this is the equivalent
Aramaic term to the Greek King’s Eye.337 Similarly, Lommel maintains that the term
gaušaka was the source of a Greek distorted translation of the already familiar concept of
the King’s Eye.338 Other scholars were more concerned by the fact that these officials were
marked by the action of hearing rather than seeing. Accordingly, it has been suggested that
the gaušaka functioned as chiefs of the local police,339 intelligence officers,340 royal
emissaries who represented the central authorities in legal cases,341 low ranking public
functionaries,342 the aides of the royal inspectors of the satrapies (i.e. the ‘eyes’), and
officials who functioned similarly to Xenophon’s circuit commissioners but on the satrapal
level.343 All of the above suggestions are speculative, but it is certain that the gaušaka
operated in the outermost borders of Egypt and probably throughout the Persian Empire.344
Moreover, it is rather clear that the gaušaka were not the informants mentioned by
Xenophon. Yet, if these officials were indeed royal agents, it is reasonable to assume that
their presence contributed to the King’s ability to supervise the satrapies and ensured a
flow of reliable information from the provinces to the royal court.
There was no King’s Eye
The silence of the Old-Persian testimonies, the numerous discrepancies in the Greek
sources, and the seemingly unreliability of the post classical sources led Hirsch to conclude
that there was no King’s Eye. He postulates that this ahistorical Achaemenid institution
originated from Iranian mythology. In the tenth Yasht, an Avestan hymn, the Zoroastrian
God Mithras is described as having one thousand ears, ten thousand eyes and ten thousand
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spies, spread throughout the land ever watchful of any acts of insubordination.345 Hirsch
suggests that the Great Persian Kings exploited this Iranian mythological motif to
encourage their subjects to subscribe to the idea that, just like the god Mithras, they too
had a legion of secret agents listening and watching for any indication of subversive
activity. Presumably, these rumors circulated throughout the Achaemenid Empire and
eventually made their way into the accounts of Xenophon and others.346
In spite of the many merits of Hirsch’s argument, there are two objections to his
conclusions. First, the absence of the King’s Eye from the Old-Persian record is all but
expected. Achaemenid royal inscriptions bear little to no information regarding the
administrative apparatus of the Achaemenid Empire. Moreover, the documents found in
various archives throughout the Empire are concerned primarily with commercial
transactions and redistribution of resources. More importantly, the available Old-Persian
sources are official in nature and therefore the fact that there is no mention of a secret
intelligence service should not come as a surprise.347 Second, it is possible that the
Achaemenids drew inspiration from the representation of Mithras in Iranian mythology to
spread the notion that the Great King was the god’s earthly equivalent. Yet, the
effectiveness of the rumors addressed by Xenophon could not have endured for long unless
they were confirmed by actual instances in which the central authorities demonstrated their
capacity to gather intelligence and act upon it. It seems likelier that the Achaemenids
implemented concrete measures to maintain and augment the fear of being associated with
treasonous acts. The policy of rewarding informants, mentioned by Xenophon, was likely
to be one of these measures.348 Furthermore, Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out the
uncertainties concerning the extent of Achaemenid adherence to Zoroastrianism, and the
primacy of Ahuramazda, the god of the kings and kingship, in Achaemenid royal ideology,
which renders Hirsch’ emphasis on the centrality of Mithras as problematic.349
Parallel Institutions
Another way in which scholars sought to corroborate the historicity of the King’s Eye was
by pointing out the existence of similar institutions in other ancient royal regimens. On the
one hand, it has been suggested that the Achaemenids borrowed the office of the King’s
Eye from their Near-Eastern predecessors. In Egyptian sources we find the earliest known
reference to officials designated as the King’s ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, dated to the first half of
the first millennium BC.350 There is a possible Assyrian parallel attested in a document
YT 10.7: “We sacrifice unto Mithra, the lord of wide pastures, who is truth-speaking, a chief in assemblies,
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dated to the seventh century BC that features an idiomatic usage of two verbs amāru (‘to
see’) and šamū (‘to hear’). Moreover, it has been suggested that the regular employment of
a formulaic command – “write me whatever you see and hear” – in the letters of the
Sargonid kings (721-627 BC) may attest the existence of Assyrian royal officials who
functioned as royal overseers or inspectors.351 As noted above, Herodotus recounts how
Cyrus the Elder, while the Median Empire was still the ruling empire, chose one of his
playmates to be the King’s Eye in the midst of a game of pretend. 352 Another intriguing
Median episode narrated by Herodotus recounts the exploits of Deioces, the Median King
who had spies and informants scattered throughout Media, which enabled him to apprehend
and punish with due measure disloyal subjects. 353 Balcer highlights the fact that both
episodes are set in a reality in which the Persians have yet to take over the Median kingdom
and deduces that the Persians adopted the office of the King’s Eye from the Medians. 354
Yet, since these anecdotes are almost certainly fictive, it seems highly likely that they
depicts Persian court practices, e.g. the eyes and ears of the king along with personal guard
and an audience ritual, which were projected into the Median past by later generations.355
On the other hand, it is possible that the Achaemenid King’s Eye inspired the
emergence of similar institutions employed by empires which existed in parallel to the
Achaemenids or rose centuries after their demise. A good example is the well attested
Athenian imperial magistrate called the Episkopos (επίσκοπος), an essential component in
the Athenian imperial mechanism. These officials were dispatched to the subject states in
order to ensure proper administration and to enforce obedience to Athenian directives.
Balcer maintains that this Athenian imperial institution was predicated on an Achaemenid
model.356 Shahbazi places an emphasis on the account of Philostratus357, in which the
‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the Parthian King are mentioned. He claims that these titles were
appropriated during the Parthian era and later transmitted to the Sassanid Empire, whose
ruling dynasty was known for its tendency to follow the footsteps of the Achaemenids.358
Another possible parallel appears in Indian documents dated to the beginning of the second
century AD which mention five imperial censors who are referred to as the five senses of
the government.359 Another royal Indian official called adhyaksha (‘inspector’, ‘overseer’)
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may have been based on the Achaemenid King’s Eye. 360 Lastly, a similar institution is
attested in seventh century China, which constituted an official designated as the ‘ear-andeye’ and operated as a censor.361
The aforementioned examples demonstrate that trustworthy royal officials who
supervised the state of affairs in the provinces were a critical component in any imperial
framework. This principle is discussed by Aristotle, who highlights an inherent weakness
of any monarchic regime. Since the king is just one person, Aristotle argues, he is
dependent on others to maintain his position of prominence. Consequently, it becomes
necessary for a king to assign to his most eminent companions the task of listening and
watching, which enabled the king to see and hear everything. 362 This passage seems to
reflect Xenophon’s aforementioned passage on the Persian King’s eyes and ears, as both
point out the necessity to form a web of spies and informants through which any sign of
dissent can be treated before it endangers the stability of the domain or the position of the
monarch. The Achaemenid Empire was no different. Briant has no doubt that the Persian
central authorities took measures to facilitate firm control over the satrapies and to ensure
that those who governed them followed royal directives without hesitation.363
In light of the available evidence, several conclusions can be made. First, the
account of Xenophon demonstrates that the Achaemenids established a semiofficial
intelligence gathering network that was predicated on voluntary informants that informed
the Persian authorities about disloyal utterances and activities. Second, the numerous
parallel institutions in other imperial settings does not unquestionably prove the existence
of the office of the King’s Eye in the Achaemenid Empire, but it renders it more probable
that the Achaemenids invested efforts to monitor the provinces officially and unofficially.
Third, it is plausible that the Greek sources may have misunderstood or distorted the
functions of the office of the King’s Eye,364 but these discrepancies are not sufficient to
reject its historicity. Accordingly, the scholarly consensus suggests that a sort of secret
service existed, which relied on a large number of paid informants, i.e. ‘ears’ and ‘eyes’,
and was directed by a senior overseer, possibly the King’s Eye, who reported about the
affairs of the empire directly to the King.365 In my view, the existence of a high ranking
court official who was responsible for processing the massive flow of information coming

360

Frye 1963, 98.
Autran 1950, 290–91; Oppenheim 1968, 174 with n. 4.
362
Arist. On the Heavens 398a-b; Arist. Pol. 1287b29-30.
363
Briant 2002, 343.
364
Lenfant (2015, 116) deems the appearance of the King’s Eye in the Greek sources as a newly coined
expression which was a translation which designated a Persian institution and that the considerable
discrepancy is the outcome of the Greeks reinterpreting this office into a Greek term in a way that would
make sense from their own perspective.
365
Oppenheim 1968, 173; Frye 1984, 108–9 with n. 79; McNeal 1986, 156; Tuplin 1987a, 120; Pomeroy
1994, 241–42; Cataldo 2009, 59–60. A slightly different interpretation is offered by Balcer (1977, 261), who
suggests that there may have been at least one Eye for each satrapy, since the singularity of the office, as
described by Aeschylus, Herodotus and Aristophanes, is far from certain. Shahbazi (1988, 183–84) argues
that many security officials, whose identity was kept in secret, were called the ‘eyes of the King’. They
functioned as the chiefs of the bureau of security, and as such were assigned to perform various tasks,
inspection of the satrapies to name one.
361

55
from the ‘eyes’, ‘ears’ and ‘listeners’ in satrapies and deciding which reports demanded
the King’s attention is more than likely.

Conclusion
It is evident that the central Persian authorities invested considerable resources and
manpower in monitoring the satrapies. Satrapal administration consisted of chancellors,
scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status, while periodic inspections were
conducted by the King or his loyal agents. These measures facilitated a flow of information
from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the satrapies,
while establishing firm control over the satrapies and ensuring that royal directives were
executed. The capacity to gather intelligence could be used not only to detect signs of
insubordination among the subject nations but also among the satraps. The royal personnel
in the satrapies in general and in the satrapal court in particular constituted a continuous
reminder that nothing can escape the King. Consequently, since the local government was
constantly scrutinized, the chances that a satrapal rebellion or a local uprising were checked
at an early stage increased considerably.
It is difficult to determine when this royal surveillance array was established.
Xenophon’s claim, namely that the entire imperial apparatus was established en masse by
Cyrus the Elder, seems highly unlikely and it is more probable that royal supervision, just
like many other branches of the Achaemenid imperial government, developed gradually
over time. The rise of Darius, however, and the challenges he overcame must have
prompted an effort to expand and empower the institutions which were responsible for
supervising the satrapies.366 In this way, the Persian royal authorities kept a close eye on
the state of affairs in the satrapies and the conduct of the satraps. But while the satraps were
closely monitored by the Great Persian King, they were given considerable resources and
conferred with extensive executive power which corresponded with the numerous satrapal
duties they were expected to fulfill. Satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives are the
subject of the following chapter.
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3. SATRAPAL DUTIES AND RESOURCES
The office of satrap entailed numerous and diverse duties and functions. For successful
fulfillment of these satrapal obligations, the satraps had access to ample financial and
military resources. In the following, the emphasis is placed on the responsibilities of the
satrap vis-à-vis the central Persian authorities and the resources allocated to the satraps for
the successful completion of the tasks assigned by the Great Persian King. By surveying
the various satrapal obligations and resources we can obtain a better understanding of the
Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and how satrapal performance was
evaluated. Consequently, the extent and limitation of satrapal power, authority, and
jurisdiction are also clarified and contextualized. In this way, one can explain (1) what
motivated a certain satrap to prefer a specific course of action or policy over another and
(2) whether the consequences of such action were perceived as failures or successes by the
Persian royal authorities.

3.1 Satrapal Duties
Satraps as Protectors of Royal Domain
The Old-Persian Record (xšaçapāvā)
The term xšaçapāvā in the Old-Persian record is used to designate the Persian provincial
governors, whom the Greek authors call satraps.367 This designation, which appears twice
in the Bisitun inscription,368 constitutes a composite of two Old-Persian words: (1) xšaça
which is generally translated as ‘dominion’ or ‘monarchy’,369 and (2) pāvā, which means
‘guardian’.370 The exact nature of the term xšaça is contested. Briant argues that it is closely
connected to the abstract notion of kingship, as it “connotes first and foremost the total
loyalty to the king of the person described by it.”371 Conversely, several scholars claim that
xšaça contains a geographical element. Herrenschmidt, for instance, maintains that it
signifies not royal power but the Persian kingdom itself, i.e. the totality of the countries
through which the rule of Persian King extends.372 In a variant of this interpretation, Tanck
argues that the concept of kingship existed not only as a pure abstraction but signified a
specific territory as well. Through an analysis of the context in which the term xšaça
appears in Achaemenid royal inscriptions, she argues that the terms xšaça and dahyu are
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synonyms, and that the former denotes Persis and the latter the subject lands.373 Tanck’s
interpretation is widely favored as the term xšaçapāvā is generally translated as ‘protector
of the realm’.374 According to a more expansive definition, the xšaçapāvā, i.e. the satraps,
were keepers of Persian interests and order, both in Persis and the provinces.375
The emphasis on protecting the royal domain is corroborated by the actions of the
satraps mentioned in the Bisitun inscription. Darius recounts how Dādarshi, the satrap of
Bactria, was ordered to march to the adjacent Margiana in order to crush a rebel army led
by a Margian named Frāda. The satrap emerged victorious and Margiana was pacified.376
Similarly, Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, marched against a rebel army who had invaded
his satrapy on the orders of Vahyazdāta, allegedly another false Smerdis. Vivāna
vanquished the rebel forces twice and eventually captured and promptly executed
Vahyazdāta.377 These two satraps are portrayed as a loyal servants who protected the royal
domain on behalf of their King. The loyalty of Dādarshi and Vivāna is emphasized by the
thematic contrast in the Bisitun inscription between those who remained true to Darius and
those who were branded as liars for claiming to be the legitimate kings. We should not
forget, however, that the Bisitun inscription provides us with a mere glimpse of the Great
King’s expectation of his satraps. It is imperative, therefore, to consult other sources when
seeking to elucidate the nature and character of satrapal duties.
The Hebrew, Aramaic and Babylonian Sources
The Hebrew term ahashdarpān () ֲא ַּחשְדַּ ְרפָן, probably the Hebrew parallel for the OldPersian xšaçapāvā, makes several appearances in the biblical sources.378 Overall, these
officials are described as officers who received their orders directly from the Persian King.
This procedure may serve as an indication of their senior position in the satrapal hierarchy,
but we cannot conclude with certainty that this term is used to denote the provincial
governors.379 Similarly, the Babylonian texts pose a problem since the designation
aḫšadrapānu seems to signify either a provincial governor, i.e. satrap, or a lower-ranking
local administrative officer.380 The ambiguity becomes more prominent since the term bēl
pīḫāti is also frequently employed to designate satraps.381 In short, the overall scanty
evidence, the ambiguous context of the available documents and the problematic
373
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terminology renders it difficult to use Aramaic, Hebrew, and Babylonian sources to shed
additional light on the attributes of the office of satrap.382 Fortunately, the Greek sources
provide copious information on satrapal duties and responsibilities.
The Greek Sources
The duty of protecting the royal domain, the same duty which is embedded in the OldPersian designation of Achaemenid provincial governors, is well attested in the Greek
sources. According to Xenophon, it was Cyrus the Elder who proclaimed that he would
honor satraps who would became valuable protectors of his kingdom.383 But what was the
nature of the threats a satrap was expected to contain? An answer is provided by Xenophon:
τῶν μὲν γὰρ πολεμικῶν ἔργων ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὸν ἰσχυρῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐξ
ὁπόσωνπερ ἐθνῶν λαμβάνει <τι>, τέταχε τῷ ἄρχοντι ἑκάστῳ εἰς ὁπόσους δεῖ διδόναι
τροφὴν ἱππέας καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους, οἵτινες τῶν τε ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ
ἀρχομένων ἱκανοὶ ἔσονται κρατεῖν καὶ ἂν πολέμιοι ἐπίωσιν ἀρήξουσι τῇ χώρᾳ.
For we agree that [the Persian King] is strongly attentive to warfare, because regarding all
of the nations from which he exacts tribute, he orders each governor to provide
maintenance to as many horsemen, archers, slingers and light-armed troops as necessary,
so that [the governors] would be sufficiently capable to rule over their subjects and to
protect the land in case an enemy attacks.

Xenophon’s compressed account seems to entail two types of threats: (1) a local uprising
against Persian rule and (2) an incursion staged by a foreign entity. While the Achaemenids
had to suppress domestic rebellions on numerous occasions, the second type of threat is
somewhat ambiguous. Who were the enemies the satraps were expected to ward off? One
possibility is a foreign invasion force, such as the incursions staged by the Delian League
in the aftermath of Xerxes’ invasion, the Spartan military operations in Asia Minor in 401395 BC, and the invasion of the Greco-Macedonian army of Alexander the Great in 334
BC. Another potential enemy that posed a challenge to the authority of the Great King was
a rogue satrap. The insubordinations of Oroites and Aryandes have been discussed in detail
chapter 1, but while their audacity did not lead to open war, the revolts of Pissuthnes and
Cyrus the Younger were resolved only after an armed conflict. A satrapal rebellion
probably required direct royal intervention that is assigning the task of eliminating a
disobedient satrap to the governors of neighboring satrapies.384 An alternative threat that
the satraps had to grapple with were occasional raids staged by seemingly autonomous
peoples who dwelled within Persian territory and refused to acknowledge the sovereignty
382
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of the Great King. In Asia Minor, for example, the tribes dwelling in the mountainous
hinterland of Mysia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia frequently attacked royal domain.385 The
Persian response to the menace of the rural tribes of Asia Minor was military retaliation.386
Maintenance of the Armed Satrapal Forces
Since the satraps were expected to contain and suppress any military threat to Persian rule,
Persian supremacy in the satrapies was safeguarded through the presence of substantial
military forces. As noted above, Xenophon claims that when Cyrus the Elder dispatched
his satraps to their respective provinces he ordered them to muster cavalry and chariot units
from the Persians and allied nations.387 In addition, Cyrus instructed his governors to
maintain a sufficient number of horsemen, archers, slingers and light infantry388 and the
combat readiness of the satrapal forces was inspected on a yearly basis by the central
authorities.389 In essence, the satraps functioned muster-officer, quartermaster, and
paymaster since they were obligated to train, equip, and provision these contingents. 390
Satrapal Contribution to Royal Campaigns
The Composition of Achaemenid Royal Armies
The satraps were also expected to supply levies to royal campaigns. On numerous
occasions the Great Persian Kings issued a decree which ordered the subject peoples
throughout the Empire to contribute levies for the royal army. Cambyses, for instance,
marshaled an army for his Egyptian campaign in c. 525 BC that included various subject
nations, including the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks.391 Darius I issued a similar decree in
preparation for his campaign against the Scythians in c. 513 BC,392 and the same goes for
Artaxerxes I regarding the expedition he dispatched to retake Egypt in the 460s.393 The best
example, however, is provided by the Herodotean catalogue of Xerxes’ invasion force,
which exhibits the multi-ethnic composition of the royal armies deployed by the
Achaemenids. Herodotus provides a detailed account on the composition of Xerxes’ army,
which was comprised of no less than sixty-seven distinct ethnic units.394 These levies were
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mobilized from six different satrapies, stretching from Ionia to the Caucasus, and assigned
to ten different divisions.395 When seeking to convey the enormous size of Xerxes’ invasion
force Herodotus rhetorically asks “for which nation did Xerxes not lead from Asia to
Greece?”396
One may contest the level of accuracy of Herodotus’ list, but the abundant
ethnographic detail, the probability that Herodotus had access to veterans who served in
Xerxes’ army, and the compatibility with the catalogue of nations as recounted in the
Bisitun inscription, 397 means that it is highly unlikely that Herodotus fabricated this list.398
This does not mean, of course, that we should take it at face value. Nonetheless, we should
acknowledge that Herodotus’ sources regarding this matter were generally accurate.399
Another compelling example is the royal armies mustered by Darius III to ward off
the army of Alexander the Great. Curtius Rufus (3.2.1-10) reports that the royal army that
fought at the battle of Issus was mustered in Babylon in 333 BC and consisted of numerous
ethnicities. Curtius adds that the urgency to stop Alexander’s progress hindered the
enlistment of Bactrians, Sogdians, Indians and the dwellers of the Red Sea. The second
royal army that was routed in Gaugamela was even more ethnically diverse.400 In sum, the
ethnic diversity of the contingents that served in the armies of the Great Kings clearly
demonstrates that the subject nations were a crucial drafting pool for military manpower.401
What Was the Role of the Satraps?
The satraps were instrumental in the process of mobilization of royal armies. Herodotus
reports that immediately after Xerxes decided to invade Greece, the Persians who had
assembled at Susa departed to their respective provinces to facilitate the enlisting of
Pisidians, Cabelees, Milyae, Moschi, Tibareni, Macrones, Mossynoeci, Mares, Colchians, Alarodians,
Saspires and the island tribes that came from the Red Sea (τὰ δὲ νησιωτικὰ ἔθνεα τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἐρυθρῆς
θαλάσσης). The nations which contributed cavalry contingents were as follows (Hdt. 7.84-86.2): Persians,
Sagartians, Medes, Cissians, Indians, Bactrians, Caspians, Libyans, Paricanians and Arabians. The nations
which contributed ships and crew to Xerxes’ fleet (Hdt. 7.89-96): Phoenicians, Syrians, Egyptians, Cyprians,
Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Dorians, Carians, Ionians, Ionian islanders, Aeolians, Greek settlers from
Pontus, Persians, Medes and Scythians.
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troops.402 Though Herodotus does not spell out who these Persians were, it seems
reasonable to assume that they were the King’s satraps.403 Moreover, if we are to believe
Herodotus, the Achaemenid procedure regarding an official declaration of war required
preliminary deliberation in a war council assembled by the King. This forum must have
included the most prominent members of the royal court and plausibly several satraps
though certainly not all of them.404 In any case, Herodotus notes that after Xerxes
announced his final decision a sort of competition took place, as each satrap sought to win
royal favor by mustering the best equipped contingents.405
The satraps’ role in royal campaigns was not limited solely to the mustering phase.
Though the role and position of the satraps in the above mentioned examples is not
specified, it is reasonable that certain satraps may have assumed an active command post
as officers of the divisions levied from their satrapies, especially if the campaign took place
in a neighboring region, as exemplified in the role of the satraps in the Battle of the
Granicus River.406 Moreover, on various occasions satraps were promoted to lead the
King’s armies on large scale campaigns,407 an appointment which serves as an indication
that the appointed satrap had considerable military experience which merited such a
prestigious command.
Collection of Tribute
One of the primary civic duties of the satraps was the collection of tribute. Tribute held a
central role in Achaemenid royal ideology, as attested by Achaemenid royal inscriptions,408
and its importance is attested in the Greek sources as well. 409 Fortunately, the Greek
sources are more explicit in respect to the role of the satraps in regard to the collection of
tribute. Xenophon explicitly notes that the collection of tribute constituted a satrapal
duty.410 Furthermore, Thucydides recounts a letter sent by Darius II to Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus in 413 BC, in which the satraps were notified that the Great King wondered
why they failed to send the tribute as expected.411 This notification clearly demonstrates
Hdt. 7.19.3: Περσέων τε τῶν συλλεχθέντων αὐτίκα πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἑωυτοῦ ἀπελάσας.
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that the regular collection of tribute was a satrap’s responsibility. A successful collection
of tribute was facilitated through an effective exploitation of the agricultural potential of
the conquered territories. This explains why Xenophon points out that the satraps were
expected to see that their domain was prudently utilized,412 and that satraps who were able
to show a flourishing and densely populated satrapy were given additional land and other
honors, while those who failed to do so could have been removed from office.413
Imitatio Regis
According to Xenophon, the satraps were also expected to imitate Achaemenid royal
customs and practices. This was, once more, a directive that was allegedly issued by Cyrus
the Elder, who bid his satraps to follow his example and in turn to encourage their
subordinates to follow their examples.414 Accordingly, the satraps were instructed to reign
with moderation and self-restraint,415 to grant those who were worthy a seat at the satrap’s
table, to share the wealth of their satrapy with loyal subordinates, and to honor those who
exhibited noble character.416 The satraps maintained their own satrapal court, which was
to a great extent a miniature version of the royal court, and just like the Persian King, they
were expected to give audience to those who sought consultation.417 Furthermore, the
satrapal court was the place in which the satrap’s sons and sons of other Persian nobles
present in the region were educated.418 Xenophon also notes that the satraps were expected
to maintain extravagant gardens (παράδεισοι),419 a setting which allowed them to exercise
hunting and warfare, two skills that the Persian King and his nobles were expected to
hone.420 The purpose of these requirements, as Briant convincingly argues, was “to
conserve the political and cultural homogeneity of the Persians of the imperial diaspora.”421
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Conclusion
In essence, the satraps were expected to keep the peace and ensure that the tribute kept
flowing. As long as the King got his share of the revenue and his authority was
unchallenged, the satrap’s performance must have been regarded as adequate. More
importantly, a satrap who successfully met the King’s expectations received honors and
gifts.422 The Achaemenid Kings had a vast empire to rule and administer but the impressive
apparatus of royal supervision, as surveyed in the previous chapter, enabled a close watch
on the state-of-affairs in the satrapies. Even still, the King’s attention to matters of a
specific satrapy must have been limited, while the nature of satrapal duties reveal that only
in times of crisis, when the local satrap failed to contain, direct royal intervention was likely
to occur. As we shall see, the response of the Persian central authorities varied from limited
interventions such as issuing a royal decree or a change in personnel to the deployment of
a fully equipped royal army.

3.2 Satrapal Financial Resources
The Great King’s expectations of his satraps were numerous and demanding. A satrap who
wanted to maintain royal favor had to maintain the peace, to protect the land, to keep the
tribute flowing, and to pay the soldiers and administrators. In order to accomplish these
royal directives, the satrap was furnished with considerable financial resources in addition
to civic and military manpower. In what follows, a survey of the various sources of satrapal
revenue is offered. It is followed by a description of the mechanism through which the
Persians ensured the availability of capable manpower for military and civic purposes. By
outlining the scope and limitations of satrapal resources, we can contextualize the decisions
and policies enacted by the satraps of western Anatolia and achieve a better understanding
of the possibilities and necessities which led the satraps to prefer a specific course of action
or policy over another.
The Aristotelian Model
One of the most detailed accounts that are concerned with satrapal sources of revenue is
the Aristotelian Oeconomicus. This treatise provides a highly detailed description of the
financial resources which were at the disposal of the satraps. In contrast to the Herodotean
catalogue of satrapies, which merely quantifies the amount of tribute paid to the Great King
in silver talents, the Aristotelian economic manual enumerates no less than six types of
satrapal revenue:423
οἰκονομίαι δέ εἰσι τέσσαρες, ὡς ἐν τύπῳ διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιπτούσας
εὑρήσομεν), βασιλική σατραπική πολιτική ἰδιωτική… δεύτερον δὲ τὴν σατραπικήν. ἔστι
δὲ ταύτης εἴδη ἓξ τῶν προσόδων ἀπὸ γῆς, ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ἰδίων γινομένων, ἀπὸ
ἐμπορίων, ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρώτη μὲν καὶ
κρατίστη ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐκφόριον, οἱ δὲ δεκάτην
προσαγορεύουσιν), δευτέρα δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων γινομένη, οὗ μὲν χρυσίον, οὗ δὲ ἀργύριον,
οὗ δὲ χαλκός, οὗ δὲ ὁπόσα δύναται γίνεσθαι, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων. τετάρτη δὲ
καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ γῆν τε καὶ ἀγοραίων τελῶν γινομένη, πέμπτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν
βοσκημάτων, ἐπικαρπία τε καὶ δεκάτη καλουμένη, ἕκτη δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπικεφάλαιόν
τε καὶ χειρωνάξιον προσαγορευομένη.
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There are four types of administrations that can be classified (for we shall see that the rest
will fall into this classification): royal, satrapal, civic and private… The second type is the
satrapal administration. For this type there are six sources of revenue: from land, from those
who inhabit the land, from trade, from taxes, from cattle and from other sources. The first
and most important of these is revenue from land (which some call produce tax, while
others tithe). The second [source of revenue] is generated from the particular (sources of a
specific region), either gold, silver, copper or anything else that is available. The third is
revenue from trade stations. The fourth is revenue from dues imposed on land and markets.
The fifth comes from cattle, which is called revenue or tithe. The sixth is generated from
other sources, called poll-tax and craftsman-tax.

Since this work was probably composed in the last quarter of the fourth century BC or even
later424, it is uncertain to what extent this model reflects Achaemenid practices and
institutions. The apparent centrality of the provincial administration is an important
indicator425, but certainly not a definitive one. Aperghis, for instance, argues against the
view that the author incorporated Achaemenid elements into his model. He claims that the
Achaemenid decentralized monetary policy allowed satraps, cities and local dynasts in
Asia Minor and the Levant to mint their own coins. Aperghis points out that coinage is not
mentioned in the in the Aristotelian model and concludes that is was not predicated on the
Achaemenid Empire.426
There are, however, several objections to Aperghis’ conclusion. First, the economy
of the Achaemenid Empire was markedly flexible. While the financial system in the
western satrapies was fairly monetized, the commercial transactions in the core satrapies,
as attested in the Persepolis Fortifications tablets, were conducted in kind as well as in coin.
Furthermore, the Babylonian record reveals that taxes, dues and other commercial activates
had been discharged either in silver or in kind,427 while silver payments are also attested in
Egypt428 and in the Persepolis Archives.429 Second, there is little doubt that the main focus
of the discussed passage is the sources of satrapal revenue. Yet, the manner in which the
satraps exacted their imposts and dues seems secondary, and as a result it is not discussed
in detail. Hence, to deduce from the absence of coinage that the described model does not
reflect Achaemenid practices is far from convincing. Third, Aperghis himself claims that
“the financial administration of the Seleukid Empire inherited a great deal from that of the
424
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Achaemenids”.430 Later on he adds that the challenges the Seleucids grappled with were
essentially similar to those the Achaemenids faced, and that the Seleucids could not but
adopt the various Achaemenid administrative institutions, regulations, and practices that
proved themselves to be effective for over two centuries.431 In other words, even if
Aristotelian model is based on the Seleucid taxation system familiar to its author, it still
probably reflects certain Achaemenid elements that were appropriated by the Seleucids.432
As we shall see, there is a considerable body of evidence that shows that the majority of
the sources of revenue that are described in this passage were well in use during the
Achaemenid era.
The Classes of Satrapal Revenue
(1) Revenue from Land
The first type of satrapal revenue mentioned in Aristotle’s Oeconomicus is the income
generated from agricultural exploitation of the territories dominated by the Persians.433
Two designations are ascribed to this type of revenue: ἐκφόριον and δεκάτη. Such
articulation may imply that these terms are in fact synonyms that signify the same type of
income.434 Yet, Descat argues that these classifications corresponded to two distinct
systems of revenue extraction. The ἐκφόριον refers to a fixed rate set by the Persian
government on the basis of estimated agricultural productivity, while the δεκάτη denotes a
levy of 10% on the actual harvest.435 Furthermore, through an analysis of the Mnesimachus
inscription, dated to the early Hellenistic period, Descat offers a reconstruction of the
method by which the Persians assessed the agricultural potential of a given territory.436 He
maintains that the Persian tribute assessment was calculated on the basis of one mina of
gold (about 500 gr.) per, presumably squared, parasang (a tract of land of about 1.5 km2).437
There is little doubt that the taxes generated by agricultural production, whether in
kind, bullion or coin, were of the utmost importance. Herodotus states that the Great King
received regular tribute from each of the lands he ruled, along with provisions for his
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army.438 Moreover, according to Xenophon, the satraps were expected to maximize the
production of foodstuff in their respective domains, which resulted in greater income.439 It
should also be noted that numerous administrative documents found in Persepolis
demonstrate that produce of various types (e.g. grain, wine, fruits, and sesame) were levied
in the adjacent villages and stored in warehouses before being transported to an unknown
destination, though probably some sort of royal centers.440 The enactment of a tithe is also
well attested in the Persepolis archives. Several tablets from Persepolis, dated to the reign
of Darius I, constitute receipts for distribution of wine. Each of these documents recounts
a certain quantity of wine, of which one tenth is designated as a tithe (El. rit/riut).441
Another source which sheds light on levies in kind which were imposed by the Persian
authorities is the Book of Nehemiah. When seeking to illustrate his just and humble
conduct as the governor of Yehud, Nehemiah boasts that he stopped the levies of bread,
wine and cattle in addition to taxes (in silver shekels), which were exacted by his
predecessors, and whose purpose was to provide for the various expenses of the governor
of Yehud.442 Since Nehemiah was merely the underling of the governor of the satrapy
Beyond-the-River, the satrap must have enacted similar levies only on a grander scale.443
(2) Mines
Mines are the second type of revenue that is mentioned, and there is plenty of evidence that
indicates the availability of numerous mines, mineral deposits and other valuable materials
during the Achaemenid era. Herodotus reports that the Elamite site at Ardericca, located
about eighty km from Susa, was a source of bitumen, salt, and oil, 444 while in Phrygia a
lake near the city of Anaua yielded salt.445 He also notes the existence of naphtha fields in
the vicinity of Susiana.446 Strabo reports that in the vicinity of Syspiritis, an Armenian city,
a gold mine existed as well as a deposit of sandyx, an arsenic ore that was used to produce
red and purple dyes.447 Strabo also notes that both deposits were well known in the time of
Alexander the Great, and therefore were likely to be exploited by Alexander’s Achaemenid
predecessors.448 In addition, Strabo reports that Onesicritus, the Cynic philosopher who
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accompanied Alexander in his eastward march, claimed to have seen a river in Carmania
that produced gold dust in addition to mines of silver, copper, ochre, arsenic, and salt.449
In a passage that was predicated on the work of the fourth century historian Polycleitus of
Larissa, Strabo maintains that the Achaemenid Kings levied silver, gold, dyes, and other
goods that each province produced.450 Ctesias claims that there were silver mines in Bactria
and that the rivers in India produced gold.451 The latter claim is corroborated by Herodotus
who reports that the Indians send a tribute of 360 talents in the form of gold dust to the
Great King.452
In Egypt, ten Hieroglyphic rock inscriptions dated to the reign of Darius I are
concerned with the operations and workers in the stone quarries in Wadi Hammamat,
which was located in the mountains of the eastern desert. These quarries were exploited
continuously as early as the Early Kingdom and well into the Roman period. 453
Furthermore, Cypriot copper was also fairly popular in the Achaemenid period. Stager and
Walker address several items that were fashioned from copper that originated from Cyprus
and were found in Achaemenid imperial centers such as Persepolis and Pasargadae.454
The wealth of precious metals and other minerals is best exemplified by the Susa
Foundation Charter, a trilingual inscription which commemorates the construction of a
palace during the reign of Darius I. In this striking document, Darius provides us with an
account of the various minerals, precious metals, and other raw materials which were
gathered and used by the builders. He notes that cedar wood that was brought from
Lebanon, yaka-wood (i.e. North Indian Rosewood) from Gandara and Carmania, gold from
Lydia and Bactria, lapis lazuli and carnelian from Sogdiana, turquoise from Chorasmia,
silver and ebony from Egypt, and ivory from Nubia, India, and Arachosia.455 The wealth
of the satrapies and the capacity of the Great Kings to harness and effectively exploit it is
impressive.456 In short, there is little doubt that the Great Persian Kings had notable access
to a considerable variety minerals and precious metals.
The lack of evidence, however, prevents us from obtaining a precise understanding
of the actual income generated by mines, that is, the frequency and amount of the levies
imposed by the Persian authorities in respect to these operations. Briant postulates that the
owners of these sites were required to submit periodic accounts regarding their production
to the local Persian officials, which were used to exact a certain amount from each
operation according to an unknown rate.457 Such a hypothesis, despite the striking scarcity
of documentation, is reasonable. Aperghis, who is also well aware of the difficulty posed
by the absence of sources, points out the distinction in the Aristotelian Oeconomicus
449
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between the first type of revenue, namely revenue from land, and the second, which is the
income from mines and other natural resources. He argues that there is little doubt that the
Seleucid kings extracted significant revenue from natural resources, not only mines but
also forests, irrigation canals, industrial products, and so forth.458 Moreover, while the
evidence for Seleucid access to silver and gold ores is scarce, the availability and
exploitation of other precious metals, minerals, and products is well attested.459 Therefore,
the possibility that such lucrative resources were not exploited by the Achaemenids is
simply incredible, and it is difficult to believe that profiteering from natural resources was
a Seleucid innovation rather than a continuation of Achaemenid practices. The
considerable treasuries captured by Alexander, which consisted of massive amounts of
precious metals, should be seen as another, albeit indirect, attestation for Achaemenid
access to precious metals deposits.460
One question remains: to what extent did the satraps benefit from the availability
of precious metals and other natural sources that were found in the provinces? Gold and
silver mines were probably of crucial importance, and it is not unreasonable to assume that
the Great King might have preferred to exercise direct control over these and other lucrative
operations in the satrapies. Yet, there is a strong possibility that the satraps were in charge
of such operations. First, revenue from mines is explicitly classified in the Oeconomicus
as of the satrapal sort, hence under the supervision of the satrap himself. Since the satraps
were responsible for the King receiving his fair share of the revenue, whether goods or
cash, it seems plausible that the income from mines and other similar operations was also
supervised by the satraps and their underlings.461 Second, Xenophon provides clear proof
that the natural resources in the satrapies were well under satrapal authority. In 410 BC,
after the Peloponnesians lost an entire fleet in the battle of Cyzicus morale was low, and it
was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who exhorted Peloponnesian
soldiers by proclaiming that there was plenty of wood in the King’s lands, and later on he
provided them with timber and funds to rebuild their fleet.462 The implication is clear: not
only that the satraps had control over the natural resources in their domain, in this case a
resource of clear strategic importance, but they also had the discretion to use the resources
in their domain as they saw fit as long as the King received his tribute. Therefore, it is
reasonable for us to conclude that mines and other mineral deposits were managed by the
satrapal administration. This also means that the availability of natural resource probably
meant a substantial increase in revenue not only for the King but for the satraps as well.
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(3 & 4) Trade Posts, Lands and Markets
The third and fourth categories, i.e. taxes on trade posts, lands, and markets can be
interpreted as taxation on commercial activities. Regarding the taxes on trade posts, an
Aramaic palimpsest papyrus from Elephantine recounts the traffic of trade ships to and
from Egypt over an entire year.463 This document includes the ships respective destinations,
ports of origin, along with manifests of the crews, captains, and cargoes. It also enumerates
the taxes levied on the shipments carried by these ships, including entry and exit dues in
addition to taxes on itemized cargo. The payments were made to the ‘house of the king’,
i.e. the local Persian treasury.464 Similarly, tax imposts on harbors are attested in a bilingual
inscription from Xanthus, which commemorates a decree issued by Pixodarus, son of
Hecatomnus, who presided as the satrap of Caria from 341 to 335 BC.465 Though highly
fragmentary, it is evident that Pixodarus granted the people of Xanthus, Tlos, Pinanra, and
Candaya a tithe of the harbor dues (δεκάτην τῆς ἐμπορίας).
There were additional commercial activities which were taxed by the Persian
authorities. Babylonian administrative texts recount the legal obligation to register slavesales in the local royal tax office, and that a certain amount was levied on the transaction
as tax.466 Main traffic routes were also liable for taxation. A Babylonian tablet, dated to
496 BC, shows that those who sailed up and down the Euphrates River and used the riverine
installations, such as bridges and quays, were regularly taxed by the officials of the Persian
government.467 Another source of revenue was tax which was imposed on administrative
appointments. According to a Demotic papyrus from Elephantine, a certain Paibes made a
payment in two installments for the appointment of his son Djedhor as the second Wabpriest of Khanum.468 It seems clear, therefore, that the Persian authorities exacted revenue
from the appointments of a priest in the local temple, and quite possibly from additional
institutions with similar administrative hierarchy in Egypt and elsewhere.
(5) Tax on cattle
The tax on cattle that is mentioned by the author of the Aristotelian Oeconomicus was
probably calculated according to the increase of herds.469 Several documents from
Persepolis contain receipts for sheep and goats which were handed over as payment for a
tax called baziš. These documents note the name of the official to whom the payment was
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made, the number of animals, their kind, age, and sex.470 Additional documents list the
number of animals received by those who were sent to round up cattle, presumably state
officials,471 designated as the bazikara, i.e. the collectors of baziš.472 Another possible
subcategory of this tax type was levies of horses. Herodotus reports that the tribute the
Cilicians paid to Darius I constituted 360 silver talents in addition to 360 white horses.473
Moreover, Arrian states that upon the arrival of Alexander in the winter of 334/3 BC, the
people of Aspendus agreed to pay tribute to the Macedonian King, which included horses,
as they did for the Persian Kings.474 Strabo notes that the region of Cappadocia provided
the Persians, in addition to silver tax (ἀργυρικὸν τέλος), i.e. the regular tribute, no less than
1,500 horses, 2,000 mules, and 50,000 sheep. Strabo adds that the Medes payed twice as
much.475 Moreover, Strabo claims that the people of Media and Armenia were famous
horse breeders, 476 and he even mentions a disagreement in regard to the origin of the
Nisaean horses, which were famously used by the Persian Kings themselves, as some say
that it was Media while others Armenia. Herodotus, for example, states that the Nisaean
plain was located in Median territory,477 a claim which is possibly corroborated by the
Bisitun inscription where Nisaya is identified as a place in Media.478
(6) Pol-Tax or Craftsman’s Tax
Regarding the poll-tax that is mentioned in the Oeconomicus, there is no known source that
can corroborate that such a tax existed. The abovementioned Aramaic palimpsest papyrus
might elude to such a tax, since it includes the phrase ‘silver of the men’ ()גבריא כספ, which
might denote some kind of toll,479 and possibly a sort of poll-tax.480 Yet, the ambiguity of
this term renders it impossible to determine whether a poll-tax was actually employed by
the Persians or not.
Conclusion
Xenophon claims that Cyrus the Elder instructed his satraps to dispatch from each of their
provinces a fair share of the things which were fine and good back to the royal court. 481
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We are left to wonder what portion of the collected taxes was deemed the King’s share.482
It is evident, however, that the satraps presided over a diverse and multifaceted taxation
system, which facilitated a continuous flow of funds. Indeed, some of which were sent to
the Great King as tribute, while the rest was used for the military, administration and other
satrapal expenditures. The conditions, of course, were singular in each satrapy, and it is
rather certain that while certain satrapies were wealthy in natural resources, others were
not as fortunate. The satrapal sources of revenue were considerable but not limitless, and
we shall see in the following chapters that in times of crisis the satraps had to appeal to the
King for financial aid.

3.3 The Achaemenid Conscription System
The Persian authorities were in constant need of manpower. Various civic projects required
capable workers and skilled craftsmen while the armies of the Great King demanded fresh
levies of soldiers to fight the King’s wars and to maintain Persian military supremacy.
When seeking to understand the mechanism which enabled the Persians to acquire capable
laborers and soldiers, the Babylonian records provide us with ample evidence. The archives
of the Murašu family of Nippur483, the Egibi family of Babylon,484 and that of Bel-Rēmanni
of Sippar,485 along with the archives of the Ebabbar Temple in Sippar486 and that of the
Ezida Temple of Borsippa487, to name only a few, consist of numerous administrative
documents which shed light on the various aspects of the Achaemenid conscription
system.488
The Mechanism
According to the Babylonian records, the Persian authorities were able to meet the various
requirements for manpower by distributing crown lands. These lands granted to numerous
groups who dwelled in Babylonia, often of non-Babylonian descent, in exchange for
services and dues. Those who received these land grants were subjected to various taxes in
kind or silver along with the obligation to take upon themselves manual labor or military
service on demand. The allocated crown estates were divided into three categories: chariotland (bīt markabti), horse-land (bīt sīsî) and bow-land (bīt qašti). These designations
indicate the type of military service the grantees took upon themselves. Bow-lands were
expected to supply archers and infantry soldiers, owners of horse-land furnished cavalry
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soldiers, and chariot lands were to fit out chariots and charioteers.489 These taxes and
services owed by the occupants of crown land are identified in the Babylonian texts as ilku,
which is generally translated as ‘service’. In essence, the ilku tax constituted an annual
silver payment ranging from ten shekels (about 50 gr) up to 17 minai (about 8.5 kg),
depending on the size of the land held by the grantee. As noted above, this tax could also
be traded for other obligations, including corvée labor and military service when such
services were required.490 A certain function of the ilku tax, whose purpose was to ensure
the availability of unpaid, unfree labor, is designated as an urašu service.491 Another aspect
is denoted as upiyâta tax, which signifies the obligation to pay tax in-kind to the Great
King.492
Traditionally, a number of land holders were grouped into an administrative unit
called ḫaṭru(s), which was headed by a šaknu/šagnu, i.e. the foreman of the group. The
duties of the šaknu included the allocation of the land parcels among the members of the
ḫaṭru, ensuring that the all of the available land was allocated and used, collection of owed
dues and taxes, and making sure that any service obligations, military or otherwise, were
adequately fulfilled. These duties were imposed on individual real-estate owners, the
administrative personnel of temples that received land grants from the Persian authorities,
and probably other similar corporate organizations.493 Through this mechanism, the Persian
government was able to intensify agricultural exploitation of crown lands and consequently
maximize revenues. More importantly, a large pool of potential conscripts was created,
ensuring the availability of able-bodied men for manual labor and military service.494
Civic Applications
Babylonian Record
There are several instances which demonstrate the effectiveness of the Achaemenid
conscription system in regard to civic projects. In a document from Babylon, dated to 517
BC, we are informed that a certain Bulṭaya, probably a seasoned if not professional sailor,
received a monthly salary of eight shekels from Marduk Nāṣir Apli of the Egibi family to
transport cress, oil, and flour by boat to Babylon.495 This service is denoted as a ‘service
on behalf of the King’ (kanšu), an obligation to the Persian authorities that the Egibi firm
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incurred as the legal owner of crown land.496 A Babylonian tablet found in Borsippa, dated
to 488 BC, recounts a demand issued by the Persian authorities to haul boats to a quay near
Susa.497 These boats were appropriated for the collection of the abovementioned upiyâta
tax, and the service, denoted as urašu, i.e. liability for manual labor, was provided by an
owner of a bow-land. Similarly, another document of unknown date or origin revels that
eighteen registered owners of bow-land, who were members of the ḫaṭru of the Kirkaeans,
were conscripted by a certain garrison-commander named Edarni-Bel to haul two boats to
an unknown location.498
The obligation incurred by owners of crown lands enabled the Persian authorities
to finance and supply laborers for routine governmental operations and infrastructure
development. A document from the Egibi family archive, dated to 507 BC, recounts that
the abovementioned Marduk Nāṣir Apli paid a debt of one and a half mina of silver, and
that the money was used to finance the construction of a royal canal in Elam, possibly to
pay the wages of the laborers hired to dig the canal.499 There are additional documents
concerned with unspecified projects that reveal similar financial obligation along with
salaries and rations, paid in kind or silver by Marduk nāṣir apli.500 It has been suggested
that these financial payments were made due to ilku tax the Egibi family took upon itself
as the legal owner of crown estates.501 In any case, an additional document dated to 535
BC that was found in Sippar records the obligation of a certain Kinaya to the temple
administer (šangu) of the Ebabbar temple to monitor a nearby canal and to prevent it from
overflowing and damaging the royal road.502 Since a high ranking official in the temple
hierarchy seems to have been responsible for the wellbeing of the royal road in the region,
one can infer that the maintenance of roads and canals was imposed on local temples,
almost certainly in exchange for land grants. 503 A similar case is recounted in a document
from the same year and place. This time we are informed that six spades and four sickles
were brought to Bunene-shimanni and ten spades to Bel-silim at the sluice canal of the
Cyrus River Canal. The equipment was clearly intended for a large group in charge of
digging and maintaining the canal.504 Since this document belongs to the archive of the
Ebabbar temple in Sippar, the maintenance of the canal was probably assigned to the priests
serving in the temple.505 If that was the case, it seems reasonable to assume that such an
obligation was the result of a land grant given to the priests from the Persian government.
Road measurement was another task that the Persian authorities imposed on receivers of
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land grants. In Sippar, for example, the šaknu of the ‘temple-enterers’ (sing. ērib bīti) of
the Ebabbar temple, as recounted in a document dated to 530 BC, was obligated to measure
a road.506
Other Sources
There are numerous examples in non-Babylonian sources for corvée labor that was
furnished by the subject peoples on behalf of the Persian authorities. Regarding the
province of Yehud, the author of the Book of Nehemiah mentions that some of the subjects
of the King had to mortgage their lands and vineyards in order to be able to pay the
tribute.507 Another possible attestation appears in Herodotus’ account. After the Persian
fleet suffered heavy losses following the failed attempt to circumvent Mount Athos, Xerxes
ordered to dig a canal through the isthmus of the promontory to facilitate a safe passage for
his armada.508 Briant points out that in addition to Xerxes’ troops, the inhabitants around
Mount Athos also participated in the project, probably the denizens of the five cities
mentioned by Herodotus.509 The local workers were probably conscripted to participate in
the project, which is reminiscent of the practices recorded in the Babylonian sources.
Similarly, several sources report that the Suez Canal, whose construction was initiated by
the Egyptian King Nacho, was completed by Darius I.510 It is reasonable to assume that the
canal was constructed by conscripted workers from the neighboring settlements in a
manner that resembles the mechanism described in the Babylonian records.511 Moreover,
in the aforementioned Aristotelian Oeconomicus, we are informed that Antimenes, having
been appointed by Alexander to preside as the supervisor of roads, ordered the satraps to
see that the storehouses along the royal roads were adequately stocked. A possible
implication that can be deduced, assuming that this was a continuation of Achaemenid
practice, is that the satraps were responsible for road maintenance, including the supply of
provision and routine upkeep of the roads, probably by means of corvée labor.512 This
impression seems to be corroborated by a fairly colorful anecdote recorded by Aelian, who
claims that a certain stretch of road from Susa to Media was filled with scorpions.
Accordingly, every time the Great King’s entourage was about to use this route, the road
was cleared.513 Since we are only told that the King issued the order to clear the road three
days before his journey, it seems reasonable to assume that this task was assigned to the
satraps, who saw that a local workforce was collected for the execution of this labor.
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Lastly, the Susa Foundation Charter provides us with a clear demonstration that the
Persians were able to employ specialists from numerous satrapies for their building
Projects. Babylonian workers dug the foundations, Cedar wood was transported by
Assyrians, Carians and Ionians, Ionian and Sardian masons fashioned the stone columns,
Mede and Egyptian goldsmiths produced decorations, Egyptians carpenters also
participated in the works, and Babylonian workers fashioned the bricks.514 It is evident,
therefore, that the satraps, either on behalf of the King and probably for the sake of their
own operations, had the capacity to enlist and employ capable and skilled manpower for
various projects and other services,515 and that civic projects and operations were financed
and maintained through the obligation incurred by holders of crown lands.
Military Applications
As noted above, the occupants of crown estates were liable for military service. In a similar
fashion to corvée labor, the conscription of soldiers was based on the needs of the Persian
central authorities. In other words, in times of peace the holders probably cultivated the
land and paid taxes in kind or coin, though the military obligation did not lapse but simply
was not implemented. Moreover, the sources show that crown land owners were able to
hire replacements when seeking to discharge themselves from military service. This means
that the Persian officials did not care about the identity of the person who reported for duty,
as long as the quota was met.516
Babylon
Again, the Babylonian administrative archives shed light on how the military applications
of the Achaemenid conscription system operated. A Babylonian document dated to 513
BC lists the equipment provided for twelve squires who accompanied cavalry soldiers for
a period of three years.517 The equipment was supplied by three individuals, who were
probably liable for this military service but hired replacements to take their place and
furnished them with the provisions appropriate for their task. Moreover, in a letter which
recounts an argument over jurisdiction between a certain Guzanu, an owner of a chariotland, and an unnamed officer of the citadel in Sippar, we learn that the former was deprived
of his chariot driver, shield-bearer, i.e. the third man on the chariot, along with several
militia men.518 This example demonstrates a correlation between being the owner of
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chariot-land and the obligation to serve as a charioteer. Another document, dated to 487
BC, recounts how a certain Babylonian businessman made a payment of silver to discharge
himself from the obligation to supply military equipment and travel provisions.519
Similarly, holders of bow-land in Nippur in 422 BC were forced to take a loan in order to
obtain clothing and additional unspecified military equipment.520 Another document, dated
to 421 BC, also from Nippur, constitutes a contract between Rimut-Ninurta, who owed
cavalry service in Uruk, and Gadalyama, who received payment and equipment to take
upon himself this obligation.521 Lastly, the responsibility of holders of bow-land in Nippur
to furnish soldiers is attested in a document dated to 421 BC.522
Darius’ Bisitun Inscription
The numerous examples provided by the Babylonian record should not be taken as an
indication that these administrative practices and regulations were exclusive to Babylonia.
Similar taxation and conscription systems are attested in other satrapies, albeit not as
frequently.523 To begin with, the term bow-land (bīt qašti) appears in the Babylonian
version of the Bisitun inscription,524 while in the parallel section in the Old-Persian version,
Darius boasts that he restored the farmsteads, livestock, houses and slaves which Gaumāta
stole from the people.525 This phrase may indicate that the actions of Gaumāta, which
allegedly disrupted the order of things, were reversed by Darius, and also that, just like in
Babylon, crown land was parceled and granted to the King’s subjects in return for taxes
and services throughout the Empire.
Asia Minor
The conscription system which is depicted in the Babylonian record is also corroborated
by the Greek sources. Apparently, this system was known to Herodotus, who reports that
the King’s land was parceled out to provide for his army, though he does not specify what
was to be provided.526 This is clarified by Herodotus’ report regarding the immediate
Persian response to the burning of Sardis by the Ionian rebels in 498 BC. According to
Herodotus, the Persians who dwelled in the districts west of the Halys River were able to
muster an army and to defeat the Ionians near Ephesus.527 Such an immediate and effective
response was impossible without a well-established system similar to the one described in
the Babylonian sources. Another interesting and revealing episode is recorded by
Xenophon. An estate that was owned by a Persian named Asidates, situated in the vicinity
of Pergamum, was attacked by Xenophon and his men. After the Persian noble and his men
were able to withstand the attack, they signaled to their neighbors that they were in distress.
Shortly after several forces came to the rescue. Xenophon reports that these forces included
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a band of men-at-arms led by a certain Itamenes, an unspecified number of Assyrian
hoplites and eighty Hyrcanian cavalrymen from Comania, 800 peltasts and cavalry troops
from Parthenium along with a contingents that came from Apollonia and other adjacent
districts.528 The Assyrian and Hyrcanian soldiers are identified by Xenophon as troops who
received their pay from the King, and their maintenance and wages were probably financed
through revenues generated by crown estates.529 In any case, the quick response coupled
with the diversity and impressive size of the Persian reinforcements demonstrate not only
the dense settlement pattern under Persian rule, but more importantly the readiness of the
local communities to provide levies to ward off raiders. It is highly likely that the troops
that came to the rescue were holders of crown estates who answered when duty called.530
In 396 BC, while campaigning in western Anatolia, the Spartan King Agesilaus
realized that he was at a tactical disadvantage due to lack of sufficient cavalry forces in
comparison to the Persian contingents under the command of Tissaphernes. Therefore, he
compiled a list of the wealthiest men in the region and ordered them to provide horses,
weapons and trained cavalry troops. The Spartan king’s demand was quickly met.531 Again,
this indicates that the local population was already capable of furnishing cavalry soldiers
in a relatively short time span, probably due to the well-established institutions and
procedures similar to those described in the Babylonian records. Lastly, it has been
suggested that the non-local detachments that were deployed at the battle of Granicus were
also recipients of crown estates.532
Egypt
The presence of available military personnel, facilitated through the allocation of crown
land, is also well attested in Egypt. An Aramaic Papyrus, dated to 495 BC, shows that land
parcels were allocated by the Persian authorities and that at times there were disagreements
between landholders, which were resolved by the imperial administration.533 That the
occupants of these lands probably incurred an obligation to serve in the Persian army is
demonstrated in a document dated to 461 BC, which shows that an Aramaean soldier
stationed in the garrison of Elephantine was the legal owner of a plot of land.534
Interestingly, an additional record from Elephantine, composed after 434/3 BC, recounts a
dispute between a soldier serving in the garrison and a woman. According to the petitioner,
named Nattun, in spite of the fact that the discussed tract of land that was owned by his
detachment was ploughed, he did not receive his share of the revenue.535 Another
illuminating Aramaic document, dated to the late fifth century BC, records the satrap
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Arshama’s (i.e. Arsames) reaffirmation of a hereditary lease.536 Interestingly, in his reply,
Arshama reminds the grantee that he will have to pay tax for the land he inherited from his
father. Another letter dispatched by Arshama mentions thirteen Cilicians, whom the satrap
ordered to release from custody after he had concluded that they were not deserters but
rather captured by Egyptian rebels.537 It has been suggested that since these men were
captured after they were unable to make it safely into the garrison, they probably served in
a non-local detachment in Egypt, and were probably given crown land as a source of
income.538 Similarly, a document discovered in Saqqara mentions ‘fields of the garrison’
and ‘things that ought to be brought to the house of the King’, i.e. the treasury.539 It is
certain that the estates occupied by foreign garrison soldiers in Egypt were land grants
distributed by the imperial administration in order to provide for the soldiers in return for
their services.
Conclusion
The Great Persian King expected much of his satraps, and in order to successfully meet
these expectations, the satraps were furnished with ample resources. Satrapal financial
resources and manpower were considerable. Satrapal sources of revenue were numerous
and lucrative while the Achaemenid conscription system guaranteed that there would be
no shortage of laborers and soldiers. All of the above instances give a strong impression
that the satraps must have had considerable military forces at their disposal. Therefore, the
extent and limitation of satrapal military capacity is the focus of the following section.

3.4 Satrapal Military Capacity
The Types/Categories of Satrapal Forces
As we have seen, the Great King expected his satraps to keep the peace, to suppress local
uprisings, and to ward off external threats. Accordingly, the satraps had considerable
military forces at their disposal.540 The ancient sources allow us to identify three types of
military forces in any given satrapy: (1) elite units that consisted of soldiers hailing from
the core satrapies, often of Persian origin, (2) non-local contingents which were drafted
and transplanted by the Persian authorities, often times occupants of crown estates, and (3)
local contingents which were levied as a part of the subject nations’ obligation to contribute
a certain number of troops in addition to regular tribute.541
Royal vs. Local
Klinkott makes a distinction between ‘royal troops’ (“Reichstruppen”), a term which he
employs to denote non-native soldiers who served in a given satrapy, and ‘satrapal’ or
‘administrative’ troops (“Satrapen- oder Verwaltungstruppen”), a term which he ascribes
to the local contingents conscripted by the satrap himself.542 Such categorization, however,
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is somewhat problematic. On the one hand, all of the forces stationed in the satrapy were
‘satrapal’. On the other, we have seen in the previous chapter that in spite of the fact that
Xenophon identifies certain units and officers in the satrapies as ‘royal’, all of the satrapal
forces, of local and foreign origin, were under satrapal authority. Even if the involvement
of the central authorities in the appointment of officers and placement of garrisons
constituted an effective measure to cultivate obedience among the provincial governors,
each satrap was the senior officer in his domain in regard to civic and military affairs. For
this reason, the terminology employed by Klinkott creates an unnecessary confusion in
respect to the authority of the satrap vis-à-vis the military personnel in his satrapy. The
distinction between ‘royal’ and ‘satrapal’ or ‘administrative’ troops insinuates that only a
portion of the military forces in the satrapy were subordinate to satrapal authority. If the
title ‘royal’ is irrelevant in respect to satrapal jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to conclude
that this designation was used by Xenophon to distinguish non-local contingents, i.e.
Persian and other, from local levies, and nothing more.
The Various Satrapal Units
Satrapal Land Army
The ancient sources provide ample information regarding the units which comprised the
forces stationed in the satrapies. Xenophon mentions horsemen, archers, slingers, light
infantry,543 and even chariot units.544 The types of unites mentioned by Xenophon are well
attested. Cyrus the Younger, for instance, deployed twenty scythed chariots in the battle of
Cunaxa.545 Sling-bullets inscribed with Tissaphernes’ name found at Gördes, located in
northern Lydia, suggest that the satrap of Lydia had slingers at his disposal.546 Moreover,
there are numerous instances of satraps in command of cavalry squadrons, infantry
detachments and sometimes both. For example, Thucydides reports that in 412 BC
Tissaphernes came to Miletus with infantry and cavalry forces,547 and shortly after he
moved on to Iasus with an infantry contingent.548 Xenophon reports that Thibron dreaded
the superior cavalry forces of Tissaphernes.549 Another satrap with a formidable cavalry
force at his disposal was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.550 Moreover,
the joint armies of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, deployed in 397 BC in Ionia against the
Spartan General Dercylidas, consisted of infantry and cavalry divisions,551 and a similar
satrapal army was deployed in the battle of Sardis in 395 BC. 552 According to Diodorus,
this army amounted to ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry.553 In sum, the
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military forces deployed by the satraps of western Anatolia were formidable and fairly
diverse.554
Satrapal Fleet
There are several attestations for the existence of satrapal fleets. The expedition of
Aryandes against the Libyans included unspecified naval forces. 555 In c. 500 BC the
governor of Sardis was able to furnish 200 ships for a military campaign against the island
of Naxos.556 Pharnabazus, together with Conon the Athenian, was the supreme commander
of the Persian navy that defeated the Spartans near Cnidus.557 Later on, Pharnabazus and
Conon sailed to Greece, occupied Cythera, and used it as a base of operations to raid the
Laconian coastline.558
Mercenaries
Just like the Achaemenid Kings, the satraps were ready and able to augment their armies
with mercenaries whenever necessary.559 It should be noted that despite the fact that the
available sources recount numerous instances in which the Persians hired soldiers of
fortune, almost all of known instances are concerned with Greek mercenaries.560 In 441/0
BC the satrap of Lydia Pissuthnes supplied 700 mercenaries to Samian exiles who planned
to retake the island after it was captured by Athens.561 In 427 BC Pissuthnes dispatched
Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries to assist the pro-Persian party at Notium.562 Probably
in the late 420 BC the same Pissuthnes, now in a state of open revolt, employed Greek
mercenaries against the King’s forces. Eventually the Greek mercenaries defected to the
King’s side and brought about the downfall of the rogue satrap.563 Pharnabazus too
supplied the Peloponnesians with mercenary soldiers in 411 BC.564
One of the most famous Persian employers of Greek mercenaries was Cyrus the
Younger. According to Xenophon, when Cyrus travelled to the royal court after he had
Xenophon (Cyr. 5.3.24) makes a distinction between plain cavalry troops (ἱππεῖς) and mounted archers
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been summoned by his father Darius II, he was escorted by 300 Greek bodyguards.565 Later
on, when Cyrus decided to overthrow his brother Artaxerxes II, he issued a command to
the garrison commanders stationed in the Ionian cities to enlist as many Peloponnesian
mercenaries as possible and of the best quality.566 According to Xenophon, the pretext for
such action was the need to counter Tissaphernes’ purported design to recapture the Ionian
city-states.567 Later on, Cyrus began enlisting barbarian and Greek mercenaries, while
publicly declaring that he was making preparation for a campaign against the Pisidians.568
The overall impression is that the enlistment of mercenaries was a well-established satrapal
prerogative. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that even when Cyrus’ ploy was finally
detected by Tissaphernes, it was due to the overly extensive size of Cyrus’ army rather than
the mustering itself.569 Moreover, after Cyrus was killed at the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus,
the leader of the Greek mercenary contingent, informed Tissaphernes that he and his men
were willing to switch sides and to fight the King’s war against the Mysians, Pisidians, and
Egyptian rebels.570 Such an offer, if we are to believe Xenophon, indicates once more that
the deployment of mercenaries in times of necessity was nothing but ordinary.
Another interesting example is that of Mania, the wife a Zenis of Dardanosu, a
viceroy of Pharnabazus and the Persian governor of Aeolis. After Zenis passed away,
Mania administered her late husband’s domain with much success. She even conquered
several coastal Greek cities by using Greek mercenaries. 571 Similarly, Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus employed Greek mercenaries when they were seeking to ward off the
Peloponnesian army led by Dercylidas in 397 BC.572 Xenophon also reports that the
preparations of Pharnabazus and Conon to raid the coastline of Laconia included fitting
ships and hiring unspecified mercenaries.573
In the late 350s BC Artaxerxes III was mustering an army to recapture Cyprus. On
the Great King’s demand, Idreius, of the Hecatomnid household and the satrap of Caria at
the time, supplied forty triremes and 8,000 mercenary troops to the Persian expedition.574
Moreover, due to the growing power of Philip II, the same Artaxerxes ordered his satraps
to assist the Perinthians, who were besieged by Philip in 340 BC. In response, the satraps
sent to Perinthus a force of mercenaries along with funds, food, weapons and other
necessary provisions.575 In short, the satraps of western Anatolia, and doubtlessly satraps
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in other regions throughout the Empire, had access to an extensive pool of hired soldiers,
in addition to funds and the permission to enlist mercenaries to resolve problems in their
satrapy or when commanded by the King.576
Military Personnel from the Core Satrapies
Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus the Elder, once again, the Achaemenid practice of enlisting
Persian soldiers to serve in the provinces.577 There are numerous instances in the ancient
source of military personnel hailing from the core satrapies, namely Persia. Babylonia and
Media, in the satrapies. Herodotus, for example, reports that Oroites had 1,000 Persians
under his command,578 and that Persian troops were stationed in the citadel of Memphis
along with allied contingents,579 which, according to Thucydides, were Medes.580 Persian
and Babylonian troops and more frequently officers appear on multiple occasions in the
Elephantine papyri.581 The aforementioned garrison in Deve Hüyük in Syria was manned
by soldiers of Persian origin.582
The presence of Persian soldiers and officers in the satrapies is far from surprising.
On the one hand, these units were more inclined to remain loyal to the Persian authorities,
which explains why many of the Persians who appear in the archives of Elephantine served
as commanding officers. On the other, the Persians were renowned warriors. The Persian
warrior code is clearly articulated in an inscription found in Naqsh-I Rustam, in which
Darius I proclaimed that he was a good horseman, and could use the bow and spear on a
horseback and on foot.583 At Persepolis, Darius set another inscription in which he claims
that Persis produced good horses and good men.584 The Persian warlike nature and military
capacity were well known to the Greeks. Herodotus states that the Persians saw that their
youth were capable of riding a horse, hurling a spear and shooting arrows.585 Xenophon
claims that Cyrus the Younger surpassed all in horsemanship, archery and javelin throwing
to such a degree that he was able to overcome a bear he encountered while hunting.586
Similarly, Xenophon reports that Persian boys who reached the age of ten were expected
to have mastered the usage of a bow, a javelin and a sabre. 587 Moreover, the Greeks
witnessed the battle hardened Persians in action on multiple occasions. Herodotus, for
instance, takes special notice to the famous force of 10,000 Persian soldiers known as the
Immortals.588 He also states that at the battle of Plataea Mardonius’ elite guard of 1,000
Persians proved to be a formidable enemy and that only after Mardonius and his Persians
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perished the rest of the barbarian army broke into flight. 589 Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume that the Persian contingents stationed in the satrapies were well-trained and wellequipped, especially in comparison to locally conscripted units, and as such formed an elite
fighting force which was at the disposal of the satrap.
Functions
According to Xenophon, Persian occupation troops were stationed in two types of
garrisons: (1) those serving in the citadels of urban centers and (2) those stationed in key
locations in the countryside. The former were commanded by phrouarchs (φρούραρχοι),
hereinafter designated as garrison commanders, while the latter were commanded by the
chiliarchs (χιλίαρχοι).590 It is generally agreed that Xenophon makes a distinction between
the small detachments stationed in the citadels of fortified urban centers and the widely
scattered and thinly spread satrapal militia stationed in the countryside. 591 As such, the
units which were under the authority of the chiliarchs probably included the garrisons
placed along the royal road, as reported by Polyaenus.592 Tuplin makes another observation
regarding Xenophon’s account, namely that Xenophon employs the general term φρουροί
to denote soldiers stationed in the citadels of the urban centers, while the soldiers stationed
in the country are identified as φυλακοί.593 It is evident that the purpose of such distribution
of the military satrapal forces was to secure Persian hold over the administrative,
commercial, and strategic centers in the provinces while providing protection to the
periphery from various immediate threats, such as incursions staged by the aforementioned
hill tribes.594
Function of the Elite Soldiers
While the overarching objective of the satrapal military forces was to protect the provinces,
the sensitive duty assigned to the forces installed in the citadels and key locations was
clearly of greater importance. Accordingly, Klinkott postulates that the elite Persian and
royal detachments were placed in such essential locations.595 This postulation seems
reasonable since the Persian authorities must have implemented various measures to
maintain control in case of a local uprising, one of which was to install soldiers of
unquestioned loyalty in strategically important locations. As noted above, Herodotus
recounts the presence of Persian military personnel in the provincial capitals of Memphis596
and Sardis.597 Key strategic locations were also held by Persian troops. For example, the
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aforementioned site of Deve Hüyük, which was manned by Persian troops, constituted a
crucial checkpoint on the road which connected northern Mesopotamia to the Syrian
heartland.598 According to Xenophon, the garrison which was installed on the Syrian side
of the Cilician Gates, an important passageway that connected the low plains of Cilicia to
the Anatolian Plateau, was under royal authority in 401 BC.599 Since Xenophon notes royal
involvement regarding this particular strategic point, it is plausible that the soldiers serving
in this post hailed from the core satrapies. Furthermore, the senior officer of garrison in
Elephantine, which was situated on the southern border of Achaemenid Egypt, had military
jurisdiction over Upper Egypt as far as Memphis.600 Therefore, it is significant to note that
the persons who presided as the garrison commanders were exclusively Persians, and many
of the soldiers were of non-local origin.601
In sum, the placement of royal troops, whether Persian or other, in sensitive
strategic points had two objectives: (1) to protect the satrapies from potential external
threats and (2) to contain and suppress local uprisings, with or without the assistance of
satrapal forces of local origin. If a rebellion proved to be too much for the Achaemenid
garrisons, the loyal Persian forces in the satrapies were presumably expected to maintain
control over key positions and to hold the line until the arrival of reinforcements from the
King or from the adjacent satrapies. A similar scenario occurred in Sardis at the beginning
of the Ionian revolt and once more in Egypt in the 460s BC. In the latter case, after a local
uprising spun out of control, the Achaemenid garrison in Memphis was besieged by the
Egyptian insurgents and their Athenian allies. The siege was lifted eventually and the
garrison was relieved due to efforts of Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, who was dispatched by
Artaxerxes I with an army to restore Persian rule in Egypt.602
Function of the Local Levies
In spite of some reservation in regard to their loyalty to the Persian authorities, the local
levies still constituted an important element not only in the Persian royal armies but also in
the satrapies. Conscripted soldiers, whether local or foreign, could be drafted and used in
routine security details as well as in times of crisis. The local Jewish community at
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Elephantine, for example, supplied troops for the local Persian garrison.603 Similarly, we
have seen that the Babylonian documents surveyed above recount numerous instances in
which holders of crown land in Babylon and the adjacent settlements furnished manpower
and equipment for military purposes.604 Since there is no indication that these services were
rendered in times of crisis, one can conclude that the soldiers and provisions supplied by
the inhabitants of Babylonia were intended to be used in routine security tasks.605
Furthermore, conscription was also employed to augment satrapal forces in special
circumstances. For instance, when seeking to convey the formidable military might of
Oroites, Herodotus reports that while the satrap of Lydia had 1,000 Persian troops at his
disposal, he was also able to muster forces from Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia. 606 The
distinction between the Persian elite guard stationed at the satrapal court and the forces that
could be potentially levied from the provinces which comprised Oroites’ domain indicates
that Herodotus was referring to local levies which were ready for recruitment. According
to Xenophon, when Cyrus the Younger decided to rebel he took special care that the
barbarian contingents in his satrapy were adequately trained as soldiers, 607 and when he
began his march upwards he commanded a force of 100,000 barbarians. 608 Even if the
figure supplied by Xenophon is inaccurate, the army of Cyrus was formidable, since the
Persian prince must have realized that a clash with a fully equipped royal army was
inevitable. These soldiers must have been levied from the regions under Cyrus direct
control, namely Lydia, Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia.609
The Versatility and Capacity of the Satrapal Forces
The various types of land and sea forces along with an extensive pool of conscript soldiers
and mercenaries indicate that the military capacity of the satraps was quite formidable.
Numerous examples demonstrate that the satraps were able not only to effectively protect
their domain but also to launch military campaigns independent of royal support.
The account of Darius I in the Bisitun inscription demonstrates the impressive
extent of satrapal military capacity. The events recounted in the inscription reveal four
ways by which Darius suppressed the multiple rebellions against his rule: (1) to personally
lead an army against a rebellious nation;610 (2) to intimidate the locals, thus inducing them
to handover the ringleaders of the revolt;611 (3) to appoint a general by a special
Porten et al. 1996, 31B, B34, B39, B49 (“Jew of Elephantine the fortress”) and B24 (“Jew who is in
Elephantine the fortress”). An additional document (Porten et al. 1996, B50) records a complaint filed against
a Jewish soldier.
604
See p. 75 above.
605
Xenophon (Cyr. 8.8.20) notes an ancient Persian custom according to which those who held lands were
expected to furnish cavalrymen for the protection of the country while those who performed outpost duty in
defense of the country received pay for their services. It is easy to detect a clear distinction between forces
in charge of a routine protection, i.e. those serving in the outpost in contrast to seemingly reserve cavalry
forces that were levied for other purposes, probably due to a local crisis or a royal demand for troops.
606
Hdt. 3.127.
607
Xen. An. 1.1.5.
608
Xen. An. 1.7.10.
609
Xen. An. 1.9.7.
610
DB §16-20 (Babylon); DB §31-32 (Media); DB §40-44 (Persis).
611
DB §22-23 (Elam).
603

86
commission and to send him with an army to crush a rebellion;612 (4) to order a satrap to
suppress a revolt with his own contingents. The fourth type of response is crucial to the
present discussion. Darius proclaims that his father Hystaspes, most likely the presiding
satrap of Parthia, squashed a revolt that engulfed Parthia and Hyrcania.613 Only after
Hystaspes made his first attempt to suppress the rebels, we are told that Darius sent
reinforcements to his father.614 Similarly, Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was sent to
suppress a revolt in the adjacent Margiana,615 while Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, was
ordered by Darius to crush a local uprising.616 Darius explicitly mentions the instances in
which he himself furnished armies to a specially commissioned general, but there is not
even a hint that he sent reinforcements to these satraps. Hence, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the absence of any mention of royal military support indicates that the
satrapal contingents were sufficient to deal with the threat posed by the local insurgents.
Satrapal mobilization was capable of producing sizable armies. The army collected
by Cyrus the Younger to repel Tissaphernes was capable of laying siege to Miletus, a
formidable task which must have required a large force.617 As noted above, when the
Persian crown prince began he march into the Persian heartland, he was able to muster
100,000 barbarian troops in addition to 13,000 Greek mercenaries. 618 While Xenophon’s
figure cannot be taken at face value, it still serves as an indication that Cyrus non-Greek
forces were considerable. Similarly, in their attempt to ward off the Peloponnesian land
army commanded by Dercylidas, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were able to muster from
their respective satrapies a joint force of 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. 619 Another
revealing example is the aforementioned raid staged by Xenophon and his men on an estate
of a local nobleman in Mysia. The Greek mercenaries were warded off by considerable
forces that came to the rescue from the nearby settlements.620 This instance serves as a clear
demonstration that the satrapal force were able to provide almost an immediate response
to such threats.
Granicus
There are two events which, although occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century,
shed light on satrapal military might. There are the battle of the Granicus River (334 BC)
and the battle of Gaugamela (331 BC). According to Diodorus, the Persian army that
engaged Alexander at the battle of Granicus was commanded by generals and satraps.621 It
seems reasonable to assume that this force did not constitute a fully equipped royal army
DB §25 (Hydarnes in Media); DB §26-28 (Dādarshi in Armenia); DB §29-30 (Omises in Armenia and
Assyria), DB §33 (Takhmaspāda in Sagartia); BD §49-50 (Intaphernes in Babylon).
613
DB §35.
614
DB §36.
615
DB §38.
616
DB §45-48.
617
Xen. An. 1.1.7. In the following passage (An. 1.1.8), Xenophon adds that Cyrus sent a letter to his brother
Artaxerxes II, in which he demanded that the Ionian cities should be taken from Tissaphernes and given to
him. At no point in this communication Cyrus requests reinforcements, which implies that his army was
raised by using the resources he had at his disposal without any royal assistance.
618
Xen. An. 1.7.10.
619
Diod. 14.39.4-5.
620
Xen. An. 7.8.15.
621
Diod. 17.18.2: οἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπαι καὶ στρατηγοὶ.
612

87
similar to those Alexander was destined to meet at Issus and Gaugamela, but rather a joint
force of various contingents hailing from the adjacent satrapies. The mustering of a royal
army usually took considerable time, as it is best exemplified by Xerxes’ preparation for
his Greek campaign, which, according to Herodotus, took no less than four years.622
Therefore, the army that was ordered to ward off the Greco-Macedonian invasion force in
the spring of 334 BC was probably scrambled quickly by the satraps of Anatolia along with
additional forces that were able to make it in time to provide assistance.
Diodorus provides a detailed description of the satraps who participated in this
battle, their position in the Persian battle array, and the forces under their command.623 On
the left flank we find first Arsamenes, the satrap of Cilicia, who led an unspecified cavalry
contingent,624 then there was Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who commanded
a Paphlagonian cavalry contingent, and finally Spithrobates625, the satrap of Ionia, who led
a Hyrcanian cavalry contingent. On the right flank Diodorus names Rheomithres, the satrap
of Persis, who commanded 1,000 infantry and 2,000 horses from Media and a similar
number of Bactrian forces. Oddly enough, Diodorus omits the names of the generals who
participated in the battle.626
The ancient sources also provide different figures for the size of the satrapal army
that was routed by Alexander. According to Diodorus, the satraps deployed 10,000 cavalry
and about 100,000 infantry.627 Justin, on the other hand, states that the Persian army
constitutes no less than 600,000 strong, a figure which one cannot accept.628 In contrast,
Arrian records more reasonable figures, as he reports that the satraps mustered 20,000
infantry and a similar number of cavalry.629 Either way, the battle of the Granicus River
provides us with clear proof that the satraps had access to impressive military sources and
that they were also eligible to take on active command duty on the battlefield.
Gaugamela
As noted above, the satraps were also expected to dispatch levies for the King’s army,630
and the satrapal component within the royal army is again exemplified in the case of the
forces deployed by Darius III at Gaugamela. Fortunately, Arrian recounts in detail the
nationality and commanding officers of the different units of Persian army.631 Thus, we are
622
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informed that three of the senior commanders were satraps: Bessus, the satrap of Bactria,
commanded the Indians, Bactrians, and Sogdians; Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia,
commanded the Arachosians and the mountaineer Indians (τοὺς ὀρείους Ἰνδοὺς
καλουμένους); lastly, Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, commanded the Arians.632 Just like
in the battle of the Granicus River, the satraps presided as generals in a large scale
engagement.
Satrapal Naval Campaigns
We have seen that Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, was capable of mounting a seemingly
independent expedition by land and sea with the intention of subjugating the Libyans.633
The same goes for the naval campaign of Artaphrenes against Naxos,634 and Pharnabazus’
attack against the Peloponnesians coastline.635 Another example is recounted by Ctesias,
who reports that before Darius I launched his campaign against the Scythians, he ordered
Ariaramnes, the satrap of Cappadocia, to cross over to Scythia in order to capture male and
female prisoners.636 The force dispatched by satrap was rather small, only fifty
penteconters. Even still, if we believe Ctesias, this anecdote demonstrates once more that
the satraps could, and at times were ordered to, conduct independent military campaigns
and raids, well beyond Persian domain. The same goes for the forces deployed by
Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger against the disobedient hill tribes of Asia Minor. 637
These campaigns, although limited in scale, exhibit the mobility and versatility of the
satrapal forces of the governors of the western satrapies.
The Limits of Satrapal Military Capacity
Satrapal military might, however, was not without limitations. Often in times of crisis the
satraps had to turn to royal military assistance. This notion is expressed in the Cyropaedia
when Cyrus the Elder justifies his demand for tribute by underscoring that whenever a
province is threatened, it is the Great who would provide protection.638 Similarly,
Xenophon claims that the aforementioned circuit commissioners were furnished with an
army which they could deploy when necessary.639 At times, local uprisings proved to be
too much for the satrapal forces in the provinces. The best example is the Egyptian revolt
against Persian rule in the late 460s BC. Achaemenid military presence in Egypt was
considerable. Achaemenid garrisons were stationed in Memphis,640 Pelusium, Daphnai,
Mareia, and Elephantine,641 and there is evidence for two additional garrisons in the eastern
edges of the Nile Delta, namely Migdol and Tell al-Mašūta.642 In addition, after Xerxes
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suppressed an Egyptian revolt in c. 485 BC,643 a more oppressive policy was
implemented.644 The only specific detail Herodotus provides is the appointment of
Achaemenes, Xerxes’ brother, as the new satrap of Egypt. Even still, the placement of the
King’s brother as satrap probably indicates that the Persian King was keen on keeping a
close eye on the affairs of Egypt and it seems plausible that Persian military presence in
the region was also augmented. Nevertheless, in spite of the considerable Persian military
presence in Egypt, the rebel forces led by a Libyan named Inarus, were able to overwhelm
the local satrapal forces.645
There are several additional examples which demonstrate that satrapal forces could
not withstand a fully equipped army in a pitched battle. During the campaign season of 395
BC Agesilaus roamed and pillaged the countryside of western Anatolia almost
unchallenged, and when he was finally opposed at the battle of Sardis, he utterly defeated
the forces of Tissaphernes.646 Xenophon even claims that prior to the Persian defeat near
Sardis, Tissaphernes deceitfully exploited the truce concluded with Agesilaus to ask the
King for reinforcements,647 but the satrap was defeated at the battle of Sardis
nonetheless.648 Lastly, despite the sizable satrapal forces deployed at the battle at the
Granicus River, the Persian contingents were routed by Alexander.649

Conclusion
In essence, the military capacity of the satrap was considerable. Though Xenophon’s model
seems to focus solely on the stationary garrison forces of the Achaemenid Empire, the
ancient sources reveal that the satrapal forces could function as a standing army as well as
a mobile fighting force. It seems highly unlikely, as noted by Tuplin, that the satrapal
cavalry contingents were a part of the Persian provincial standing army. 650 The same can
be said for heavy infantry and chariots. The cavalry units must have been mobilized for
planned raids while heavy infantry units were mustered for pitched battles. The ability to
mobilize considerable forces on demand was enabled by a conscription system which
allowed the Persian authorities to augment the garrisons when necessary. Consequently, in
any given satrapy the subjects of the Great Persian King, both native and transplanted
populations, were at the ready to furnished men, equipment and provisions whenever the
Persian authorities demand it. The prerogative to muster an army was both royal and
satrapal, though the conduct of Cyrus the Younger reveals that the satraps were expected
to obtain royal approval. In short, in peacetime the satraps maintained a minimum number
of soldiers in active service, while having access to a considerable number of reserve units
of various types which were ready for deployment.651
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4. IONIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
Western Anatolia constituted a frontier region of the vast Persian Empire. The coastal
districts of the western satrapies, however, were inhabited by Greek communities and as
such were also an integral part of the Greek world. In the following, I intend to demonstrate
that the geopolitical reality of western Anatolia served was the backdrop for two opposing
processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western satrapies.
On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the latter half of the sixth century BC
triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of European Greeks to intervene in the
affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Asiatic brethren.652 On the other hand, Xerxes’
failure to subjugate mainland Greece resulted in a dramatic change in Persian imperial
strategy in the west. The actions of the Great Persian King suggest that the policy of
westward expansion, ushered by Cyrus the Great and continued by Cambyses and Darius
I, was superseded by a policy of entrenchment. More importantly, having discarded his
plan to conquer the Greek homeland, Xerxes became less concerned in respect to the state
of affairs in the western frontier in the later part of his reign. These pivotal developments
meant that the governors of the western satrapies had to fulfill their satrapal duties while
striving to contain the growing Greek threat with minimal support from the Persian central
authorities.

4.1 Ionians and Greeks
Defining Ionia
The designations which are used in the ancient sources to denote the Greek communities
of Asia Minor are somewhat ambiguous. At times the Ionians are identified as members of
a particular Greek sub-group who shared customs, cults, tribal names, and a religious
calendar.653 Such a broad definition includes all of the Greek communities, in Europe as
well as in Asia, who identified themselves as Ionians. An alternative definition is based on
geography. According to this comparatively narrow definition, the Ionians were
exclusively the denizens of the twelve city-states that founded the Ionian League shortly
before the Persian conquest of Asia Minor.654 In other words, the Ionians consisted of the
Greek communities residing in the coastal district known as Ionia and the nearby islands.
A third definition includes all of the Greek communities which inhabited Asia Minor,
namely the Ionian, Dorian and Aeolian city-states in the Asiatic continent in addition to
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the islands adjacent to the Anatolian coastline.655 While these various definitions are used
interchangeably by the ancient Greek authors,656 in the present study I adopt the third and
last of the abovementioned definitions. I do so because the Greek communities of the
Asiatic continent and the adjacent islands who were either Persian subjects or under Persian
military pressure are the main focus of the present chapter.
Ionians and Greeks
The ancient Greeks believed that the Ionian city-states were founded by settlers who
migrated from the Greek mainland shortly after the Trojan War during the so-called ‘Ionian
Migration’.657 The origin of these Greek colonizers is unclear. Traditions dated to the
beginning of the Archaic period suggest that the Greek immigrants came from Messenian
Pylos658 and Boeotia659, while in the sixth century BC the place of Athens became more
and more predominant in Ionian ancestry.660 According to Herodotus, the Athenians were
perceived not only as of Ionian stock661 but also as the most distinguished community
among the Ionian Greeks.662 But a significant shift occurred in the middle of the fifth
century BC. The Athenians refashioned their Ionian descent, as they began to claim that
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they were autochthonous.663 More importantly, the Ionians were recast as Greeks who
originally dwelled in Achaea, from which they were driven out.664 After finding refuge in
Athens, the homeless Ionians went on to colonize Asia, which transformed Athens into the
mother-city of Ionia.665 It is generally agreed that the tradition which depicts the Ionian
city-states as Athenian colonies was the product of Athenian propaganda, since it meant
that the Ionians owed their metropolis certain obligations and as such facilitated tighter
Athenian control over its fellow members of the Delian League.666
Be that as it may, in spite of the discrepancies in the literary sources concerned with
the origin of the Asiatic Greeks,667 there is no doubt that already at the beginning of the
Archaic Period the Greekness of the Asiatic Greeks was well-established in Greece and
Ionia.668 While this point might seem somewhat obvious, the fact that the Ionians were
perceived as Greeks meant that they shared a bond of kinship with their European brethren.
This bond is defined by Alty as ‘ethnic feeling’, that is “feelings (or opinions) arising from
someone’s membership of an ethnic group.”669 Such a sentiment encouraged a sense of
camaraderie between Greek communities on both sides of the Aegean, which was used by
the Asiatic Greeks to garner the support of mainland Greeks on multiple occasions. As we
shall see in the following section, while using kinship relations in order to gain support was
not an uncommon phenomenon in the history of ancient Greece,670 the solidarity between
the Asiatic and European Greeks gradually became a source of trouble for the Persian
authorities in Asia Minor.
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4.2 Ionian Appeals for Help
Cyrus, the Ionians, and Sparta
The earliest known occurrence in which mainland Greeks intervened in Persian affairs on
behalf of the Ionians occurred shortly before the Persian conquest of Ionia. According to
Herodotus, when the Lydian king Croesus began his eastward march to face the Persians,
Cyrus tried to incite the Ionians, subjects of the Lydians at the time, to switch sides. The
Ionians, however, rejected Cyrus’ proposition.671 But after Croesus’ army was driven back,
it became clear to all that the arrival of Cyrus was imminent. Consequently, the Ionians
and Aeolians dispatched an embassy to Cyrus, informing the Persian King that they were
willing to acknowledge Persian supremacy in exchange for the same privileges granted to
them by the Lydian kings. The Ionian diplomatic effort, however, was rebuffed by
Cyrus.672
Alarmed by Cyrus’ rejection, the Ionians made a unanimous decision to send
emissaries to the Greek mainland to ask for Sparta’ support against the Persians.673 At
Sparta, the senior Ionian delegate, Pythermus of Phocaea, donned a purple cloak and
delivered a long speech in an attempt to move the Spartans into action. The Spartans,
however, reluctant to make any concrete promises, decided to send scouts to examine the
current situation in Asia. The Spartan embassy travelled to Sardis and had an audience with
Cyrus. Herodotus reports that the brazen Spartan envoys informed the Great King that the
Lacedaemonians would not allow any city which was on Greek soil to suffer any harm. In
response, Cyrus warned the Spartans that they would have troubles of their own for trying
to intervene in the affairs of Ionia. Ultimately, the Spartan threat proved to be hollow. The
Persian armies swept across Ionia capturing one city after the other while the Spartans
stood by.
The Greek city-states of Ionia are described in Herodotus’ report as situated on
Greek soil,674 while in Diodorus’ account the Lacedaemonian envoys who approached
Cyrus professed their blood ties to the Asiatic Greeks.675 From the Greek viewpoint, the
claim that Ionia constituted Greek territory and the bond of kinship between the Spartans
and Asiatic Greeks legitimized the Spartan intervention in the interactions between Cyrus
and the Ionians. In other words, a sentiment of Greek solidarity was the main impetus for
the Spartan diplomatic intervention in Asia Minor. The Spartan effort to assist to Ionians,
even if limited to diplomacy, suggests that the Spartans, and possibly other Greek nations,
were concerned with the wellbeing of the Ionians and were willing to take action in order
to prevent the subjugation of fellow countrymen by non-Greeks.676
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The Ionian Revolt
The Ionian Revolt was the pretext for greater involvement of mainland Greeks in Persian
affairs. Herodotus is the only extant source for this rebellion against Persian rule, to which
he devoted considerable attention.677 While the causes for and sequence of the events
pertaining to the Ionian Revolt have been explored thoroughly, 678 the manner in which
Aristagoras, the acting tyrant of Miletus, won the military support of Athens is the main
point of interest here.
Shortly after the Ionians rose in rebellion, Aristagoras travelled to Sparta in order
to convince the Spartans to join the rebellion. The Milesian tyrant tried to provoke king
Cleomenes’ greed by describing the great wealth of the Persian Empire, but as soon as the
Spartan king learned that the distance between Ionia and the Persian heartland was equal
to a three months journey, he declined.679 In light of his failure to mobilize the Spartans,
Aristagoras quickly departed to Athens. Fortunately for the Ionians, Athenian attitude
toward Persia had already turned hostile. Prior to the arrival of Aristagoras, Artaphrenes,
the satrap of Lydia, ordered the Athenians to take back Hippias, the deposed Peisistratid
tyrant, or to suffer the consequences. The Athenian response was to brand the Persians as
their enemies.680 Under these favorable circumstances, Aristagoras gave a speech in front
of the Athenian popular assembly, in which he mentioned the endless wealth of Asia and
reminded his audience that Athens, the mother-city of Miletus, had the obligation to protect
its colony.681 The Athenians were persuaded and soon after twenty Attic ships set sail to
Ionia.682 The Ionian rebels and their mainland allies captured Sardis, with the exception of
the citadel, and put the satrapal capital to the torch. The Greek momentum, however, was
short-lived. The Persians rallied and decisively defeated the Ionians at the battle of
Ephesus. As a result, the Athenians decided to return home, refusing to give heed to the
repeating appeals of Aristagoras.683 Eventually, the revolt was crushed, Ionia was pacified,
and Persian rule was reinstated.
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In the context of the Ionian Revolt a new precedent was set. Instead of limiting
themselves to diplomacy, the Athenians sent troops to fight the Persians head on. Since the
tradition concerned with the intervention of Artaphrenes in Athenian politics is
suspicious,684 the only remaining impetus for the Athenian decision to send an
expeditionary force was their sympathy for their fellow countrymen. Equally important are
the profound consequences of Athens’ unsuccessful attempt to assists the Ionians to regain
their liberty. Darius retaliated by sending Mardonius to the northern Aegean to assert
Persian supremacy in the region.685 This campaign was followed by an expedition to the
Greek mainland, whose objective was to punish Athens and Eretria for the burning of
Sardis. This punitive campaign, however, was only partially successful. Eretria was sacked
but Athens remained unscathed due to the unexpected Greek victory at Marathon.686
Darius, so it seems, was not seeking to add new territories to his empire but to deter the
European Greeks from meddling in the matters of Asia Minor.687
We should be mindful of the literary function the role of the Ionian Revolt in
Herodotus’ account, namely that the involvement of Athens and Eretria in the Ionian revolt
was a crucial step toward the inevitable clash between Greece and Persia. Nevertheless, the
historicity of Athens’ participation in the Ionian Revolt is rather certain, which means that
the Persians must have realized that the bond between the European and Asiatic Greeks
became a real and immediate threat to Persian rule in western Anatolia. One may
hypothesize that Xerxes’ invasion to Greece was motivated not only by an imperial strategy
of expansion but also by the need to put an end to the Greek problem in the west. In any
case, Xerxes’ failed to subjugate mainland Greece, but this pivotal event highlighted
Ionia’s problematic position, and the solution that was favored by the Greeks resulted in
an even greater readiness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of western
Anatolia.
Deliberating the Evacuation of Ionia
Like the rest of the subject nations, the Asiatic Greeks sent contingents to participate in
Xerxes’ invasion to Greece.688 But the Persian defeat at Salamis reignited the Ionians’
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desire to throw off the yoke of Persian subjugation.689 Herodotus recounts that after the
naval battle a group of Chian envoys travelled to Sparta and Aegina and beseeched the
Greek allies to liberate Ionia. The Greeks, however, refused to sail beyond Delos since they
still feared the might of the Persian fleet.690 Sometime after, a Samian embassy arrived at
Delos, where the Greek fleet was mooring. The Samian envoys implored the Greeks to
save Ionia from servitude and states that the Ionians were ready and willing to revolt, that
the Persians were cowards, and reminded their audience of their common gods. This time
the Greeks were persuaded and so they set sail to the east. 691 This campaign ended with a
Greek victory at the battle of Mycale, in which the Samians and Milesians betrayed the
Persians and joined forces with the mainland Greeks.692
The victories at Plataea and Mycale marked the end of the Persian Wars.
Nonetheless, though the Persians were pushed back for the time being, the Greeks feared
the Persian King who was still looming in the east. More importantly, the recent experience
taught the Greeks that they were more than capable of making a stand in the Greek
homeland, but Asia Minor was an entirely different story. It was clear to all that as long
as there were Greeks in the Asiatic continent, they would be vulnerable to Persian
subjugation. Accordingly, shortly after the battle of Mycale the Greek allies assembled at
Samos to deliberate the future of the Greek communities of Asia Minor. Herodotus
recounts the debate between the Athenian and Peloponnesian delegates on this matter:693
[2] ἀπικόμενοι δὲ ἐς Σάμον οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ ἀναστάσιος τῆς Ἰωνίης, καὶ ὅκῃ
χρεὸν εἴη τῆς Ἑλλάδος κατοικίσαι τῆς αὐτοὶ ἐγκρατέες ἦσαν, τὴν δὲ Ἰωνίην ἀπεῖναι τοῖσι
βαρβάροισι: ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἐφαίνετό σφι εἶναι ἑωυτούς τε Ἰώνων προκατῆσθαι
φρουρέοντας τὸν πάντα χρόνον, καὶ ἑωυτῶν μὴ προκατημένων Ἴωνας οὐδεμίαν ἐλπίδα
εἶχον χαίροντας πρὸς τῶν Περσέων ἀπαλλάξειν. [3] πρὸς ταῦτα Πελοποννησίων μὲν τοῖσι
ἐν τέλεϊ ἐοῦσι ἐδόκεε τῶν μηδισάντων ἐθνέων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὰ ἐμπολαῖα
ἐξαναστήσαντας δοῦναι τὴν χώρην Ἴωσι ἐνοικῆσαι, Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ οὐκ ἐδόκεε ἀρχὴν
Ἰωνίην γενέσθαι ἀνάστατον οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίοισι περὶ τῶν σφετερέων ἀποικιέων
βουλεύειν: ἀντιτεινόντων δὲ τούτων προθύμως, εἶξαν οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι. [4] καὶ οὕτω δὴ
Σαμίους τε καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νησιώτας, οἳ ἔτυχον συστρατευόμενοι
τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, ἐς τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἐποιήσαντο, πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὁρκίοισι ἐμμενέειν
τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι. τούτους δὲ καταλαβόντες ὁρκίοισι ἔπλεον τὰς γεφύρας λύσοντες:
ἔτι γὰρ ἐδόκεον ἐντεταμένας εὑρήσειν. οὗτοι μὲν δὴ ἐπ᾽ Ἑλλησπόντου ἔπλεον.
[2] After they arrived at Samos, the Greeks deliberated the evacuation of Ionia and in which
part of Greece, of which they were in possession, it would be right to settle [the Ionians],
and [the possibility of] handing over Ionia to the Barbarians. For it seemed impossible for
[the mainland Greeks] to continually keep watch over the Ionians, but without the former
being present, the Ionians had no hope of being delivered from Persia’s reach. [3] In regard
to these matters, it seemed best to those of the Peloponnesians who were in office to give
the land of the Greek nations which medized to the Ionians after their trade centers had
689
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been depopulated. But the Athenians thought that Ionia should not be abandoned and that
the Peloponnesians have no right to give advice concerning the fate of Athens’ colonies.
As [the Athenians] vehemently objected to the [Peloponnesian] proposition, the
Peloponnesians yielded. [4] And thus [the Greeks] admitted the Samians, Chians, Lesbians
and other islanders, who had joined the Greeks in the campaign, as allies after they
compelled them by pledges and oaths to be faithful and to refrain from deserting [the
alliance]. After they bounded them through oaths, they set sail with the intention of
destroying the bridges; for they still taught that they would find them intact. And so they
sailed to the Hellespont.

Diodorus provides a similar yet not identical version:694
[1] οἱ δὲ περὶ Λεωτυχίδην καὶ Ξάνθιππον ἀποπλεύσαντες εἰς Σάμον τοὺς μὲν Ἴωνας καὶ
τοὺς Αἰολεῖς συμμάχους ἐποιήσαντο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπειθον αὐτοὺς ἐκλιπόντας τὴν Ἀσίαν
εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην μετοικισθῆναι. ἐπηγγέλλοντο δὲ τὰ μηδίσαντα τῶν ἐθνῶν ἀναστήσαντες
δώσειν ἐκείνοις τὴν χώραν: [2] καθόλου γὰρ μένοντας αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας τοὺς μὲν
πολεμίους ὁμόρους ἕξειν, πολὺ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ὑπερέχοντας, τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους ὄντας
διαποντίους μὴ δυνήσεσθαι τὰς βοηθείας εὐκαίρους αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι. οἱ δὲ Αἰολεῖς καὶ
οἱ Ἴωνες ἀκούσαντες τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ἔγνωσαν πείθεσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι, καὶ
παρεσκευάζοντο πλεῖν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν Εὐρώπην. [3] οἱ δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι μετανοήσαντες εἰς
τοὐναντίον πάλιν μένειν συνεβούλευον, λέγοντες ὅτι κἂν μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς τῶν ἄλλων
Ἑλλήνων βοηθῇ, μόνοι Ἀθηναῖοι συγγενεῖς ὄντες βοηθήσουσιν: ὑπελάμβανον δὲ ὅτι κοινῇ
κατοικισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων οἱ Ἴωνες οὐκέτι μητρόπολιν ἡγήσονται τὰς Ἀθήνας.
διόπερ συνέβη μετανοῆσαι τοὺς Ἴωνας καὶ κρῖναι μένειν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας.
[1] Leotychidas and Xanthippus sailed back to Samos and made the Ionians and Aeolians
allies. After these things, they persuaded them to abandon Asia and to migrate into Europe.
They announced that they would compel the Greek nations which sided with the Persians
to leave and to give them their lands. [2] For, on the whole, as long as they stayed in Asia
they would have enemies at their boarders which were more powerful than they are. Their
allies, however, being across the sea, would not be able to come to the rescue when time
demands it. The Aeolians and Ionians, after hearing these proclamations, decided to obey
the Greeks and so they made preparations to sail with them to Europe. [3] But the
Athenians, having changed their mind, advised them to stay, saying that even if none of
the Greeks would come to help them, the Athenians, being their kinsmen, would provide
assistance. They assumed that the Ionians, after they had been settled in a common location
[in mainland Greece] by the Greeks, would no longer consider Athens as their metropolis.
Therefore, it came to pass that the Ionians changed their mind and decided to stay in Asia.

In spite of a few minor discrepancies,695 both Herodotus and Diodorus agree that the Greek
allies sought a viable and permanent solution to the plight of the Ionians. Since the Ionians
had appealed their mainland brethren for help on numerous occasions ever since the
Persians conquered Asia Minor, the Spartan proclamation merely reiterated what was
already known to all, namely that the geographical situation of Ionia vis-à-vis the Persian
Empire meant that the Ionians were endemically unable to provide for their own defense.696
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While the Spartan proposition was imperfect,697 the Athenians thwarted the
evacuation of Ionia by conjuring up their shared ancestry with the Ionians. By doing so the
Athenians were successful at branding the Peloponnesian proposition as an illegitimate
interference in what was an internal Ionian affair. Since the Athenians persuaded the
Ionians to stay in Asia by pledging themselves and their allies to the defense of Ionia, one
wonders what Athens had to gain by perpetuating Greek presence in western Anatolia.
Diodorus notes that the Athenians were afraid that they might lose the advantages of
Athens’ status as the Metropolis of Ionia, and it can be added that the presence of the
Ionians in Asia ensured that they would continue to be dependent on Athens and its
formidable navy for protection. Furthermore, by placing the emphasis on the common
Ionian origin and framing the security of the Ionian-city states as an exclusively Ionian
affair, the Athenian delegitimized future Spartan interventions in the affairs of Ionia. And
so, while Sparta remained the leader of the Hellenic alliance, the Athenians used this debate
to cement their prominence among the Ionians, which became useful later on, when Athens
assumed the leadership in the war against Persia.698
Conclusion
In summary, the interactions between the European and Asiatic Greeks in the context of
Persian military pressure reveal that the former felt responsible for the safety, security, and
liberty of the latter. This sentiment of solidarity was predicated primarily on ties of kinship
and metropolis-colony connection. Prior to Xerxes’ invasion this bond drove the Spartans,
Athenians, and Eretrians to interfere in the affairs of western Anatolia on behalf of the
Ionians. But after the Persians were driven out of Greece, in the congress held at Samos,
the Athenians claimed publicly that they would stand by Ionia’s side and guarantee its
safety. This proclamation transformed what was, until that point, no more than a moral
obligation based on the goodwill of the mainland Greeks into one of the ideological pillars
of the soon to be formed Delian League. As we shall see, for the legitimacy of the Delian
League to remain unchallenged, the Athenians, who assumed the role of guarantors of
Ionian liberty, had to insert themselves further into the affairs of western Anatolia if they
wanted to retain their position. Yet, Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate the European
Greeks had an equally profound impact on Persian policies in the west, which is explored
in the following section.
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4.3 The Greek Counter-Offensive in the 470s
Xerxes’ Measures to Secure Persian Rule in Asia Minor
After the decisive defeats at Plataea and Mycale, Xerxes aborted his plan to conquer Greece
and returned home.699 The Great King, however, may have anticipated a Greek
counterattack of some sort since prior to his departure Xerxes took measures to safeguard
Persian rule in western Anatolia. To begin with, Xerxes made sure that there were sufficient
land forces in the region and that key positions were under firm Persian control. For
example, Xerxes reinforced the garrison at Sardis, probably to ensure that the satrapal
capital would not be captured once again by the Greeks.700 Moreover, the Great King
ordered the construction of a fortified palace and a citadel at Celaenae, a Phrygian city
adjacent to Pisidia which was located on the route that linked Ephesus to northern Syria.701
Due to the strategic importance of Celaenae, this measure probably echoes an attempt to
bolster Persian military presence in this region. 702 In addition, by fortifying Celaenae the
Persians were able to monitor movement of enemy forces and prevent them from marching
unchallenged into the Anatolian hinterland.703
Another measure by which Xerxes cemented Persian rule in western Anatolia was
the promotion of loyal Greek medizers to positions of power. Herodotus recalls that
Theomestor son of Androdamas was appointed as the new tyrant of Samos, while Phylacus
son of Histiaeus, also from Samos, was given the title ‘benefactor of the King’ (εὐεργέτης
βασιλέος) and was granted vast estates, probably in Ionia.704 Moreover, sometime after
Xerxes arrived at Sardis in 479 BC Xeinagoras of Halicarnassus was appointed as the ruler
of Caria,705 and it has been argued that this action should be interpreted as a Persian effort
to reassert royal presence in Cilicia due to fear of a Greek attempt to subjugate Cyprus. 706
In addition, several Greek cities were given by Xerxes to Greeks medizers for safe
keeping,707 and Briant points out that almost all of these cities were located in the Troad, a
699
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region in which important Persian naval bases were located, e.g. Cyme. 708 As a result,
loyalty to Persian rule in this region must have enhanced considerably.
All in all, it is not out of the question that the aforementioned defensive measures
applied by Xerxes in western Anatolia provide us with a mere glimpse of the Persian effort
to fortify western Anatolia in light of the defeat at Plataea and Mycale. Be that as it may,
the counter-offensive of the Hellenic Alliance began shortly after the Great King returned
to Persia. But while the Persian forces in the west were under attack, the response of the
Persian central authorities suggests that Xerxes had not only abandoned his policy of
westward expansion but expected the local satrapal authorities to contain the Greek assault
and to protect Persian rule in the west with the resources at their disposal.
The Greek Advance
The Greeks did not wait long before they took the offensive. Soon after the victory at the
battle of Mycale, the Athenians laid siege to the city of Sestos which was under Persian
control at the time. The Persian defenders, however, held the line for several months until
the city fell in the autumn of 478 BC.709 The attack on Sestos was only a prelude. In the
spring of 478 BC the forces of the Hellenic Alliance, under the command of the Spartan
regent Pausanias, landed on Cyprus.710 The extent of Pausanias’ success, however, remains
unclear,711 and Persian rule on Cyprus was fully restored not long after the Greeks
departed.712 Following the Cypriot campaign, probably in the autumn of 478 BC,713 the
Greek fleet sailed northward and captured Byzantium.714
Despite having the initiative, the Greek effort was still defensive in nature. The
subjugation of Cyprus would have barred the Persians from using it as a base of operations,
thus cutting short the range of the Persian fleet. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium, two
cities which exercised control over the narrow straits between Asia and Europe, the
Hellespont and the Bosporus respectively, was necessary to hinder a crossing of another
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Persian invasion force into Europe. All in all, it seems that the Greeks sought to keep the
Persian fleet out of the Aegean and to prevent a second Persian land invasion into Europe.
The Persian Opposition
But what about the Persians? The relatively succinct accounts regarding the capture of
Byzantium are interpreted by Meiggs as indication of lackluster Persian resistance.715 Yet,
such an interpretation fails to consider the possibility that, just like the Greeks, the Persians
were surprised by the defeat of Mardonius,716 and as a result were not fully prepared to
withstand the Greek counterattack. The attack on Sestos, for instance, caught the Persians
off guard, since Herodotus explicitly states that the city was not prepared to withstand a
prolonged siege.717 This impression is bolstered by the fact that in spite of the long duration
of the siege, no reinforcements came to relieve the besieged Persians.718 Moreover, the
Persians launched a counterattack of their own, through which they managed to recaptured
Sestos and Byzantium.719 But the Persians refrained from marching further into Thrace, as
the Persian objectives were exclusively Sestos and Byzantium. The limited scope of the
Persian counterattack suggests that the Persians were determined to prevent the Greeks
from invading Asia Minor through the Bosporus straits, which could have destabilized the
region and induced another Ionian revolt. The same can be said in regard to Cyprus. The
reinstatement of Persian rule on the island was not followed by Persian naval operations in
the Aegean, and one can infer that the Persians were satisfied with preventing the Greeks
from using the island as a staging point for future raids against Persian coastal settlements
in the eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the Persian central authorities sought to maintain
stability in the west by containing the Greek offensive and refraining from further
escalation.
The Rise of the Delian League
After the capture of Byzantium a dramatic development took place. Pausanias, the
commander-in-chief of the Greek alliance, incurred the hatred of the Greek allies due to
his abusive behavior and adoption of Persian attire and traditions.720 As a result, Pausanias
was recalled to Sparta, reprimanded for his oppressive behavior but eventually acquitted.721
The Greek allies, however, became averse to Spartan leadership, 722 and rejected the
appointment of the Spartan Dorcis as the new general. Instead, they offered the leadership
715
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to the Athenians, who rose to the occasion while the Spartans acquiesced. 723 The
withdrawal of the Spartans facilitated the establishment of a new Hellenic coalition known
as the Delian League.724 The official mission statement of the newly founded alliance
varies in the ancient sources. Thucydides claims that the objective of the League was to
seek restitution for the suffering the Greeks endured during the Persian wars by ravaging
the Great King’s domain.725 Diodorus reports that the elected general of the allied forces,
Cimon son of Miltiades, was instructed to assist the allied cities which were in Asia and to
liberate other Greek city-states which were still garrisoned by the Persians.726 These two
distinct goals can and should be seen as complementary. Be that as it may, the creation of
the Delian League signaled the beginning of a new round of hostilities between Greeks and
Persians. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium meant that the remaining Persians
strongholds in Europe were cut off from Asia. Therefore, it was only natural that the first
operations of the Delian League were aimed against the last pockets of Persian resistance
in the northern Aegean.
The Operations of the Delian League in the 470s
The first target of the Delian League was Eion, a Persian stronghold situated on the mouth
of the Strymon River.727 Eion was strategically important since those who controlled it
were able to monitor the movements of armed force across Thrace.728 And so, the League’s
forces laid siege to the city throughout the winter of 447/46 BC. 729 Eion eventually fell
after the Persian governor Bogas chose to set the city on fire instead of capitulating, causing
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the death of his wife, children, and himself, an action for which, according to Herodotus,
Bogas was praised by Xerxes.730
The next Persian stronghold in the northern Aegean that was overran by the forces
of the Delian League was Doriscus, which dominated the crossing of the Hebros River via
the coast.731 We do not know when Doriscus fell. A hint is provided by Herodotus, who
claims that the Persian governor of Doriscus, a certain Mascames, received many gifts from
Xerxes for his success at withstanding numerous Greek attempts to capture Doriscus, and
that his descendants were honored by Artaxerxes I for his courage.732 The ambiguity of
Herodotus’ remark has led to the suggestion that Doriscus fell only after the accession of
Artaxerxes I, possibly in the mid-460s BC.733 But others claim, correctly in my view, that
the information provided to us by Herodotus is not sufficient to conclude with certainty
how long the Persians maintained control over Doriscus.734 It is, however, highly likely
that the Greek attacks against Doriscus began shortly before or after Cimon besieged
Eion.735
The capture of Eion and Doriscus were only the highlights of the Delian League’s
operations in the northern Aegean. We are told by Herodotus that the Greeks captured all
of the Persian fortresses in the region with the exception of Doriscus.736 The Greeks, so it
seems, were determined to expel the Persians from Europe. But what were the Persians
trying to achieve? The fierce resistance offered by the Persian forces in Eion and Doriscus,
Xerxes’ positive reaction to the manner in which Bogas perished, and the royal honors
awarded to Mascames suggest that the Great Persian King ordered his forces in Thrace to
hold the line. One can speculate that Xerxes’ intention was to occupy the Greeks in Europe
so to have the necessary time to adequately fortify western Anatolia. Such a suggestion is
corroborated by the fact that the struggle for Thrace continued for three years after Xerxes’
retreat and that the Persian central authorities neither sent reinforcements to the northern
Aegean nor made any attempt to recapture the lost Thracians strongholds.
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4.4 Pausanias, Xerxes and Artabazus
Pausanias’ Machinations in Byzantium
The Persian effort to hold off the Greek offensive was not limited to military measures.
Several sources report that shortly after the Hellenic Alliance captured Byzantium,
Pausanias began conspiring with Xerxes.737 Allegedly, after the fall of Byzantium
Pausanias saw that several high-profile Persian captives were released and given safe
passage back to the Persian heartland. This act was accomplished in secret by a confidant
of Pausanias named Gongylus, who was instructed to accompany the Persians and to
deliver a letter to Xerxes. Thucydides includes what seems to be a verbatim account of this
letter, in which Pausanias proposed to marry Xerxes’ daughter and to subjugate Sparta and
Greece in the name of the Great Persian King.738
Pausanias’ proposal, we are told, was well received at the royal court. Thucydides
states that Xerxes dispatched Artabazus son of Pharnaces to supersede Megabates as the
new governor of Hellespontine Phrygia and gave him a letter bearing the King’s signet to
deliver to Pausanias.739 In his reply Xerxes expressed his gratitude for the release of the
Persian captives, encouraged Pausanias to carry on with his plans, ensured the Spartan that
he would lack neither funds nor manpower, and added that Artabazus was instructed to
assist him.740 The nature of the assistance provided by Artabazus is clarified by Diodorus,
who says that the newly appointed satrap gave Pausanias large sums of money with which
he was to buy the allegiance of other Greek notables.741
As noted above, Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, probably at the end of 478 BC,742
due to his abusive behavior, and, according to Thucydides, collaboration with the
Persians.743 But shortly after his acquittal, most likely in the spring of 476 BC, Pausanias
sailed back to the Hellespont without the approval of the ephors and expelled the Athenians
from Byzantium. At some point the Athenians took back Byzantium, and Pausanias went
to Colonae in the Troad.744 We are left to wonder what Pausanias accomplished during his
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time in Colonae, but we do know that his exploits prompted his second recall and ultimate
downfall.745
The authenticity of the purported collaboration between Pausanias and Xerxes has
been contested.746 Even scholars who accept the accusation of medism as historical argue
that these charges were unfounded.747 As it stands, the nature of the available evidence
renders it impossible to resolve the scholarly debate regarding Pausanias’ exploits in the
Hellespont. Nevertheless, the one uncontested historical fact in this episode is the
appointment of Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.748 While Thucydides
credits the arrival of Artabazus to Pausanias’ machinations, it is far more likely that the
loss of Sestos and Byzantium prompted this change in personnel. Artabazus, I argue, was
the ideal candidate for this position. As a seasoned general who accumulated considerable
military experience during Xerxes’ invasion749 and forged connections with men of worth
in the west,750 Artabazus was the right man to rule a western frontier region that was under
attack.
But what was Xerxes seeking to achieve through the appointment of Artabazus? I
find it hard to believe that Xerxes entertained the notion of enslaving the Greek homeland,
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with or without the assistance of Pausanias.751 Since Artabazus came to the west with gold
rather than a massive army, his objectives must have been more attainable. In light of the
Persian efforts to hold the line in Thrace, Artabazus was probably instructed to use bribes
in order to ensure the collaboration of powerful men in the Aegean front. By garnering, or
buying, support in the Hellespontine region, Artabazus was able to extend his influence
beyond the borders of his satrapy with the purpose of hindering future attacks against
Persian domain.752 Accordingly, the decision to appoint Artabazus as the new satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia and perhaps as the King’s representative in the negotiations with
Pausanias are revealing. It suggests that Xerxes was aware of the problems in the western
frontier and that he had full confidence that the local Persian forces were up to the task.
Artabazus, so it seems, was mandated to ensure that the western borders of the Empire
were secured while Xerxes turned his attention to other endeavors elsewhere.

4.5 Xerxes’ Campaign from the Persian Viewpoint
In the immediate aftermath of Xerxes’ abortive invasion to Greece, the Persians were
expelled from Europe and even Cyprus was briefly occupied by the Greeks. On the face of
it, the western satrapies were in a state of emergency whereas Persian responses to the
Greek challenge constituted short-lived counterattacks in the Hellespontine region, the
appointment of Artabazus, and the seemingly fruitless collaborations with influential
Greeks such as Pausanias. One wonders why the Persian response to Greek aggression was
limited in scope. The answer can be found in a tradition in which the Greco-Persian Wars
ended with a Persian victory. This alternative version is visible not only in the ancient
literary corpus but also in royal proclamations found in Achaemenid royal centers. Such a
tradition, I argue, is highly likely to resonate Xerxes’ efforts to protect his own reputation
and prestige in light of his failure to expand the borders of his realm.753 Yet, the promotion
of such a version, a version that did not correspond with the actual reality in the western
satrapies, had consequences which the satraps had to face.
The Greek and Persian Versions
The scarcity of Persian documentation renders it difficult to assess the impact of the
unsuccessful attempt to subjugate Greece on Xerxes’ position.754 The Greek sources, of
course, provide a heavily biased and therefore unreliable depiction of the Persian defeat
and its catastrophic consequences.755 Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
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Persian version of the war against the Greeks was radically different and equally biased as
it was aimed at downplaying Xerxes’ military defeats while highlighting the more
successful aspects of his Greek campaign.
In a succinct summary of the events of the Persian Wars, Dio Chrysostom claims
that Xerxes defeated the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, sacked Athens and imposed
tribute on the Greeks before returning home.756 One should admit that Chrysostom is not
utterly wrong. The Greeks were in fact defeated at Thermopylae, Athens was sacked by
the Persians, and the Greek communities in Asia remained subjects of the Persian Empire
long after Xerxes’ departure. Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the Xerxes placed an
emphasis on his accomplishments during his Greek campaign, regardless of its final
outcome, and presented the expedition against the Greeks as a success.757 It is possible, as
postulated by Briant, that Chrysostom’s account conveys a tradition which originated from
the official Persian version of the events which transpired during Xerxes’ invasion, a
version which was cultivated and disseminated by Xerxes after he returned to the Persian
heartland.758
The notion that the Persians accomplished their objectives can be found in
Herodotus’ Histories as well. Herodotus claims that after the battle of Salamis Artemisia
of Caria tried to persuade Xerxes to return home by pointing out that the primary objective
of the campaign, namely the punishment of the Athenians for the burning of Sardis, was
achieved.759 Now, the historicity of the content of Artemisia’s speech, if she ever gave a
speech, is highly dubious. Yet, Herodotus, so it seems, acknowledges the possibility that
Xerxes’ campaign could have been deemed as partially successful from a Persian
viewpoint. But the Histories provide further evidence for the manner in which Xerxes’
campaign may have been presented by the Persian royal authorities. In his attempt to
convince the Athenians to switch sides, Xerxes made a promise to rebuild the Athenian
temples that had been burned down during the sacking of Athens.760 Briant argues that this
promise implies that Xerxes despoiled the Athenian acropolis and took the loot back to
Persia to be paraded as markers of a successful expedition.761 Briant’s postulation is
corroborated by reports concerned with the restoration of the statues of the Athenian
tyrannicides Hermodius and Aristogeiton, which were stolen by Xerxes.762 Additional
monuments which Xerxes took with him back to Persia were a bronze statue known as the
Water-carrier from the temple of the Mother in Athens,763 the foundation of the statue of
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Artemis of Celces,764 the bronze statue of Apollo from the Branchidae at Miletus, and the
image of Brauronian Artemis from Brauron.765 That these spoils of war were used for
propagandistic purposes is corroborated by Arrian, who states that Xerxes had all the
statues, ornaments and votive offerings which he stole from the Greeks taken to Babylon,
Pasargadae, Susa, and other cities in Asia,766 and it is highly likely that these artifacts were
used to validate Xerxes’ claim that the war against the Greeks ended with a Persian
victory.767
The Daiva Inscription
Another possible manifestation of an alternative Persian version of the Persian Wars can
be found in a trilingual inscription (Old Persian, Akkadian and Elamite) commissioned by
Xerxes and known as the Daiva inscription.768 The Daiva inscription was preserved on five
stone slabs which were discovered in Persepolis and Pasargadae though not in-situ.769 The
date in which the Daiva inscription was produced is contested. Herzfeld has argued that
the formulaic similarities between the Daiva inscription and inscriptions commissioned by
Darius I indicate that it was produced early in the reign of Xerxes, i.e. before his invasion
to Greece.770 Herzfeld’s initial dating of the inscription was widely accepted,771 but later
on Herzfeld himself changed his mind and argued that the Daiva inscription was produced
after Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate Greece but before Pausanias was expelled from
Byzantium.772 Eventually Herzfeld settled on 478 BC.773 Presently, it is widely agreed that
the Daiva inscription was produced after Xerxes’ invasion,774 and even if it was
commissioned in the 480s, it is almost certain that it was on public display throughout
Xerxes’ reign.
In light of the above, the Daiva inscription provides indirect proof of the manner in
which Xerxes’ Greek campaign was presented in Achaemenid royal centers. In a similar
fashion to other Achaemenid royal proclamations, the Daiva inscription includes a
catalogue of tributary peoples in which thirty one peoples are listed.775 In comparison to
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similar lists which appeared in inscriptions commissioned by Darius I, Xerxes’ catalogue
includes a greater number of subject peoples.776 The message the catalogue conveys is
clear: Xerxes expanded the borders of the Empire, a claim which depicted the Great King
as an accomplished conqueror, a capable general, and a worthy successor of his
predecessors.777 Interestingly, there are two or possibly three groups of Greeks which are
mentioned in the Daiva inscription: (1) the Ionians (Yaunā), (2) ‘[the Ionians] who dwell
by the sea’ (tyaiy darayahiyā dārayatiy) and (3) [the Ionians] who dwell beyond the sea’
(utā tyaiy paradraya dārayatiy).778 It is generally agreed that the Yaunā were the Asiatic
Greeks, but the other two designations are contested. In regard to the identity of ‘those who
dwell by the sea’, it has been suggested that this term signifies the inhabitants of the satrapy
of Hellespontine Phrygia,779 the Asiatic Greeks in general,780 or the dwellers of the Aegean
islands.781 Regarding ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’, it has been argued that this term
denotes the territories of Thrace and Macedon, or at least part of them, 782 while other
scholars have argued that the term signifies the European Greeks.783 Sancisi-Weerdenburg
has suggested a more inclusive definition by arguing that from the Persian viewpoint the
nations beyond the sea included Greeks, Thracians, and Scythians.784
If the term ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’ was used to denote the European
Greeks or even the dwellers of the northern Aegean, it becomes evident that the official
Persian version was that Xerxes successfully subjugated these peoples and exacted tribute
from them, just as Dio Chrysostom claims. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that
the term Skudra, i.e. Thrace, is also included in Xerxes’ catalogue of nations.785
Accordingly, there is little doubt that Xerxes proclaimed that his control in the northern
Aegean, and possibly mainland Greece, was unchallenged, a claim which utterly ignored
the reality in the western frontier.786
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The possibility that Xerxes proclaimed that his Greek campaign was a success is
nothing but expected. No Persian King in his right might would have dared to publicize his
failures, an act which would undermine his authority and embolden potential pretenders.
The fact that Xerxes continued to reign for additional fourteen years,787 during which he
saw that the building program in the Achaemenid royal capitals, which was initiated by
Darius I, continued as planned,788 suggests that the Persian defeats in the western frontier
constituted “but a brief inconvenience in the history of the Persian Empire.”789 The Greek
incursions, as seen from Susa or Persepolis, were not viewed as a threat to Persian rule in
Asia Minor. But from the viewpoint of the satraps of western Anatolia the Greek attacks
constituted a real and immediate problem which exacerbated when the anti-Persian Delian
League was founded. Xerxes was not alarmed by the Greek incursions and was confident
that his satraps were up for the task. Accordingly, the satraps of western Anatolia were
expected, in accordance with their satrapal duties, to protect the King’s possessions in the
west without royal assistance.

4.6 The Battle of the Eurymedon River
The battle at the Eurymedon River was a pivotal event in the history of the Delian
League.790 In the early 460s BC a confederate fleet of about 200791 ships under the
command of Cimon was campaigning in Caria and Lycia, subjugating several cities, some
by persuasion and others by force.792 At some point, Cimon learned that Persian land and
sea forces were being mustered nearby at the mouth of the Eurymedon River. The Athenian
general decided to strike and a double engagement ensued. After defeating the enemy fleet
being punished by the Great Persian King in royal proclamations, reliefs of Persian heroes (or kings) subduing
mythical monsters, and the rigid continuation of style and manner in which the Great Kings were depicted.
Accordingly, Briant (2002, 542) has argues that this artistic backdrop must have enhanced the impression
created by the catalogue of nations in the Daiva inscription, namely that the empire, including the western
frontier, was pacified and that the authority of the Great King was absolute.
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Cimon and his men disembarked and routed the Persian land forces that were encamped
on the river bank. There are several discrepancies in the ancient sources in regard to the
size of the Persian fleet,793 the identity of the Persian generals,794 and the location of the
first naval engagement.795 The exact date of the battle is also contested, as arguments have
been made in favor of 469796 and 466797 BC. In spite of these disagreements, it is widely
accepted that the mobilization of Persian land and sea forces at the Eurymedon constituted
preparations for a large scale offensive that was intended to reassert Persian supremacy in
the Aegean.798 In what follows I highlight the shortcomings of the Persian offensive
hypothesis and demonstrate that the Eurymedon battle was nothing more than an
engagement between a confederate fleet sent to ravage the King’s land and augmented
satrapal forces which were mobilized to contain and repel the Greek invaders. Such
interpretation corresponds with the detached attitude of the Persian central authorities
toward the state of affairs in western Anatolia and strengthens the impression that Xerxes
was unmoved by the Greek incursions in the west and had confident that his satraps were
capable of protecting the western borders of his empire.
The Persian Offensive Hypothesis
The proponents of the hypothesis that Cimon’s Eurymedon campaign thwarted
preparations for a Persian offensive make several seemingly compelling arguments. It has
been argued that Xerxes, determined to avenge his past defeats, mobilized land and sea
forces with the intention of reviving Persian preeminence in the west, 799 and that Xerxes,
aware of the Naxian revolt and the increasing dissent among Athens’ allies, decided to
seize the moment and strike.800 In addition, the substantial size of the Persian fleet coupled
with the mobilization of land forces were seen as indications of an ambitious offensive in
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the making.801 Furthermore, the size of Greek fleet, namely 200 vessels, had been deemed
too large for a raiding party, which led to the conclusion that Cimon was in fact leading a
preemptive strike.802 All of these arguments may seem convincing, but none of them is
without flaws.
The Greeks as the Aggressors
A close reading of the sources reveals that the battle at the Eurymedon was preceded by
Greek aggression. From the capture of Eion in 476 BC the war against Persia came to a
standstill. The Athenians, so it seems, preferred to cement their position as the leaders of
the Delian League,803 and one can infer that the Persians, still unchallenged in the Asiatic
continent, were satisfied with the emergence of an unofficial truce. But the diminishing
Persian threat and the failure of the Athenian leadership to follow the Delian League’s
official objectives, namely to liberate Persian controlled Greek cities and to ravage the
King’s land, were not without consequences. The Athenians witnessed a sharp decline in
support for continuing the war against the Persians among the members of the Delian
League, 804 which corroded the justification for Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and
men.805 These developments probably led to the abortive attempt of the Naxians to secede
from the Delian League, and for the first instance in the history of the Delian League in
which the Athenians used force to compel a former member to rejoin the alliance.806 Thus,
from an Athenian point of view, the Naxian secession attempt was a warning sign, a clear
indication that the legitimacy of the Delian League was in decline. Since this was the
background to Cimon’s campaign in Caria and Lycia, it seems reasonable to assume that
the Athenians dispatched a fleet to south-western Anatolia in order to demonstrate to their
allies and perhaps to the rest of the Greek world that the war against Persia was far from
over.807
That the Athenians were eager to reassert their position as the leaders of the war
against Persia is reflected in the propagandistic frenzy that followed Cimon’s victory at the
Eurymedon. Stelai in honor of the Athenians who fell at the Eurymedon were set up in
Athens,808 celebratory epigrams commemorating the Greek triumph were inscribed on
monuments set up by Cimon,809 and the spoils from the battle were used to beautify
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had contributed their fair share diligently in the past and it is more likely that their change in attitude occurred
once Athens began targeting Greek cities while the Persian threat became less and less tangible.
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Thuc. 1.98.4.
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Cf. Hornblower 2011a, 21. In addition, Grote (1846, 395) maintains that Cimon was sent to Asia due to
an Athenian desire to obliterate the memory of Athens’ recent brutal treatment of Naxos.
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Paus. 1.29.14.
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There are three epigrams, each a four-line stanza, which were inscribed on monuments set up by Cimon
in celebration of his victories. See: Aeschin. 3.183-5; Diod. 11.62.3; Plut. Cim. 7.3-8.1. Wade-Gery (1933)
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Athens.810 In addition, the victory was commemorated at Delphi,811 depicted on vase
paintings,812 and Athenians boys were named Eurymedon.813 By the time of Plutarch, the
battle at the Eurymedon River was remembered as a pivotal moment in the war against
Persia, a glorious achievement that overshadowed the triumphs at Salamis and Plataea.814
But when the actual consequences of the battle are taken into account, the claim that the
battle was a watershed moment seems like a wild exaggeration. 815 To being with, to our
best knowledge cities from Caria and Lycia did not joined the Delian League. It is quite
possible that several cities within the confederate fleet’s range might have joined the Delian
League due to awe or fear, but the scarcity of evidence, mainly the information that can be
derived from the Athenian tribute lists, suggests that the Delian League did not expand
eastward.816 Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Cimon, having utterly defeated the
Persian forces, decided to return home instead of capitalizing on his victory. 817 Therefore,
one can hypothesize that the Athenians were more interested in reminding their allies that
the war against Persia was still ongoing and that the existence of Delian League was

provides a comprehensive survey of all the extant traditions and versions of Cimon’s celebratory epigrams.
Further on Cimon’s epigrams, see: Peek 1940.
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Plut. Cim. 13.6-8.
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Paus. 10.15.4-5. Moreover, Kebric (1983) has argued that the Lesche of the Cnidians at Delphi, a clubroom for communal gathering, was constructed and adorned in response to the Athenian victory at the
Eurymedon.
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It is generally agreed that the famous Eurymedon Vase, a red-figure oinochoe dated to c. 460 BC,
celebrates Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon. On Side A there is a depiction of a mature bearded Persian,
wearing a decorated jumpsuit, a soft cap, and a dangling empty quiver. The Persian is bending over with his
hands held to the side of his head in a gesture of panic. On side B we find a naked Greek youth who seems
to be chasing the Persian while brandishing not a spear but his penis. Between the two there is an inscription
which says: “I’m Eurymedon, I stand bent-over”. The restoration suggested by Schauenburg (1975, 104 n.
38a) is the following: εὐρυμέδον εἰμ[ὶ] κυβά[δε ]ἕστεκα. On the connection between the Eurymedon Vase
and the Eurymedon battle, see: Dover 1989, 105; Pinney 1984; Miller 1997, 13; Castriota 2005, 99; Cohen
2011, 474–77.
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The best example for this phenomenon is the Athenian general Eurymedon (e.g. Thuc. 3.80.2), who, as
pointed out by Hornblower (1991, 154, 475), was almost certainly named after this battle.
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Plut. Cim. 13.4. Compare: Paus. 1.29.14. Plutarch (Cim. 12.1, 13.4) even claims that nobody humbled the
Great Persian King like Cimon at the Eurymedon.
815
Plutarch (Them. 31.3) maintains that prior to the Egyptian uprising in the early 450 BC, Cimon
successfully established Athens’ mastery over the sea, which forced the King to mount a counterattack. While
Keen (1997, 63-4) deems this achievement as an outcome of Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon, I argue that
such a statement reflects Athenian propaganda rather than historical reality.
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Gomme 1945, 290–95. Thucydides (2.9.4) reports that the allies of Athens in 431 BC included the coastal
cities of Caria with its Dorians neighbors, but a thorough examination of the Athenian tribute lists (see: Keen
1993a) demonstrates that while Lycian and Carian settlements appeared inconsistently in the mid-450s BC,
they are conspicuously absent after 440 BC. Therefore, it is clear that the Carian and Lycian cities were in a
position to depart from the Delian League with impunity and it is not out of the question that they
acknowledged Persian authority.
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Rhodes (1992, 43) posits that at the very least Cimon could have made an attempt to recover Cyprus, as
he did in 450 BC under less favorable circumstances. Moreover, it is puzzling why the Athenians did not
cement their control over southwestern Anatolia, which entailed numerous strategic advantages. Cf. Keen
1993b; Keen 1997, 65–66.

114
imperative.818 Accordingly, it is not out of the question that the somewhat exaggerated
reputation of the battle at the Eurymedon River was probably the outcome of Athenian
propaganda.
The Persians were on the Defensive
The notion that the Greeks were the aggressors is bolstered by several indications which
suggest that the Persians were on the defensive. First, there is no substantive evidence for
Persian design to mount an assault on the Aegean. The three traditions which make such a
claim are, as noted by Keen, highly dubious.819 Most importantly, it is hard to believe that
the Persians were in a state of paralysis for at least a decade before they resolved to reassert
Persian authority in the Aegean, or that Xerxes was motivated by a thirst for vengeance so
long resolved after his failure to conquer Greece. In general, the assumption that the Great
Persian Kings were aware of or cared for the political squabbles in mainland Greece is
unrealistic. Accordingly, it highly unlikely that Xerxes was paying close attention to the
changing dynamics between Athens and its allies from the moment he returned home and,
when he learned about the Naxian revolt, he sprang into action seeking revenge. As we
have seen, Xerxes was unaffected by the Greek incursions which preceded the Eurymedon
campaign, so there is no reason to believe that he suddenly changed his mind and made
plans to storm the Aegean once more. Xerxes, I argue, was not paralyzed but detached, and
almost certainly preoccupied with other regions within his domain which demanded his
attention.820 This was true before the Persians were defeated at the Eurymedon River, and,
when considering the fact that the Greek victory had no substantial consequences, probably
after.
Second, any argument that is predicated on the size of Persian land and sea forces
cannot be accepted. The ancient sources are notorious for providing questionable if not
818

Several explanations have been suggested for the seemingly abrupt ending of the Greek offensive. Plutarch
(Cim. 13.4) implies that the Persians sued for peace after the defeat at the Eurymedon, but it is rather clear
that the biographer is referring to the so-called Peace of Callias, which Diodorus (12.2.4-5) dates to 450/449
BC. Some scholars (e.g. Walsh 1981; Badian 1987) have argued that a peace treaty was concluded after the
Eurymedon. Nevertheless, there are several problems with such a claim. First, Blamire (1989, 144) notes that
the conclusion of a truce after the battle at the Eurymedon River is utterly absent from fourth century BC
traditions. Second, if the Athenians and Persians came to terms, how could we explain the Athenian
involvement in the Egyptian uprising in first half of the 450s BC and the Athenian attack on Cyprus in 450
BC? A more plausible explanation have been suggested by Meiggs (1972, 79), who maintains that Cimon
decided to refrain from pushing forward because he had no reconnaissance on the potential threats that were
waiting ahead and because the sailing season was close to its end.
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Keen 1997, 58. Plato (Menex. 241d) merely mentions in passing that Xerxes planned a third invasion.
Diodorus (11.58.2-3) asserts that Xerxes’ expected Themistocles to facilitate the reassertion of Persian power
in the Aegean, but the death of Athenian general led Great King to abort his plan. This tradition, it should be
noted, is utterly rejected by Thucydides (1.138.4). Justin (12.15.17-20) asserts that Xerxes began preparations
for a second Greek campaign after he learned about the elimination of Pausanias, his alleged co-conspirator.
All in all, the traditions concerned with a third Persian invasion should be envisioned as manifestations of
Greek paranoia rather than actual Persian design. Cf. Fornara 1966, 271; Meiggs 1972, 467; Badian 1993,
87–88; Keen 1997, 58–59.
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The portrayal of Xerxes in the ancient sources as preoccupied almost exclusively with court intrigue in
the later part of his reign (e.g. Hdt. 9.108-13, Ctes. FGrH 688 F13 §32-33; Diod. 11.69.1-2; Just. 3.1.1-2)
cannot be accepted as historical. It is far more likely that Xerxes had to attend to the needs of his vast empire,
of which western Anatolia was only a small part.
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dubious figures whenever Persian armies and navies are involved. 821 In respect to the
number of Persian ships deployed at the Eurymedon, the figures mentioned in the sources
range from 200 to 600,822 while we have no concrete information regarding the size of the
Persian land forces. On the contrary, there are several indications which suggest that the
size of the Persian fleet that gathered at the Eurymedon was grossly inflated. Keen notes
that Phanodemus' claim that the Persians deployed 600 ships is dubious since it constitutes
the sum of both Greek and Persian fleets as reported by Ephorus.823 Moreover, we are told
that Cimon, with a fleet of at least 200 ships,824 had to force the Persians to engage as the
latter tried to refrain from battle by sailing up river until the arrival of eighty Phoenician
ships which were en route from Cyprus.825 In previous naval engagements in which the
Persians had a numerical advantage there was no hesitation on the Persian side. 826 The
caution of the Persian admirals suggests that the Persian fleet may have been much smaller
than reported and perhaps even smaller than Cimon’s armada.827
In regard to the Persian land forces, a close reading of the sources reveals that the
Greeks were probably far from outnumbered on land as well. Plutarch notes that Cimon’s
fleet consisted of newly designed triremes, which were broader and were furnished with
bridges between the decks. The new design meant that each trireme was capable of carrying
a greater number of hoplites.828 In other words, Cimon’s fleet was carrying a large infantry
force ready for deployment.829 In addition, though the reports on the land battle are
succinct, all agree that the Persian land army was easily routed, which renders the
possibility that the Persians outnumbered the Greeks even less plausible.
821

Herodotus, for example, claims that Datis had no less than 600 triremes under his command (Hdt. 6.95.2),
that the Persian fleet that crushed the Ionian rebels near Lade consisted of 600 ships (Hdt. 6.9.1, 95.2), that
Xerxes’ fleet consisted of 3,000 various types of vessels (Hdt. 7.97), and that the Persian invasion force
consisted a total of 5,283,220 men (Hdt. 7.184-6). The accounts regarding the Persian efforts to suppress an
Egyptian uprising in the early 450s BC serve as another compelling example. Ctesias (FGrH 608 F13 §367) recounts two Persian attempts to recapture Egypt: the first expedition consisted of 400,000 infantry and
eighty ships, while the second 200,000 and 300 ships. The figure reported by Diodorus (11.74.1, 75.1-2,
77.1) are equally unbelievable: 300,000 infantry and cavalry for the first expedition and 300,000 coupled
with 300 ships for the second.
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See n. 793 above.
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Keen 1997, 59–60.
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See n. 791 above.
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Plut. Cim. 12.4.
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For example, in the battle of Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-11) the Persians, who had a numerical advantage,
charged headlong. Similarly, in the battle of Salamis the Persians attacked without hesitation (Hdt. 8.84)
while the Greek counter-maneuvers were aimed at cancelling the Persian superiority in numbers by luring
the Persians ships into a narrow strait (Hdt. 8.60a-b; Diod. 11.15.4; Plut. Them. 12.3). The Persians at the
Eurymedon, so it seems, tried to do the same by sailing up river, which suggests that they had a smaller fleet.
Moreover, Herodotus (9.96-7) recounts how shortly before the battle of Mycale the Persian admirals
preferred to beach their ships and fight the Greeks on land because they had fewer ships.
827
In addition, Keen (1997, 60) argues that even if we accept the possibility that the Persians assembled a
fleet of 600 ships, it was still insufficient for a large-scale attack.
828
Plut. Cim. 12.2.
829
The magnitude of Cimon’s land forces is demonstrated by the subjugation of the city of Phaselis shortly
before the Eurymedon battle. Phaselis fell not due to a prolonged siege but after Cimon mounted a frontal
assault against the city walls, which probably required the participation of considerable land forces. See: Plut.
Cim. 12.3.
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Third, the considerable size of the Greek fleet does not necessarily mean that the
Greeks launched a preemptive strike against a forming Persian invasion force. We should
not forget that Cimon was the first Greek to sail deep into enemy waters since Pausanias’
attack on Cyprus in 478 BC. The proximity to the Persian naval bases in Cyprus, Phoenicia,
and Cilicia meant that the chances of encountering a Persian fleet were considerable.
Moreover, Athens influence in this region was non-existent before Cimon’s arrival, which
explains why Cimon was not received as a liberator by the people of Phaselis.830
Accordingly, the Athenians and their allies must have been aware of the potential threats
that Cimon would be facing during his campaign and therefore mobilized a force that was
suitable for siege works, land skirmishes, and naval engagements. In addition, a large fleet
constituted an effective demonstration of the Delian League’s might, which must have
improved Cimon’s chances of success in persuading Carian and Lycian cities to revolt from
the Persians and join the Delian League. In sum, the size of Cimon’s fleet had nothing to
do with an imminent clash with a considerable Persian force but a necessary precaution in
light of the dangers it could have encountered.
Fourth, if Cimon was instructed to attack the Persian forces at the Eurymedon, one
wonders what drove him to disregard his orders and waste valuable time in assaulting
several cities in Caria and Lycia. A prudent and seasoned general like Cimon must have
known that it was best to attack before the enemy was in full strength. In addition, the
accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch imply that Cimon learned about the Persian military
presence at the Eurymedon in the midst of his campaign in Caria and Lycia.831 If the Persian
forces at the Eurymedon were news to Cimon, the claim that he was leading a preemptive
strike becomes impossible. So why was Cimon sent to Caria and Lycia? Diodorus frames
Cimon’s exploits in southeastern Anatolia as a continuation of the overarching effort of the
Delian League to liberate Greek cities garrisoned by the Persians.832 Thus, I completely
agree with French, who maintains that “there seems no reason why we should not interpret
the campaign as one of the more successful examples of the League’s original policy, i.e.
as a punitive plundering raid upon the Persian domains.”833
Fifth, the sequence of events demonstrates that the Persian mobilization at the
Eurymedon was a response to Cimon’s advance. While it is unclear whether Cimon’s
campaign in Lycia and Caria spanned over a single or several seasons834 our sources agree
that the Persian mobilization at the Eurymedon took place while Cimon was already
operating in Caria and Lycia. Therefore, is seems unfathomable that the Persians were
leisurely mustering a vast host to embark on another ambitious conquest expedition instead
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Diodorus (11.60.4) reports that Cimon had to reduce unspecified of Carian cities by siege, while Frontinus
(Strat. 3.2.5) mentions an unnamed city that Cimon captured through a clever stratagem.
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Diod. 11.60. 4-6; Plut. Cim. 12.2.
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Diod. 11.60.
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French 1971, 38 n. 40. For a similar interpretation of the origin of Cimon’s campaign, see: Grote 1846,
395; Walker 1923, 55; Steinbrecher 1985, 104–6; McGregor 1987, 40.
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Diodorus dates all of Cimon’s achievements in Caria and Lycia to 470/69 BC, and Plutarch’s narration
gives the impression that Cimon’s assault in the region occurred in a single and continuous campaign. While
this timeline is accepted by Keen (1997, 61–62), Meiggs (1972, 74) and Blamire (1989, 138) have argued
that the many achievements of Cimon were more likely to have been accomplished over several seasons.
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of moving against the Greek invaders who were roaming in Caria and Lycia,.835 A more
reasonable explanation for the presence of the Persian forces at the Eurymedon is that the
Persian mobilization began as a response to Cimon’s exploits.836 In other words, only when
the Persian authorities received reports about the presence of a sizable Greek fleet that was
operating in Caria and Lycia they began mustering land and sea forces with the intention
of preventing the Greeks from advancing further to the east.837 Time was pressing and
when Cimon attacked the Persians were still building up their strength, which explains the
hesitation of the Persian navy.
Sixth, the usage of the Eurymedon as the mustering site for the Persian forces
validates the notion that the Persian mobilization was defensive and reactionary in nature.
The traditional staging point for Persian land forces in Asia Minor was not the banks of the
Eurymedon River but Sardis838, while the naval bases in Cilicia and Phoenicia were the
conventional mustering places for Persian navies.839 Furthermore, the Eurymedon was not
a suitable starting point for a westward campaign since there was no good coastal road for
quick transportation of troops in the area and it had no easy access to the Anatolian
hinterland.840 The only seemingly tactical importance of the Eurymedon was that it was in
the path of Cimon’s fleet, which again indicates that the Persians were aiming at blocking
the advancing Greek fleet.841
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Keen 1997, 62–63.
Steinbrecher 1985, 105–6. A similar response of the satrapal authorities in western Anatolia occurred
when Alexander invaded to Asia, as the local satraps gathered their forces and engaged the Macedonians at
the Granicus River. See n. 844 below.
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Cawkwell (1970, 47–48) points out that the assembling of a fleet was a prolonged endeavor and argues
that the forces at the Eurymedon began mustering two years prior to the battle. Conversely, Keen (1997, 63)
notes that while there are several instances of long preparations which preceded a campaign (e.g. Hdt. 726.1;
Xen. Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 15.14.2, 38.1), if the Persian preparations began two years before Cimon’s arrival,
they should have been much larger in scale than reported.
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For instance, Sardis served as winter quarters for Xerxes’ army prior to the crossing of the Hellespont
(Hdt. 7.37.1). Similarly, when Cyrus that Younger was gathering an army before he tried to usurp the throne,
the Greek officers were instructed to assemble at Sardis with the men under their command (Xen. An. 2.25). Sardis was also the site in which reinforcements from the east joined Tissaphernes’ satrapal contingents
in 396 BC (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-11).
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For examples, in 492 BC Mardonius marched with his army to Cilicia, where a fleet was waiting for him.
From there he sailed along the Anatolian coastline to Ionia (Hdt. 6.43.2-3). Two years later Datis assembled
his navy in the Aleian plain in Cilicia in preparation for the expedition against Athens and Eretria (Hdt. 6.95).
Similarly, when Egypt rebelled in the late 460s, Artabazus and Megabyzus, the generals who were ordered
to retake Egypt, marched with their land army to Cilicia and Phoenicia, where they rested their forces and
commanded the Cyprians and Cilicians to supply provisions and ships (Diod. 11.75.2-3).
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Meiggs (1972, 78) suggests that the land route was not critical since the Persians intended the ships to
carry the land forces. In contrast, Keen (1997, 61) points out that since the Athenians dominated all that was
west of the Eurymedon River, the Persian fleet needed to advance in parallel with the land forces in order to
ensure control of the coastline, a basic and necessary tactic in ancient maritime warfare. Similarly, Cawkwell
(2005, 133–34) argues that the Persians planned to march along the coast with the army and navy moving
along each other, thus capturing city after city just like Alexander did in 333 BC, albeit in the opposite
direction. Such a plan, however, does not necessarily mean that the Persian design was to launch a large scale
offensive, and it could also be argued that they simply intended to reclaim all the cities that were lost to the
Greeks in Caria and Lycia.
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It should be noted that Thucydides (8.87) reports that in 411 BC a Persian fleet sailed as far as the city of
Aspendus, which was situated on the Eurymedon River, in readiness to sail westward. At no point, however,
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In summary, the battle of the Eurymedon River was by no means the outcome of a
Greek preemptive strike that was intended to prevent a Persian offensive. It was a clash
between a confederate fleet that was instructed to liberate the Greek cities in Caria and
Lycia and Persian forces that were hurriedly gathered to protect the King’s land from the
pesky Greeks. Such reconstruction becomes evident when taking into consideration the
rising dissent among the members of the Delian League in the late 470s, Cimon’s exploits
prior to the battle, the unusual usage of the Eurymedon as a site for mobilization of Persian
land and sea forces, and the maneuvers of the Persian fleet during the naval engagement.
On the one hand, Cimon’s main objective was to reignite the war against Persia in
order to legitimize Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and men, and by extension to
discredit potential secession attempts from the Delian League. It is not out of the question,
therefore, that the battle at the Eurymedon River was an unexpected development, an
opportunity which Cimon was prudent enough to exploit. The Athenians, I argue, neither
planned nor were able to extend their authority further to the east and in any case they were
probably more interested in reminding their fellow countrymen that the Delian League was
a Panhellenic coalition that spearheaded the war against Persia rather than an instrument
of power abused by Athens.
On the other hand, it is clear that the Persian actions were reactionary in nature. The
absence of any hint that the Persians were planning to reassert their dominance in the
Aegean since Xerxes’ retreat suggests that the Great King was content with the status quo
which emerged in the mid-470s BC. The assumption that a sudden and dramatic shift in
Persian policy in the west occurred due to personal grudge is highly improbable. To our
best knowledge, there was no Persian retaliation following the battle of the Eurymedon,
which seems expected when considering the limited effect of Cimon’s achievements in
Caria and Lycia. Consequently, the forces which Cimon encountered at the Eurymedon
were probably satrapal forces scrambled from Caria, Lycia, and the neighboring satrapies
along with available ships that were harboring nearby. The notion that the Persian forces
at the Eurymedon were satrapal is expressed by Grote,842 though he left this important
observation underdeveloped. I should point out that Diodorus provides a hint that these
forces were of local origin when he notes that when the Greek surprise attack began, the
Persian infantry thought that they were attacked by the Pisidians who dwelt in neighboring
territory and were hostile to the Persians, an assumption that soldiers who were familiar
with the region and probably served nearby could have made. 843 As we have seen, one of
the most important duties of the satrap was to protect his domain from local and foreign
threats, and Cimon and his men were clearly of the latter sort.844 The Persians were defeated
Thucydides explicitly claims that the Persian fleet that was present at Aspendus was mustered at that specific
location. The only fact that Thucydides is ready to sanction is that 147 Phoenician ships came as far as
Aspendus, which implies that the armada was mobilized elsewhere and sailed to Aspendus.
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Grote 1846, 395.
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Diod. 11.61.4.
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All of the Persian generals at the Eurymedon were of noble if not royal descent. Pherendates was most
likely the son of Megabazus who was an honorable member in the royal court of Darius’ I, and was tasked
to lead the Persian attack in Thrace after the Scythian campaign (see: Balcer 1993, no. 49). Pherendates
himself was one of Xerxes’ generals (Hdt. 7.67.1) and we know that he presided as the satrap of Egypt in the
late 490 BC (see p. 41 above). Not much is known about the career of Tithraustes, but Diodorus (11.60.5)
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once more, but the consequences of this defeat were insignificant, and as such made royal
intervention redundant.

Conclusion
The Greek communities which inhabited the coastal districts of western Anatolia played a
key role in the interactions between Greeks and Persians. The bond of kinship between the
Asiatic and European Greeks was the main cause, or justification, for the interventions of
the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia. Before Xerxes’ invasion, however, the
responses to Ionian appeals for help were limited to diplomacy or small scale military
expeditions. But the willingness of the mainland Greeks to intervene on behalf of the
Ionians increased dramatically in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The foundation of the
Delian League constituted a well-organized Panhellenic effort to guarantee the safety,
security, and liberty of the Asiatic Greeks. Athens and its allies carried on the war against
Persia under the slogans of Greek liberty and vengeance, which led to several military
operations against Persian targets throughout the eastern Mediterranean. The war against
Persia validated the Delian League, and the Athenians knew that as long as they can
demonstrate that Persia remained a real and immediate threat to the Asiatic Greeks, they
would be able to justify the existence of the Delian League and by extension Athens’
dominance within this political framework.
Xerxes’ failure to enslave the European Greeks had an equally profound and to
some extent opposite impact on the attitude of the Persian royal authorities toward the
western satrapies. The apparent disengagement of the Great King in respect to the Greek
offensive in the 470s BC suggests that following the conclusion of Xerxes’ Greek
campaign the official Achaemenid policy in the west shifted from a policy of expansion to
a policy of entrenchment. Such policy, which presumably remained unchanged throughout
Xerxes’ reign, became viable due to the fact the Delian League was primarily a maritime
power. While the Greeks managed to expel the Persians from Europe and raided the
Anatolian coastline and Cyprus, at no point Persian rule in the Asiatic continent was truly
jeopardized. But while the Greeks remained an ongoing threat to Persian authority, the
dissonance between the reality in the west and its misrepresentation in Achaemenid royal
inscriptions meant that the Persian governors of the western satrapies were expected to
fulfill their satrapal duties while dealing with the Greek challenge on their own. Such an
interpretation, I argue, is much more compelling than the assertion that Xerxes simply
decided to concede the coasts of western Anatolia to the Greeks.845 The Achaemenids, as
we shall see in the following chapter, never officially relinquished their claim over Ionia,
although Artaxerxes I adopted his father’s approach toward the western frontier. The fact
that the Great King remained unconcerned regarding the western satrapies encouraged
says that he was Xerxes’ bastard son. Ariomandes was the son of Gobryas, a high ranking Achaemenid, a
spear-bearer of Darius I (See: Balcer 1993, no. 41), and his brother was the renowned Mardonius. In sum,
the generals at the Eurymedon were seasoned commanders and connected in some way or the other to the
Achaemenid royal household. Since there is no mention that they were appointed by the Great King through
a special commission, it is not out of the question that they were the satraps of the adjacent provinces who
formed a joint force to repel the Greek invaders, in a similar fashion to the satrapal coalition that Alexander
the Great faced at the battle of the Granicus River.
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E.g. Cawkwell 1968; Balcer 1991, 62.
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satrapal initiative. Consequently, while the exploits of the satraps during the reign of
Xerxes are underreported, their presence in the ancient sources becomes more and more
dominant, which reflects their growing agency in the interactions between Greeks and
Persians.
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5. DISINTEREST AND EQUILIBRIUM
In contrast to Xerxes, his son and successor Artaxerxes I played a rather secondary role in
Greek historical sources. In the early part of his reign, Artaxerxes’ interactions with the
Greeks were infrequent and reactionary in nature, and after the conclusion of the so-called
Peace of Callias in 449 BC, Greco-Persian relations were limited to diplomatic exchange
coupled with limited military conflicts in western Anatolia. Nevertheless, modern
interpretations envision almost every Persian intervention in Greek affairs as an outcome
of a royal directive dictated by Artaxerxes. Consequently, the aim of the present chapter is
to challenge and correct the apparent misconception regarding the agency of the Persian
royal authorities during the reign of Artaxerxes I.
I begin by demonstrating that Artaxerxes adopted his father’s policy of
entrenchment in the western frontier. On the one hand, Artaxerxes neither showed
expansionist aspirations toward the west nor sought to actively challenge Athens in the
Aegean. On the other hand, Athenian aggression in the eastern Mediterranean basin was
met with lukewarm Persian response. Accordingly, I argue that Artaxerxes’ lack of concern
regarding the Athenian threat can be explained by a consideration that often goes
unnoticed, namely that while there is no doubt that Athens constituted a formidable
maritime power, its reach was limited to the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean.
Therefore, Athens was never constituted a real and immediate threat to Persian authority,
and as such the Great King expected the satrapal authorities in the west to resolve, or at the
very least contain, the Athenian problem. By taking into consideration the true balance of
power between Athens and Persia as well as the Great King’s position and interest, I offer
a reappraisal of the extent and impact of the achievements of the Delian League vis-à-vis
Persia, and conclude that the depiction of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign as a glorious triumph
which coerced Artaxerxes to sue for peace must be rejected in favor of a more balanced
account.
The second point of interest is the conclusion of the Peace of Callias and the
subsequent status quo between Athens and Persia. I demonstrate that the scholarly debate
concerning the historicity of the alleged treaty negotiated by Callias can be resolved by
accepting the notion that the Peace of Callias constituted an informal agreement rather than
an official treaty. I then offer an analysis of the factors which allowed the modus vivendi
in western Anatolia to endure throughout Artaxerxes’ reign. Most importantly, I argue that
the unofficial nature of the equilibrium in the west and the measures which allowed it to
continued created favorable conditions for independent satrapal initiatives.
Lastly, I focus on the interactions between Greeks and Persians in the context of
the Archidamian War. These interactions manifested in two forms. On the one hand, there
was an ongoing exchange of embassies between Susa, Sparta, and Athens, as both Spartans
and Athenians sought to obtain Persian support in order to win the war. Though the Great
King opted to remain neutral, the vibrant diplomatic interchange shows that the relations
between Artaxerxes and the two Greek superpowers were amicable. On the other hand, a
series of skirmishes took place in western Anatolia as Athenian forces clashed with various
local contingents, some of which were affiliated with the satrapal authorities. I argue that
the discrepancy between the ongoing diplomatic exchange and the skirmishes occurring in
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the west was the outcome of the contrast between the position of the Great King and that
of the satraps of western Anatolia. From the Great King’s viewpoint blatant Persian
intervention in the war could have jeopardized the status quo in the west, but for the satraps
of western Anatolia the ongoing war in the Greek mainland created an opportunity. When
the members of anti-Athenian factions in Ionia, who wished to throw off the yoke of
Athenian rule, appealed the satraps for assistance, the latter, in spite of or perhaps due to
Artaxerxes’ do-nothing policy, were willing to intervene in hope of increasing their
influence and power.

5.1 The Disinterest of Artaxerxes I
The Embassy of Megabazus
The earliest known instance in which Artaxerxes I interacted with the Greeks was prompted
by an Egyptian uprising that erupted shortly after Xerxes’ death.846 In essence, shortly after
the Egyptians rose in revolt against Persian rule, they appealed to the Athenians for
assistance. The Athenian authorities ordered a confederate fleet that happened to be
operating in Cyprus to join the fighting. At first, the Greco-Egyptian coalition managed to
overwhelm the Persian garrisons, but eventually Artaxerxes dispatched a vast army that
suppressed the rebellion, and only a handful of Greeks who participated in the Athenian
expedition to Egypt made it home alive. But before the Great King mobilized his forces, a
Persian embassy led by a certain Megabazus arrived at Sparta and offered to finance a
Peloponnesian invasion to Attica. The Persian design, we are told, was to force the
Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt. Despite the Persian appeal, the Spartans
remained inactive.847
In a sharp contrast to Darius I’s response to Athens’ involvement in the Ionian
revolt, Artaxerxes made no attempt to punish the Athenians for meddling in Persian affairs
in Egypt. The Great King, so it seems, was unconcerned with Athens’ encroachment. But
the diplomatic effort to induce a war between Sparta and Athens suggests that Artaxerxes
was aware of the animosity between the two Greek city-states. Yet, it is hard to believe that
the Great Persian King was familiar with the contemporary state of affairs in mainland
Greece and the rising hostility between two minor polities which resided well beyond the
borders of his empire. A possible explanation can be found in a tradition concerned with a
certain Arthmius of Zeleia who, according to an inscription mentioned by several fourth
century sources, was branded as an enemy of the Athenian people for conveying Persian
gold to Greece.848 While the historicity of the decree has been challenged, arguments in
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favor of authenticity seem more compelling,849 and it has been suggested that Arthmius
was a member of the entourage that accompanied Megabazus in his journey to Sparta. 850
The notion that a Greek facilitated a Persian attempt to manipulate Greek politics by
distributing funds reveals a possible channel of communication through which the satraps
of Hellespontine Phrygia monitored Greek politics and conveyed valuable information to
the Persian central authorities.851
We should not forget that throughout the fifth century BC the satraps of
Hellespontine Phrygia found themselves in the forefront of the ongoing conflict with the
Greeks. One way to face the Greek threat was to forge connections with powerful and
influential men in the Hellespontine region in order to create a defensive bulwark that
would safeguard their satrapy from Greek incursions. The earliest instance in which this
tactic was used occurred in 478 BC, in the context of the collaboration between Artabazus
and Pausanias.852 It is rather likely that this tactic was adopted by Artabazus’ successors,
who went on to create a network of guest-friendships and other types of connections with
Greeks and Thracian elements in the neighboring regions.
Accordingly, the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia must have established a working
relationship first and foremost with the Greek communities within their satrapy. In
exchange for the satrap’s favor, which probably constituted material rewards, prominent
Greeks acted as facilitators of potential collaborations between the satrap and various
Greeks cities, communities, and individuals in Asia as well as in Europe. The Persian
ambassadors, whether sent by the satrap or the Great King himself, were in need of Greek
collaborators to arrange meetings with high ranking Greek functionaries and politicians as
well as acting as translators to enable effective communication.853 Arthmius, an Athenian
proxenus and a native of Zeleia, which was in close proximity to the satrapal capital at
Dascylium,854 was the ideal candidate to represent the interest of the satrap of
Hellespontine Phrygia in the Greek mainland.
The Hellespontine connection hypothesis becomes even more compelling when
considering the familial background of the Persian ambassador Megabazus. While is it
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almost certain that Megabazus was a high-ranking Persian noble,855 his name suggests that
he was related to an accomplished Persian general of the same name who subjugated the
Thracian coast in the name of Darius I and later on presided as one of the commanders of
the Persian fleet under Xerxes.856 The father of the general Megabazus was Megabates, the
aforementioned satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who was also a cousin of Darius I.857 The
likelihood that the ambassador Megabazus came from a family whose leading members
served in the west in key positions suggests that Artaxerxes chose a delegate who had
preexisting family-ties in the west, ties which could have increased the embassy’s chances
of success.
Therefore, it is more likely that the driving force behind the diplomatic effort to
incite a war between Athens and Sparta was the contemporary satrap of Hellespontine
Phrygia.858 It is not out of the question that after the rebellion in Egypt span out of control,
the satrap of Hellespontine informed the Persian central authorities about the deteriorating
relationship between Athens and Sparta and proposed a plan to persuade the Spartans to
attack the Athenians as a way to compel the Athenians to pull out their forces from Egypt.
Although the evidence for such a reconstruction is circumstantial, it seems more
convincing than assuming that the Great King was particularly attentive to the
contemporary political atmosphere in European Greece. Accordingly, by envisioning the
satraps of western Anatolia and their Greek proxies as middlemen who allowed the flow
of information from west to east, we can explain the mechanism by which the Achaemenid
Kings gathered intelligence on events which occurred far away from their royal capitals.
Cimon’s Cypriot Campaign
The catastrophic conclusion of the Athenian expedition to Egypt did not deter the
Athenians from further interventions in Persian affairs. In 450 BC, after peace was
established on the home front,859 the Athenians dispatched a fleet to Cyprus under the
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command of Cimon.860 The Athenians, however, were not received as liberators by the
locals. Several cities, as Marium, Citium and Salamis are mentioned by name, 861 were
subjected to Athenian siege. But the manner in which the campaign ended is unclear.
Thucydides reports that Cimon died during the siege of Citium, and that soon after the
Athenians defeated the Persians in a naval engagement.862 Such sequence of events
suggests that the death of Cimon prompted an Athenian retreat, and that the Athenians
encountered a Persian navy off Salamis on their way home.863 In this way, Cyprus was not
subjugated, but the Athenians were able to claim another victory over the Persians. In
contrast, Plutarch places the naval battle before the siege of Citium, though he agrees with
Thucydides that Citium was the place of Cimon’s demise. 864 If Plutarch’s account is
followed, it becomes much clearer that the death of Cimon led the Athenians to abort the
campaign. Diodorus’ account is rather puzzling since he states that the Athenians left
Cyprus only after the Persians sued for peace and only then he mentions in passing that
Cimon died on Cyprus.865 While it is possible that the tradition in which Cimon presided
as the commander in chief throughout the entire or at least the majority of the campaign
was fueled by his posthumous glorification,866 the overall impression is that the campaign
ended with mixed results. The Athenians vanquished the Persians once again, but Persian
rule on Cyprus endured. As such, it is difficult to accept Diodorus’ statement, namely that
it was the Athenian operations on Cyprus that drove the Persians to sue for peace.867
On the contrary, the Cypriot campaign highlighted the limits of Athenian military
capacity. The Athenians forged their Aegean empire by the might of their fleets, but their
capacity to undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean was inherently limited.
Athens’ navies posed a threat to the Anatolian and Levantine coastal regions as well as
The sources for Cimon’s Cypriot campaign: Thuc. 1.112.2-4; Diod. 12.3-4; Plut. Cim. 18.4-19.1. See also:
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timetable is widely accepted, see: Gomme 1945, 325; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 178; Badian
1993, 58–60; Green 2006, 179–80 n. 10. Conversely, Meiggs (1963, 11–31; 1972, 124–26) has argued in
favor of 451 BC as the year in which Cimon arrived at Cyprus.
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Cyprus,868 but the lack of an equally capable land army meant that the hinterland was
beyond Athenian reach. Cimon’s misadventure on Cyprus proved that defeating the
Persians armies and navies was a necessary first step, but without garnering local support,
such victories had a fleeting effect. Consequently, it is not out of the question that from a
Persian viewpoint the operations of the Delian League constituted a problem with which
the satrapal authorities were expected to deal. Be that as it may, the attempt to takeover
Cyprus made it evident that the Athenians were determined to continue operating in the
eastern Mediterranean. But the inconclusive outcome of the Cypriot campaign created an
alignment of interests which rendered a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Athens
and Persia beneficial to both parties.

5.2 Equilibrium
The Peace of Callias
In the wake of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign, the war between Athens and Persia came to a
halt. In the following decades the Athenians stopped operating in Egypt, Cyprus, and the
Levant while the Persians stayed out of the Aegean. According to the ancient sources, this
period of peace was the outcome of the so-called Peace of Callias which was purportedly
concluded in 449 BC. But while the silence of the ancient sources suggests that a status
quo was established in western Anatolia, the authenticity of the Peace of Callias has been
debated.869 The crux of this scholarly debate is the fact that while the Peace of Callias is
mentioned by several fourth century Attic orators, it is utterly ignored by fifth century
traditions.870 As it stands, both lines of argumentation, i.e. in favor or against authenticity,
remain imperfect. On the one hand, if a peace treaty had been concluded, the Athenians
would have followed their practice by commemorating the decree which announced the
end the war with Persia on a slab of stone or marble and set it up on the acropolis for all to
see. However, there is no evidence for the existence of such a formal document and none
of the available fourth century sources seems to have had access to such a document. On
the other hand, it is unlikely that the abrupt cessation of hostilities following Cimon’s death
on Cyprus was the outcome of an independent yet simultaneous decisions made by the
Athenians and the Great King.
The Informal Agreement Hypothesis
Most scholars have been inclined to accept or reject the peace. Yet, an alternative
reconstruction, one which constitutes a middle ground between these two mutually
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exclusive hypotheses, has received relatively little attention. It has been suggested that the
Athenians and Persians made an informal agreement according to which the former
acknowledged Persian superiority in Cyprus and Egypt while the latter agreed to refrain
from intervening in the affairs of the Greek city-states of Asia.871 The informal agreement
hypothesis, which is implied by Callisthenes, who rejects the claim that the Athenians
concluded a peace treaty with the Persian King, but he admits that the latter acted as if a
treaty was concluded because he was afraid of the Athenians. 872 Regardless, the informal
agreement hypothesis is far more attractive since it resolves the problematic issues which
challenged interpretations offered by both supporters and detractors of the Peace of Callias.
To begin with, the informal agreement hypothesis explains the nature of the
evidence regarding the Peace of Callias. If there was no formal treaty, we should not expect
the sources to recount the occurrence of formalities such as mutual oath-taking,873 the
ratification of the treaty in the Athenian assembly,874 or the public display of an inscribed
copy of the treaty on the Athenian acropolis. Moreover, the informal nature of the
agreement explains, on the one hand, the suspicious silence of Thucydides.875 On the other,
it clarifies why Herodotus, when referring to the embassy of Callias, states that Callias and
his colleagues were sent to Susa ‘on account of some business’ (ἑτέρου πρήγματος
εἵνεκα),876 an ambiguous articulation which, as argued by Holladay appropriately describes
not a conclusion of a formal peace treaty but an informal understanding. 877 An unofficial
agreement can also account for the contradictory fourth century versions of the specific
terms of the treaty,878 and the puzzling absence of any references to an official document
in fourth century sources.879
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Next, an informal understanding meant peace without its negative implications for
both parties. On the one hand, the conclusion of the war against Persia would have freed
to the Athenians to tighten their hold on their empire and to prepare for a possible clash
with Sparta.880 But an unofficial agreement would have allowed the Athenians to carry on
with the collection of tribute under the pretext that the funds were necessary for war against
the Persians.881 On the other hand, from the Great King’s viewpoint, a peaceful resolution
of the Greek problem must have been more than welcomed,882 especially since Egypt was
not completely pacified,883 and the Athenians, shortly before Cimon’s arrival at Cyprus,
were gradually gaining ground in Ionia, as Erythrae,884 Miletus885 and Sigeum886
acknowledged Athens’ authority. But a formal peace treaty meant that Artaxerxes was
required to officially agree to restrictions on the movements of Persian armies and fleets
and to publicly renounce any claims to the Greek city-states in Asia Minor. The mere
appearance of bowing to Athenian demands would have been humiliating and harmful to
King’s authority and prestige.887 All of these difficulties, however, are averted if we accept
the notion that Artaxerxes merely publicly proclaimed that he had no intention to launch
another offensive against Athenian domain in the foreseeable future while promising to
refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of the Greek cities of Asia, at least those who
were Athens’ allies.888
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Keeping the Peace
Mutual Interest
The peace between Athens and Persia endured until the outbreak of the Ionian war in 412
BC.889 But how the status quo in western Anatolia was able to persevere for so long? In
Athens, the unexpected death of the pro-Spartan Cimon allowed Pericles to garner support
for a policy which branded Sparta instead of Persia as the true enemy of the Athenian
people, and as long as Pericles dominated Athenian politics his anti-Spartan policy
endured.890 Thus, since the Athenians had no desire to fight on two fronts, it became
imperative to refrain from provoking the Persians.891
Furthermore, a strong indication that both Athenians and Persians were content
with the détente can be found in the apparent demilitarization of Ionia after 449 BC. The
Athenian orators of the fourth century boast that the Great King was not allowed to
mobilize an army past the Halys River.892 Although such a claim cannot be taken seriously,
the lack of Persian military activity in the coastal regions is more likely to be the outcome
of the unofficial truce, according to which Artaxerxes instructed his satraps to set their
defenses in the Asiatic hinterland, probably in the satrapal seats at Sardis and Dascylium
as well as in key locations such as Celaenae. 893 This was by no means a unilateral action.
To our best knowledge, the Athenians refrained from installing garrisons in Ionia after 449
BC and before the outbreak of Peloponnesian War.894 The silence of the sources is
validated by Thucydides, who describes Ionia as ‘unwalled’,895 and goes on to attach this
designation to a number of Ionian cities.896 It is hard to believe that the dismantling of the
fortifications of several Greek city-states in Asia and the Persian decision to keep their
forces out of Ionia were coincidental. Instead, they should be envisioned as reciprocal
measures taken by the Athenians and the Great King, as both sides apparently agreed that
demilitarizing Ionia was a necessary step which would allow the cessation of hostilities to
continue.897
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What about the tribute?
The issue of tribute must have posed a serious difficulty. On the one hand, the Athenian
tribute lists demonstrate that the Athenians exacted tribute from numerous Greek cities of
Asia, some of which irregularly. On the other hand, the Great King never relinquished his
demand for tribute from Ionia even after the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC.898
Accordingly, when Isocrates celebrates Athens’ achievements in the war against Persia, he
notes that the Athenians successfully set limits to the Great King’s domain and imposed
tribute on some of his subjects.899 From the viewpoint of Isocrates, the struggle between
Athens and Persia in Asia Minor was a zero sum game. If Athens captured a city, its
denizens were to pay tribute to Athens instead of Persia and vice versa. Yet, the earliest
dispute regarding the tribute occurred, to our best knowledge, in 413/12 BC when
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus II were called upon by the King for the tribute from their
provinces, for which they were in arrears since the Athenians prevented the satraps from
collecting tribute from the Greek cities.900 One can infer that (1) the conclusion of an
unofficial peace in 449 BC must have entailed some sort of arrangement concerning the
division of the tribute generated by the Greek city-states of Asia,901 and (2) that whatever
the precepts of the agreement between the King and the Athenians were, it was up to the
in Cos (Thuc. 8.41.2), Cameiros (Thuc. 8.44.2), Samos (Thuc. 8.50.5), and Thasos (Thuc. 8.64). Yet, the fact
that the Athenians applied a similar measure in the Aegean does not exclude the possibility that this policy
constituted an Athenian concession to Persian demand.
898
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Athenians and the satraps of western Anatolia to enforce them,902 especially in regard to
the issue of tribute.
It should be emphasized that the satraps of western Anatolia were probably in favor
of a truce with Athens. As we have seen in chapter three, peace and security were a
prerequisite for a prosperous satrapy, which had a direct impact on the satrap’s ability to
collect tribute and send the expected portion to the King. Since a timely collection of tribute
was the first and foremost satrapal duty, the satraps of western Anatolia were likely ready
to establish a workable arrangement with the Athenians in respect to the division of the
revenue. But what would have been the nature and character of this hypothetical
arrangement?
Several hypotheses have been offered regarding the manner in which the satraps
and Athenians divided the tribute that was generated by the Asiatic Greeks. Cook points
out that while the coastal cities of Ionia were allies and subjects of Athens, they also
possessed substantial tracts of land which stretched deep into the Asiatic hinterland.
Accordingly, Cook posits that each city paid tribute to Athens as a corporate body, but
individual landowners paid a tithe or rent to the Persian authorities.903 While this model
seems attractive, the impracticality of a mechanism designed for individual tribute
assessment renders it highly unlikely.904 An alternative model has been offered by Murray,
who suggests that several Greek cities preferred to send tribute to Athens and Persia in
order to maintain amicable relations with the regional imperial powers. Murray adds an
alternative scenario in which prominent Ionian oligarchs wanted to garner Persian support
in their struggle against pro-Athenian democratic factions. Accordingly, when the
oligarchs were in power, they may have thought that it would be politically prudent to
demonstrate their allegiance to Persian rule by sending tribute.905
Murray’s suggestion has been further developed by Balcer, who places an emphasis
on the impact of local political strife on the issue of tribute. In cases of stasis, Balcer argues,
one of the factions, whether oligarchic or democratic, was in control of the urban center
(ἄστυ) while the rival faction established a power base in the rural districts (χώρα). Each
faction could organize politically, militarily, and economically in these opposing nodes.
The outcome was a political bipolarity, in which the urban and rural centers functioned as
two distinct political units, each paying tribute to its political allies, either Athens or
Persia.906 This seems to be the case in Miletus in the late-450s BC, when the pro-Athenian
democrats, who established themselves in Leos and Teichioussa, continued to send tribute
to Athens, while the city of Miletus was most likely controlled by oligarchic factions which
may have been supported by the Persians.907 It seems rather likely that while in power the
Milesian oligarchs sent tribute to the Sardis in order to gain Persian support. If that was the
case, both Athens and Persia received a share of the Milesian tribute.
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A reversed scenario is equally plausible. In the aforementioned Erythrae decree,
dated to 453/2 BC, we are informed that there was a group of citizens who fled to the Mede,
i.e. the Persians.908 It is almost certain that those who fled to the Mede were pro-Persian
oligarchs who lost their power once Athens intervened and established a democracy. In a
similar fashion to the pro-Athenian democrats from Miletus, the exiled oligarchs of
Erythrae may have established themselves in the periphery and continued to send tribute
to the Persians in hope of obtaining their support in a future attempt to retake Erythrae.909
Although the factional disputes in Miletus and Erythrae occurred before 449 CB, they set
a plausible framework for Balcer’s political bipolarity model.
One must admit, as noted by Thomas, that the evidence for the double tax
hypothesis remain circumstantial.910 Nevertheless, the feasibility of the aforementioned
models for the division of tribute and the apparent peaceful resolution of the issue of tribute
suggest that the Athenians and the satraps found a way to divide the revenue of the Greekcity states of Asia in a manner which satisfied both parties.

5.3 Satrapal Initiative and Royal Indisposition
Despite the above mentioned détente between Artaxerxes and Athens, the satraps of
western Anatolia and the Athenians continued to play a central role in backing rival
factions in several Ionian cities. Accordingly, several scholars have argued that the
conclusion of the truce in 449 BC did not result in an equilibrium but in a cold war and that
“the Persians hovered on the fringes, anxious to injure Athens, giving indirect assistance
and support, acting just as those who break treaties by subterfuge should.”911 It has also
been asserted that this policy originated from Artaxerxes himself, who instructed his
satraps in the west to profit as much as possible from Athenian setbacks.912 Such
interpretation, however, not only overstates the Great King’s involvement in the affairs of
western Anatolia but also fails to recognize that Artaxerxes and his satraps had little to gain
and much to lose from renewing the war against Athens. Therefore, in what follows I
demonstrate that the series of clashes which occurred in western Anatolia after 449 BC
were local and sporadic in nature, and that they were manifestations of satrapal
opportunism rather than a cold war between the Great King and the Athenians. Such
interpretation, I argue, can be explained by the unofficial nature of the peace, which created
a grey area in which Persian and Athenian spheres of influence overlapped. The ambiguous
distinction between Athenian and Persian domain in western Anatolia resulted in a limited
struggle between the satraps and the Athenians, a struggle which was incited and fueled by
the desire of ambitious Ionian individuals to assert their political dominance in their
respective cities. In contrast to the Persian central authorities, which were interested in
keeping the peace and in an uninterrupted collection of tribute, the satraps were willing to
exploit the rise of anti-Athenian sentiment in Ionia to increase their power and influence.
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Pissuthnes and the Samian War (440/39 BC)
The earliest known instance in which a satrap sought to increase his power at Athens’
expense occurred in the context of the Samian revolt.913 In 441/0 BC Samos and Miletus,
both members of the Delian League, vied for control over Priene.914 After the Samians
defeated the Milesians, the latter appealed Athens for help, and the Athenians responded
by sending Pericles with forty ships to Samos. The Athenians imposed a democratic
constitution on the Samians, installed a garrison, and transported Samian hostages to
Lemnos to ensure future obedience. But in spite of these measures, a group of Samian
oligarchs fled to the Asiatic continent and forged an alliance (συμμαχία) with Pissuthnes
son of Hystaspes, the satrap of Lydia. The oligarchs soon returned to Samos accompanied
by 700 mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes, rescued the hostages from Lemnos, recaptured
the city and declared war on Athens. In response, the Athenians sent Pericles and nine of
his colleagues with sixty ships, of which sixteen were dispatched to Chios and Lesbos to
muster reinforcements and from there to sail to Caria to look out for a possible intervention
of the Phoenician fleet. The Athenians defeated a Samian fleet off the island of Tragia and
then laid siege to Samos itself. During the siege Pericles departed with sixty ships to Caria
due to news about an incoming Phoenician fleet, but these rumors turned out to be false.
While Pericles was away, the Samians launched a successful counterattack, but once he
returned, the siege was reinstated, and after nine months the Samians capitulated.
The Athenian response to the clash between Samos and Miletus is not surprising.
An armed conflict between two members of the Delian League posed a threat to the
stability of the Athenian-led confederacy.915 Moreover, allowing Samos, a capable shipproviding ally, to grow stronger jeopardized Athenian superiority in the Aegean.916
Therefore, the Athenians had no choice but to force the Samians into submission.917 But
what motivated Pissuthnes to side with the Samian oligarchs? According to one
interpretation, by assisting the Samian oligarchs Pissuthnes was following a royal directive
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which instructed the satraps to seek opportunities to weaken Athenian supremacy in the
Aegean.918
Yet, a close examination of the actions of Pissuthnes highlights the flaws of such
interpretation. The ancient sources ascribe two actions to Pissuthnes. The satrap’s first
action, according to Plutarch, was attempting to persuade Pericles to prevent the
introduction of a democratic constitution in Samos through bribery,919 an offer that was
clearly aimed at allowing the oligarchs to stay in power. The second action of Pissuthnes
was making a pact with the disenfranchised Samian oligarchs and supplying them with 700
mercenaries.920 The direct involvement of Pissuthnes comes to an end at this point.921
There is, of course, the issue of the Phoenician fleet. The deployment of the Persian
navy on behalf of the Samian oligarchs would have been an unequivocal proof for that the
Great King was behind Pissuthnes’ intervention.922 But there is no substantive evidence for
the presence of a Phoenician fleet in the region. The sources merely tell us that the
Athenians sent a small squadron to Caria to look out for the possibility of Persian
interference and that ultimately the Phoenician fleet was nowhere to be found. But why did
the Athenians dread such a scenario? It has suggested that there was a Phoenician fleet
mooring near Phaselis as a ploy which meant to distract the Athenians prior to the Samian
counterattack.923 In light of the available evidence, however, such a suggestion is mere
speculation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Persians were able to deploy their fleet so
quickly,924 and that Artaxerxes would have embarked on such a costly venture in order to
allow the Samian oligarchs to remain in power. And even if we accept the possibility that
Artaxerxes wanted to detach Samos from the Delian League, how can we explain the
inactivity of the Phoenician fleet?
The most cogent answer to this conundrum is that there was no Phoenician fleet. It
is possible that the Samians expected that Pissuthnes’ support would constitute more than
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700 soldiers.925 It is equally plausible that either Pissuthnes or the Samians deliberately
misinformed the Athenians about the whereabouts of the Phoenician fleet in order to
weaken the Athenian siege prior to the Samian counteroffensive.926 Perhaps the reports
concerned with the Phoenician fleet were the result of Athenian paranoia, since Pissuthnes’
attempt to bribe Pericles must have informed the Athenians about the collaboration
between the Samian oligarchs and the satrap. Accordingly, the Athenians may have
suspected that the Persians were planning to strike while they were preoccupied in Samos,
and therefore chose to take the necessary precautions to prevent a Persian sneak attack. 927
Be that as it may, the fact that no Persian fleet was deployed or even seen means that the
Phoenician phantom fleet cannot be used to validate the notion that Persian central
authorities were behind Pissuthnes’ intervention in the Samian revolt.928
There is no other evidence, direct, indirect, or circumstantial, which suggests that
the Great King instructed Pissuthnes to undermine the Athenians in the context of the
Samian revolt. Furthermore, if the Great King was determined to reassert his authority in
the Aegean, one wonders why he remained inactive for almost a decade since the
conclusion of the truce and why such a feeble attempt was made while the Athenians were
preoccupied in Samos. In fact, that the involvement of Pissuthnes did not end with an open
war between Athens and Persia suggests that both sides were determined to maintain the
peace. Accordingly, the Great King’s position regarding Athens seem to have remained the
same, namely that Artaxerxes had no desire to see the renewal of Athenian operations in
the eastern Mediterranean and was content with a pacified western frontier.
Therefore, it is far more likely, as Meiggs maintains, that Pissuthnes acted without
the authority of Artaxerxes.929 Yet, the satrap must have known that his satrapy would
probably be the first to suffer if the Athenians would renew their attacks against Persian
domain and that he would have incurred the Great King’s resentment for destabilizing the
peace in the west. Pissuthnes, I argue, acted independently in order to further his own
interest, but he did so with caution and prudence which hindered the possibility of
unwanted escalation. On the one hand, the objectives of the satrap were rather modest. The
attempt to bribe Pericles reveals that the satrap’s primary objective was to hinder the
downfall of the Samian oligarchy. Plutarch notes that Pissuthnes forged a relationship with
the Samian oligarchs that was based on goodwill, which suggests that the satrap interacted
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with the Samian in the past.930 We have seen that cultivation of connections with men of
note in the adjacent regions was the modus operandi of Artabazus, the aforementioned
satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who collaborated with Pausanias. Any prudent satrap who
ruled a frontier province must have sought to cultivate amicable relations with neighboring
powers in order to better protect the borders of his domain. By forging a benign relationship
with the oligarchic leadership of Samos, a capable maritime nation, Pissuthnes was
probably seeking to achieve that very purpose.
On the other hand, Pissuthnes probably knew that siding with the Samian oligarchs
would not be taken kindly by the Athenians. Pissuthnes’ caution is manifested in his initial
attempt to resolve the conflict between Samos and Athens with money rather with
troops.931 When bribery failed, he tried to conceal his involvement in the restoration of the
Samian oligarchy and to block potential escalation. The 700 mercenaries Pissuthnes
provided were enough to enable the oligarchs to retake Samos, but this fighting force was
far from sufficient to challenge Athens. Furthermore, it has been postulated that these
mercenaries were of Greek origin,932 a possibility which suggests that Pissuthnes employed
Greek mercenaries in order to obscure his involvement and to allow himself to claim that
he had neither knowledge nor responsibility for the actions of the Samians oligarchs. 933
The turning point, however, was the Samian decision to declare war on Athens.
Pissuthnes must have failed to anticipate the determination of the Samian oligarchs to hold
on to their position as well as the extent of Athens’ retaliation. From the moment matters
escalated into open war, Pissuthnes backed down and the Samians oligarchs were left to
fend for themselves. In addition, the fact that Pissuthnes’ early intervention did not merit
an Athenian response indicates that the actions of the satrap were not perceived as a
violation of the truce and that Pissuthnes was not regarded as an enemy of Athens.934
In sum, the cautious conduct of Pissuthnes, his calculated actions, his disappearance
once open war was declared, and the absence of Athenian retaliation suggest that neither
Pissuthnes nor the Athenians wished to violate the unofficial peace. If such analysis carries
conviction, we can conclude that the Persian central authorities were not involved in this
incident, and that Pissuthnes was neither following nor ignoring royal directives when he
intervened on behalf of the Samian oligarchs. On the contrary, the actions of Pissuthnes
were the outcome of his own initiative rather than a purported Persian policy of disruption.
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Pissuthnes merely made a careful attempt to allow his allies in Samos to remain in power,
but once his involvement became too dangerous, he preferred to cut his losses. In short, it
would be better to envision the eruption of hostilities between Samos and Athens as a local
power struggle between pro-Athenian democrats and pro-Persian oligarchs rather than an
episode in the cold war between Athens and Persia.935

5.4 The Archidamian War
The durability of the peace between Athens and Persia was put to the test in the first phase
of the Peloponnesian War, better known as the Archidamian War. From the moment it
became clear that war between Athens and Sparta was imminent, both sides resolved to
send embassies to the Great Persian King to ask for his support.936 But despite the fact that
numerous Athenian and Peloponnesian delegations made the journey to the King’s court
at Susa, the Persians remained neutral. But in contrast to the disinterest of Artaxerxes,
Pissuthnes was willing to take advantage of the situation. Since the Athenians were
preoccupied with the Spartan challenge in the Greek mainland, several Athenian subject
states, discontent with Athens’ overbearing imperial conduct, were in a better position to
regain their independence. Consequently, western Anatolia and the adjacent islands were
in a constant state of flux, as anti-Athenian factions sought ways to cast away the yoke of
Athenian rule. And just as in the case of the Samian revolt, the enemies of Athens appealed
Pissuthnes, seeking his friendship and assistance in their struggle. The satrap of Lydia,
once again, took calculated risks in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Athens.
The Reluctant Artaxerxes
The Abortive Peloponnesian Embassy (430 BC)
At the end of the summer of 430 BC a Peloponnesian embassy arrived at the court of the
Thracian king Sitalces. The purpose of the embassy was to persuade Sitalces to abandon
his alliance with Athens and to collaborate with the Peloponnesian League in relieving
Potidaea, which was hard-pressed by an Athenian siege at the time. But the final destination
of the delegation, was the Persian court. We are told that the Peloponnesian ambassadors
hoped that Sitalces would supply them with means of transportation to cross the
Hellespont, and that the arrangements for the remainder of the journey inland were made
by Pharnabazus I, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. The embassy, however, never made
it to Asia. Athenian representatives who also happened to be present at Sitalces’ court
convinced the king’s son Sadocus to hand the Peloponnesians over to Athenian custody.
The envoys were promptly sent to Athens where they were executed without trail.937
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Thuc. 2.7.1; Diod. 12.41.1. Moreover, According to Thucydides (1.82.1-2), in the winter of 432 BC the
Spartan king Archidamus encouraged the Peloponnesians to seek the alliances of both Greeks and Barbarians
(βαρβάρων), an alliance which would allow Sparta and her allies to procure funds and ships. While the term
βαρβάρων certainly includes the Persians (Brunt 1965, 262; Lewis 1977, 63), this designation probably
encompasses all of the non-Greek nations that were involved in the conflict (Hornblower 1991, 127; Munson
2012, 256 n. 66).
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The Intercepted Embassy of Artaphernes
But the Spartans were not discouraged. Several Peloponnesian embassies made it to the
King’s court in the following years.938 The purpose of the Peloponnesian diplomatic effort
becomes clear due to a diplomatic incident which occurred in 425 BC. According to
Thucydides (4.50), the Athenians intercepted a Persian embassy in Eion while en route to
Sparta. The embassy was redirected to Athens, where the Athenians got hold of a letter
carried by the Persian ambassador Artaphernes,939 whose content revealed that many
Peloponnesian embassies made it to the royal court, but because each told a different story
Artaxerxes had no idea what the Spartans desired.940 If the Spartans wish to clarify their
intentions, the Great King added, they should send ambassadors to accompany Artaphernes
in his eastward journey.
The King’s confusion in regard to Spartan intentions demands clarification. It is
generally agreed that Artaxerxes demanded the Spartans to relinquish any territorial claims
in Asia Minor in exchange for money and ships,941 and that the Great King’s confusion
was caused by either deliberate Spartan ambiguity, 942 or even self-contradiction,943 since
the Spartans were uncomfortable with the price that Artaxerxes demanded for his support.
It should be noted that collaborating with Persia, let alone abandoning the Asiatic Greeks,
created a major difficulty for the Spartans. From the onset of the war, the Spartans appealed
to the goodwill of their fellow countrymen by presenting themselves as the champions of
Greek liberty944 who fought against the oppressive Athenian Empire.945 Consequently,
collaboration with the Persian Great King would have rendered Sparta’s liberation
propaganda as senseless and would have branded the Spartans as hypocrites who sold the
Asiatic Greeks for Persian gold.946
For instance, in Aristophanes’ Acharnians (646-51), produced in 425 BC, a meeting between the Persian
King and Spartan envoys is mentioned. Oddly enough, we are told that the Great King first asked the envoys
whether Athens or Sparta were superior at sea and then demanded to know which of them was mocked by
Aristophanes. Olsen (2002, 240) deems, rightly in my view, the claim that Artaxerxes was familiar with the
work of a particular Attic playwright as “patent fantasy”, but it still revels, as noted by Lewis (1977, 64), that
the Athenians knew of at least one Spartan embassy which had got through before 425 BC.
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has suggested that the letter was actually written in Old Persian, but it generally agreed that the script was
probably in Aramaic. See: Olmstead 1948, 354; J. A. O. Larsen 1958, 124; Nylander 1968, 112 n. 16;
Momigliano 1975, 9; Lewis 1977, 2; Hornblower 1996, 207.
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Hell. 2.2.3-4. Hornblower (2011a, 159–60) adds that the Spartan claim to act as the guardians of Greek
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liberation program see: Nichols 2015, 78–106.
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For Athens as the oppressor of Greeks, see: Thuc. 1.124.3, 2.8, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, 5.85. Lewis (1992a, 383)
notes that Thucydides uses “the language of subjugation” whenever he addresses Athens as an imperial
power. Moreover, Tuplin (1985, 352–57) points out that in Archaic period tyranny was personified by
individuals but the rise of Athens brought about the emerging concept of a tyrant city.
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Hornblower 1991, 127; Hornblower 2011a, 102, 127; Munson 2012, 257. The problem of Spartan
collaboration with Persia is addressed in the aforementioned speech of Archidamus. The potential alliance
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The complaint of Artaxerxes’ suggests the Spartans changed their mind that with
each embassy. The Spartans’ frequent change of heart can be explained by the utter
collapse of Archidamus’ war strategy, which consisted of period invasions to Attica. The
Peloponnesians expected that these invasions would have provoked the Athenians to march
out and meet their enemies in the field, a scenario in which the superior Peloponnesian land
army would have surely won a decisive victory.947 Yet, in spite of the general expectation
for a swift Peloponnesian victory,948 the Athenians demonstrated unprecedented
determination to avoid a pitched battle,949 which rendered the Peloponnesian strategy as
ineffective.950 The cumulative disappointments the Peloponnesians endured during the first
years of the war made them realize that Athens could not be defeated as long as its maritime
empire remained secure. Consequently, a change in policy took place as the Spartans were
more inclined to make the necessary concessions in order to obtain sufficient funds to
muster a sizable fleet.951 Nevertheless, it seems plausible that in 425 BC the Spartans were
still hesitant to abandon the Asiatic Greeks.
But the fact that Artaxerxes encouraged the Spartans to make up their mind implies
that he was interested in collaboration with Sparta against Athens. But what drove
Artaxerxes to assume a more active stance in regard to Greek affairs? It has been argued
that Artaxerxes took the initiative because he was alarmed by the Athenians’ success at
Pylos and feared lest Sparta’s defeat would allow the Athenians to apply their expansionist
aspirations in the east.952 This seems highly unlikely, since this suggestion is predicated on
the belief that the Great King was well informed about each and every development in a
war that took place well beyond the borders of his realm, and that he was unnerved by an
Athenian victory on a relatively insignificant island off Pylos that was more coincidental
than premeditated by any of the warring parties. Moreover, for two decades the Athenians
refrained from operating in the eastern Mediterranean in spite of the fact that they were not
embroiled in a total war against Sparta. Why, then, would the Great King be alarmed at the
prospect of Athenian aggression? Therefore, it seems likelier that Artaxerxes was intrigued
by the prospect of using the Spartans to push the Athenians out of Asia Minor rather than
(1977, 63) suggests that such articulation makes it clear that collaboration with barbarians was far from a
popular course of action. It is also possible, as argued by Gomme (1945, 248), that despite removing
themselves from the war against Persia after the recall of Pausanias, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian
allies were still reluctant to partner up with an old enemy. Yet, the diplomatic exchange between Sparta and
Persia reveals that the Spartan authorities were ready to put past grievances aside due to the necessity to
curtail Athenian ambition.
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the Peloponnesians allies.
948
Thuc. 4.85.2, 5.14.3, 6.11.5, 16.2.
949
de Ste Croix (1972, 207) points out that the Athenians “devised an entirely new strategy, which no Greek
state that was not an island or situated right on the sea-coast had ever tried to employ before.”
950
For a detailed study of the failure of Archidamus’ strategy, see: Brunt 1965; Moxon 1978.
951
de Ste Croix 1972, 154; Lewis 1977, 63 with n. 86. In addition, the unexpected Athenian victory at Pylos
and Sphacteria in the summer of 425 (Thuc. 4.3-23, 26-41) unnerved the Spartans, who sued for peace but
were rebuffed by the Athenians (Thuc. 4.19.1, 21, 41). Since the Athenians had the advantage, the Spartans
must have been even more eager to conclude an alliance with the Great King.
952
Kagan 1987, 19; Cawkwell 2005, 142–43.

140
dreading an incoming Athenian assault. Furthermore, the fact that Artaxerxes made no
effort to see that an alliance with Sparta came into existence suggests that his proposal was
nothing more than “a diplomatic way of saying that if the Spartans wanted financial help,
which was surely the object of the various embassies, they must make clear that they had
no territorial claims in Asia Minor.”953
The Athenian Diplomatic Effort
The Athenians, on their part, were not idle. In the decades following the conclusion of the
truce in 449 BC, Athens kept an open channel of communication with Artaxerxes,954 and
when war seemed certain they too approached the Persian King, as well as other barbarian
nations, in their search for allies in the war to come.955 The frequent exchange of embassies
strengthens the notion that the Athenians were on friendly terms with Persia throughout
the reign of Artaxerxes,956 and it is more than reasonable to assume that the Athenians were
utterly surprised when they learned that the Spartans were trying to negotiate an alliance
with Persia, a sentiment which is confirmed by Athens’ decision to send their own embassy
to Susa, probably with the purpose of expressing their disapproval.957 But the Athenian
diplomatic delegation never reached its destination. Having arrived at Ephesus, the
Athenian ambassadors received news that King Artaxerxes had died. So, they decided to
return home.958
The King’s Interest
Artaxerxes’ reply to the Spartan appeal and the fact that the Persians remained neutral until
the winter of 413/2 BC makes it evident that the Persian central authorities were reluctant
to intervene in the conflict between Sparta and Athens. From the Great King’s viewpoint,
nothing had changed on the western frontier, and as long of the war in mainland Greece
had no impact on Persian affairs, royal intervention was unnecessary. Moreover, as long as
the Spartans refused to acknowledge Persian authority over the Greeks of Asia Artaxerxes
had nothing to gain from siding with the Peloponnesians besides alienating the Athenians,
who demonstrated time and again their capacity to threaten Persian possessions in the
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west.959 The Great King’s motive to stay out of Greek affair is logical, and the same can be
said in regard to Pissuthnes’ opposite decision, namely to exploit the conflict in the Greek
mainland for his own benefit.
The Brazen Pissuthnes
While Athenian and Spartan embassies made their way to and from the royal court at Susa,
minor skirmishes took place in western Anatolia. These conflicts took the form of factional
strife in Ionian city-states and clashes between Athenian contingents and unspecified local
forces. But since Pissuthnes’ interventions in Ionian politics seem to have posed no threat
to the status quo between Athens and Persia, Pissuthnes’ actions and motivation merit a
reappraisal.
In 430 BC stasis broke in the city of Colophon. One of the warring factions took
control over the city with the assistance of a Persian named Itamenes, while their political
rivals fled to Notium.960 It has been suggested, correctly in my view, that Itamenes was a
subordinate of Pissuthnes and that he was following the satrap’s orders.961 Soon after,
Thucydides continues, at the beginning of winter 430/29, six Athenian triremes under the
command of Melesander were sent to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute and to protect
Athenian merchantmen from Peloponnesian privateers,962 who operated in these regions.963
At some point Melesander decided to march up into the Lycian hinterland. But the
Athenian force was attacked and suffered heavy casualties, among them was Melesander.

In the aforementioned passage from Aristophanes’ Acharnians (646-51) the Persian King is depicted as
utterly ignorant of Greek affairs since he did not know whether Sparta or Athens were stronger on the sea. It
has been argued by Olsen (2002, 240) that such a question “leaves little doubt that the advantage in the war
lies entirely with Athens and explains why he grants the Spartans nothing.” While Olsen’s emphasis on naval
power is correct, I argue that Artaxerxes’ reply reveals that the Persian King could not care less about the
conflict between Athens and Sparta but was aware of the challenge of Greek naval power. The deficiencies
of the Spartan diplomatic effort are summarized by Munson (2012, 258).
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The information from the Xanthus Pillar reveals the Melesander was attacked at Kyaneai
by a Lycian dynast by the name of Trbbênimi of Lymeria.964
The next clash occurred in 428/7 BC when the Athenians who were sent to suppress
the Mytilenian revolt on Lesbos dispatched a squadron of twelve ships under the command
of Lysicles and four other commanders to collect money from their allies.965 After exacting
tribute from several unspecified settlements, Lysicles marched up the country from Myus,
across the plain of the Meander as far as the hill of Sandius,966 where he was attacked by
certain Carians and the men of Anaia.967 Lysicles was slain along with many of his soldiers.
It has been argued that the forays of Melesander and Lysicles into Caria and Lycia
constituted an Athenian retaliation for the rise of the medizers in Colophon,968 and that
Athens’ aim was to reassert its authority in the region and to deter the locals from siding
with Persia through a demonstration of force.969 Yet, one wonders why the Athenians
waited for three years to dispatch a relatively small fleet that could hardly exhibit Athenian
military might.970 The notion that the Athenians wanted to retaliate for the events in
Colophon is pure speculation, especially since Thucydides explicitly states that the primary
objective of both expeditions was to collect tribute. Therefore, it seems likelier that
Melesander and Lysicles, determined to collect sufficient funds for the war effort, made
the ill-advised decision to march inland on their own accord.971 But what was the role of
the Persians in these incidents? In contrast to the incidents in Samos and Colophon,
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Thucydides does not mention Persian involvement, and in the case of Melesander, the
involvement of the Lycian dynasts does not necessary mean that they were following
Persian directives.972 Lysicles, however, probably encountered satrapal contingents.
Thonemann convincingly argues that, according to information provided by the Xanthus
Pillar (TAM 44a 54-55), Amorges, the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes (Thuc. 8.5.5),
commanded the detachment which defeated Lysicles.973 But even if the satrapal authorities
were directly involved in some way or the other, these incidents were not followed by
further escalation.974 Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that while the King may have
received reports regarding these events, he discounted them as a local problem that had
been resolved by the satrapal authorities and required no further action on his part.975
The last known clash between Athenians and Persians in the context of
Archidamian War occurred in 427 BC. 976 A pro-Persian faction tried to take over Notium,
and this time the involvement of Pissuthnes is evident. According to the ancient sources,
one faction took over the city with the assistance of the medizers who took over Colophon
in 430 BC and a force of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes.977
But the rivals of the medizers appealed the Athenian general Paches for help. Paches
captured the city through deception, ordered the execution of the mercenaries, and gave the
city back to the pro-Athenian faction. In a similar fashion to the involvement of Pissuthnes
in the Samian revolt,978 the satrap’s role in rise of the pro-Persian factions in Notium and
Colophon has been considered to be another chapter in an alleged cold war between Athens
and Persia.979 Such a conclusion, however, is not convincing. Again, the limited nature of
Pissuthnes’ actions and the lack of escalation speak in favor of a local political struggle in
which the satrap played a secondary role. As the opposing factions in Colophon and
Notium were seeking to overpower their rivals, it was only natural that they sought to enlist
the support of either Athens or Persia. Accordingly, it has been argued that all that
Pissuthnes did was merely supporting one side in an internal strife. 980 Moreover, that lack
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of any evidence for Athenian retaliation against Pissuthnes indicates that Athens did not
consider him to be an enemy in spite of the support he provided for the medizers in
Colophon and Notium,981 and that Paches was content with regaining Notium and leaving
Colophon to the medizers. Once again, matters seem to have cooled down rather quickly
and the status quo endured.982
In summary, the ongoing exchange of embassies between Athens and Susa
indicates that the Persian central authorities ascribed little importance to the local
skirmishes in western Anatolia. One must admit that Pissuthnes was actively involved in
at least two power struggles in cities which were associated with the Delian League but the
assertion that his actions were the outcome of grand Persian strategy to undermine
Athenian supremacy in Ionia has little force. All in all, the clashes between Athens and
Persia which were recorded after 449 BC are scarce, sporadic, limited, and local. There
was no cold war, only an opportunistic satrap who could not pass on the opportunity of
enhancing his position in the Ionians cities at Athens’ expense.983 Pissuthnes anticipated
that his encroachments would not be taken kindly by the Athenians, and so he was cautious
enough in his conduct, never fully committing himself or his armed forces. 984 The
Athenians, on their part, dreaded a scenario in which Persia joined the war on Sparta’s side
and while they were not shy of reasserting their dominance in Ionia, they did not view the
actions of Pissuthnes as violation of the truce,985 and therefore refrained from mounting a
punitive attack against the satrap.

Conclusion
In spite of Athens’ role in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign,
Artaxerxes showed little interest in reasserting Persian supremacy in the Aegean. The
establishment of a détente in 449 BC, which suited the interest of the Great King as well
as Athens, marked the beginning of a new era in Greco-Persian relations, one of peace and
limited military friction. The peace in western Anatolia, however, was not absolute, as local
clashes involving the Athenians and the satrapal authorities still occurred, but at no point
was the modus vivendi between the two empires truly jeopardized. Despite the changing
circumstances throughout the decades, the Athenians and Persians had little to gain and
much to lose from renewing hostilities. In fact, the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and
the Peloponnesian attempt to conclude an alliance with Persia probably strengthened
Athens’ desire to see that the peace with Persia continued. As for the Great Persian King,
as long as the satraps of western Anatolia made sure that the tribute kept on flowing and
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that Persian authority remained unchallenged the Persian central authorities had no reason
to intervene in local skirmishes that occurred in the far west.
The position of the satraps of western Anatolia, however, was different. The
emergence of a détente which ended hostilities meant that the satraps could administer their
domains in peace. But peace came with a price. As we have seen, the satraps and Athens
presumably found a way to divide the revenue which was generated by the Greek citystates of Asia in a way that satisfied both parties. From the satraps’ viewpoint, a reduced
income must have seemed as an acceptable alternative to a disastrous and expensive war
against the Athenians. Still, the satraps probably had to meet the same tribute quotas even
if their sources of revenue were cut short. Therefore, local disputes fueled by anti-Athenian
sentiment brought about lucrative opportunities. Pissuthnes, who was a member of the
Achaemenid royal household,986 demonstrated his inclination to act independently in an
attempt to increase his influence and probably to create new sources of revenue. There was
no overarching royal policy of disruption, only satrapal opportunism. Albeit these local
clashes, the equilibrium in western Anatolia was able to last as long of the war in the Greek
mainland had not spilled over the Aegean. In the following chapter we shall see that in
spite of the fact that Darius II, the successor of Artaxerxes I, was willing to reaffirm the
unofficial truce that was established in the reign of his predecessor, the equilibrium that
held on for more than a quarter of a century came to an abrupt end. However, while the
circumstances in western Anatolia changed dramatically, Darius II followed the footsteps
of his predecessors and showed limited interest in the west. But the satraps could not remain
idle. The causes for and the events of the outbreak of the Ionian War, the final phase of the
Peloponnesian War, served as a backdrop for an unprecedented level of satrapal
intervention in Greek affairs.
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6. THE SATRAPS AND THE IONIAN WAR
The accession of Darius II marked the beginning of a tumultuous period in western
Anatolia. During his reign Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, rose in rebellion, and even after
the rogue satrap was dealt with, his bastard son Amorges continued to challenge Persian
rule. At the same time, the war between Athens and Sparta had finally spilled over the
Aegean. Ionia became the main theater of war in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War,
better known as the Ionian War, which raged on from the winter of 413/12 BC until the
annihilation of the Athenian fleet at the battle of Aigospotami in 405 BC.
While there is little doubt that Sparta’s victory in the war was facilitated by Persian
financial support, it is less clear who was the guiding hand in respect to Persian policies in
the west during this eventful period. At the present, it is widely held that it was Darius II
who, in the wake of the Athenian disaster in Sicily, ordered his satraps to forge an alliance
with Sparta with the intention of reasserting Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia
Minor.987 However, when taking into consideration how differently the conflict between
Sparta and Athens was viewed from the Achaemenid royal court at Susa in comparison to
the view from the satrapal capitals of Sardis and Dascylium, a different picture emerges.
Accordingly, in the present chapter I argue that (1) the interest of Darius II in the western
satrapies was similar to his predecessors, i.e. limited to the issues of peace and tribute, and
(2) that the satraps of western Anatolia were the true driving force behind the decision to
forge an alliance with the Spartans. I demonstrate that throughout this tumultuous period
Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, and Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia,
were given considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies. The manner in which
the war was to be pursued was to decided and altered by the satraps, while Darius remained
largely in the background.
Two preliminary remarks should be made in regard to the role of the Great King
and his satrap in the decision making process. First, satrapal actions, even those initiated
by the aforementioned satraps, were well within the boundaries of royal policy and at no
point went against the King’s wishes or interests. Second, the King was not ignorant of the
state of affairs in the west. On the contrary, as we shall see, Darius was well informed of
the developments in western Anatolia, probably due to regular reports sent by the satraps
themselves. Even still, the actions of the Great King serve as a clear indication that he had
full confidence that the satrapal authorities in the west were up to the task and that he
expected his satraps to contain and resolve the problems in the western satrapies.

6.1 The Peace of Epilycus
The final diplomatic exchange between Athens and Persia in the context of the
Archidamian War occurred early in the reign of Darius II. In a speech entitled ‘On the
Peace’, which was delivered in 391 BC, the Attic orator Andocides recalls how Epilycus,
his maternal uncle, brokered a treaty (σπονδαἰ) with Darius.988 Despite doubts regarding
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the reliability of Andocides,989 the authenticity of this speech,990 and the fact that no other
source mentions such a treaty,991 the historicity of the so-called Peace of Epilycus is
generally accepted, and it is widely held that it was ratified shortly after the coronation of
Darius II, which occurred before February of 423 BC.992
But what were the terms of the treaty negotiated by Epilycus? Those who believe
in the Peace of Callias argue that the embassy of Epilycus resulted in the ratification of the
stipulations both sides agreed upon in 449 BC.993 Others have suggested that the Athenians
sought to replace the Peace of Callias with a treaty that entailed a clause which prevented
the Persians from aiding Sparta in the war.994 Both suggestions, it should be emphasized,
correspond with the Athenian diplomatic effort to keep Persia out of the war. Accordingly,
since the Peace of Callias probably constituted an unofficial agreement, it seems likely that
the Athenians thought it was necessary to ensure that the new Great King intended to
uphold the informal understandings concluded with his predecessor.995 Thus, just like in
the case of the Peace of Callias, the informal nature of the agreement concluded with Darius
II explains the silence of the sources and the absence of any public commemoration of the
Peace of Epilycus in Athens.

6.2 Enter Tissaphernes
The Rebellion of Pissuthnes
After Thucydides mentions the abortive Athenian embassy to the Persian court in the
winter of 425/24 BC,996 the Persians vanish almost entirely from the narrative until the
winter of 413/12.997 Fortunately, Ctesias sheds some light on the dramatic developments
in western Anatolia which were glossed over by Thucydides. The Cnidian physician reports
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that Pissuthnes rose in rebellion sometime after the accession of Darius II, probably in the
late 420s BC.998 Since the death of Artaxerxes I was followed by a violent dynastic
struggle,999 it is quite possible that Pissuthnes, who was an Achaemenid by blood, may
have thought that he could dethrone a bastard of Artaxerxes I who usurped the throne.1000
Regardless of Pissuthnes’ motive, Darius II dispatched Tissaphernes, Spithradates, and
Parmises with an army to suppress the rebellion.1001 The Persian generals used bribes to
persuade the Greek mercenaries who served under Pissuthnes to desert the rogue satrap.
Shortly after, Pissuthnes was executed and his satrapy was given to Tissaphernes.1002
The Embassy to Sparta
Now let us return to Thucydides. When he begins recounting the events of the winter of
413/12 BC Thucydides reports the following:1003
[8.5.4] καὶ ὁ μὲν τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χῖοι δὲ καὶ Ἐρυθραῖοι ἀποστῆναι καὶ αὐτοὶ
ἑτοῖμοι ὄντες πρὸς μὲν Ἆγιν οὐκ ἐτράποντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ
Τισσαφέρνους, ὃς βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ τῷ Ἀρταξέρξου στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κάτω, πρεσβευτὴς
ἅμα μετ᾽ αὐτῶν παρῆν. [8.5.5] ἐπήγετο γὰρ καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ
ὑπισχνεῖτο τροφὴν παρέξειν. ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύγχανε πεπραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς
ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς δι᾽ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος
πράσσεσθαι ἐπωφείλησεν: τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεῖ ξυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιήσειν, καὶ Ἀμόργην τὸν
Πισσούθνου υἱὸν νόθον, ἀφεστῶτα περὶ Καρίαν, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ προσέταξε βασιλεύς, ἢ
ζῶντα ἄξειν ἢ ἀποκτενεῖν.
[8.6.1] οἱ μὲν οὖν Χῖοι καὶ Τισσαφέρνης κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἔπρασσον,
Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφῶντος Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαγόρας ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου Κυζικηνός,
φυγάδες τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναβάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες,
ἀφικνοῦνται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα πέμψαντος Φαρναβάζου, ὅπως
ναῦς κομίσειαν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτός, εἰ δύναιτο, ἅπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης
προυθυμεῖτο, τάς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις ἀποστήσειε τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοὺς φόρους
καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειεν.
While [Agis] was engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythrians, who were also
ready to revolt, approached not Agis but the Spartan authorities. They were accompanied
by an ambassador of Tissaphernes, the general of Darius son of Artaxerxes of the maritime
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Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 12; Hornblower 1982, 37; Briant 2002, 591; Trundle 2004, 149; Rhodes 2006,
143; Hornblower 2008, 769; Thonemann 2009, 173; Waters 2010, 823; Manning 2013, 20. For a different
view, see: Olmstead 1948, 358; Roy 1967; Meiggs 1972, 349–50.
999
For the turmoil which followed the death of Artaxerxes I, see: Ctes. FGrH 688 F15 §47-52; Diod. 12.64.1,
71.1; Paus. 6.5.7. For modern accounts, see: Lewis 1977, 70–79; Stolper 1985, 114–20; Kagan 1987, 20–23;
Briant 2002, 588–91.
1000
Woodhead 1970, 146; Westlake 1977a, 321; Kagan 1987, 21; Briant 2002, 591; Kuhrt 2007, 337 n. 2;
Waters 2010, 823; Manning 2013, 19–20.
1001
The date in which Tissaphernes came to the west is unclear. It has been argued (e.g. Wade-Gery 1958,
222 n. 1; Andrewes 1961, 5 with n. 2; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 12) that Tissaphernes’ arrival
occurred sometime before 421 BC. For a more cautious view, see: Lewis 1977, 80 n. 198; Hornblower 2008,
769.
1002
For the possibility that Tissaphernes was connected to the Achaemenid household, see: Lewis 1977, 83–
84; Westlake 1985b, 43 n. 6; Jacobs 1994, 103 n. 61; Dusinberre 2003, 39 n. 45; Klinkott 2005, 56; Kuhrt
2007, 337 n. 3; Dusinberre 2013, 44.
1003
Thuc. 8.5.4-6.1.
998

149
districts,1004 who invited the Peloponnesians [to Ionia] and promised to pay for their
expenses. For just recently Tissaphernes happened to be called upon by the King for the
tribute he owed, which he was unable to collect from the Greek cities within his domain
because of the Athenians. He thought that after he would weaken the Athenians [by
bringing the Spartans to Asia], he would be able to exact the tribute with ease; in addition,
he would affect an alliance between the King and the Spartans and capture, dead or alive,
Amorges the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes who was in rebellion in Caria, as he was
instructed by the King.
[8.6] While the Chians and Tissaphernes acted jointly in regard to the same issue,
Calligeitus son of Laophon of Megara and Timagoras son of Athenagoras of Cyzicus, both
exiles who resided at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, came at about the same
time to Sparta having been sent by Pharnabazus in order to procure ships for the Hellespont.
[Pharnabazus] was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as
Tissaphernes’, namely to induce the cities within his domain to revolt from the Athenians
in order to receive tribute from them and to conclude an alliance between the King and the
Spartans.

Persia, Athens, and Amorges
Amorges, so it seems, continued his father’s rebellion.1005 But while there is no evidence
that the Athenians assisted Pissuthnes,1006 it is certain that by the summer of 412 BC they
collaborated with Amorges.1007 Still, it is unclear when exactly the Athenians entered into
an alliance with Amorges. Due to Thucydides’ silence on the matter, two particular scraps
of evidence have received ample attention. The first is a list of payments made from
Athena’s treasury for public purposes, according to which a payment of unknown amount
was made to a general stationed in Ephesus in the spring of 414 BC.1008 Several scholars
have suggested that the Athenian general was dispatched to Ephesus in order to assist
Amorges.1009 Conversely, it has been argued that the wavering loyally of the Ephesians
caused the Athenians to install a garrison in the city,1010 or that the general arrived at
Ephesus on a tribute collection mission.1011 The other piece of evidence is a passage from
Aristophanes’ Birds, in which an Athenian inspector (ἐπίσκοπος) hurries to the assembly
in order to report on some interaction he had with Pharnaces, the satrap of Hellespontine
1004
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Phrygia.1012 Since the play was produced in the City Dionysia in early 414 BC, some
commentators have argued that Athens’ dealing with a satrap who remained loyal to the
King indicates that the relations between Athens and Persia at this point were still amicable
and that the Athenians had yet to enter an alliance with Amorges.1013 Others, however, have
offered a different interpretation, namely that the Athenians were trying to persuade
Pharnaces to join the rebellion.1014 As it stands, we cannot conclude with certainty when
the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges.
Despite the chronological ambiguity, one wonders what drove the Athenians to
provoke Darius by joining forces with Amorges. Andocides blames the Athenians for
making the disastrous decision to side with Amorges but he does not clarify why such a
decision was made.1015 Several scholars have hypothesized that Athens’ ill-fated decision
was driven by anti-Persian sentiment, a false belief that the Persian Empire was weak, as
well as Athenian arrogance and recklessness.1016 Such explanations, however, strike me as
unsatisfactory. Others have argued that Athens’ alliance with Amorges was a response to
Persian aggression, manifested through the aforementioned proposition Tissaphernes made
to the Spartans in the winter of 413/12. This interpretation is predicated on the assumption
that Darius was emboldened after he learned about the Athenian disaster in Sicily and
therefore instructed his satraps to recover the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Hence, once the
Athenians learned about Tissaphernes’ proposition to the Spartans they had no choice but
to ally themselves with Amorges.1017
Such a reconstruction suffers from two critical flaws. First, since we have no
concrete information about the exact date in which Athens concluded an alliance with
Amorges, the suggestion that the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges as a
response to Tissaphernes’ proposition remains purely hypothetical. 1018 Second, the
Athenians violated the truce well before the envoy of Tissaphernes arrived at Sparta.
According to Thucydides, Darius sent a notice to Tissaphernes in order to remind him of
the tribute he owed, probably the arrears accumulated either since his appointment as the
satrap of Lydia,1019 or perhaps the tribute that had not been collected in the two or three
years prior to the arrival of the satrapal delegations to Sparta.1020 Either way, it is clear that
the Athenians were the first to breach the truce by preventing the Persians from collecting
tribute from the Greek cities and that Athenian aggression began the chain of events which
led to Tissaphernes’ attempt to effect an alliance with the Spartans.1021
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But if the Persians were not the aggressors, why then did the Athenians decide to
go back on their truce with Darius? As discussed in chapter 4, the conclusion of the truce
in 449 BC must have entailed an agreement regarding the division of the revenue generated
by the Greek city-states of Asia between Athens and Persia. Accordingly, the fact that the
Athenians prevented Tissaphernes from exacting tribute from his Greek subjects suggests
that they were presumably no longer satisfied with the previous arrangement and resolved
to usurp the Persian share of the tribute as well.
The Athenians were not driven by greed but by financial stringency. According to
Thucydides, the first Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily, which was dispatched in the
summer of 415 BC, consisted of 100 triremes, 4,000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry.1022
Thucydides proclaims that a vast amount of resources was spent and that the Athenian
armada which set sail to Sicily was the most splendid expedition that had ever been sent
by a single city up to that time.1023 But while Thucydides does not provide concrete figures
regarding the cost of equipping such a large armament, a fragmentary inscription suggests
that the Athenians allocated no less than 3,000 talents in preparation for the Sicilian
campaign.1024 But despite the massive financial investment, the Athenians soon learned
that additional forces were needed in order to subjugate Sicily. In the winter of 415/14 BC,
shortly after an indecisive battle against the Syracusians and a failed attempt to capture
Messana, the Athenian generals sent to Athens for cavalry and money,1025 which arrived at
the beginning of the summer of 414 BC.1026 Later in the same summer Nicias sent for
additional reinforcements,1027 which were mustered during the winter of 414/13 BC and
consisted of 75 ships, 1,200 hoplites, unspecified allied forces, and 120 silver talents.1028
Notwithstanding the enormous investment of funds and manpower in the Sicilian front, the
Athenians continued to carry out operations elsewhere.1029 It is evident, therefore, that
already in the winter of 414/13 BC the Athenian financial reserves were critically low, that
is well before the Spartans fortified Decelea (summer 413)1030 and the military disaster in
Sicily (September of 413 BC).1031 In essence, severe shortage of money which jeopardized
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the entire war effort probably drove the Athenians to violate the truce in order to procure
additional funds which were crucial for Athens’ survival.
According to Andocides, it was Amorges who appealed to the Athenians.1032 Thus,
we can assume that the Persian rebel had to entice the Athenians with a compelling offer
in order to persuade them to provoke the Persian King. In the context of Athens’ financial
difficulties, it seems reasonable that Amorges had offered the Athenians complete and
undisputed control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. In return, Amorges may have
requested the Athenians to protect his position in Caria from hostile ships and the
permission to use Athenian bases in Asia.1033 Such a reconstruction, if accepted, explains
(1) the lack of evidence for direct military cooperation between Amorges and the
Athenians, and (2) the fact that Athenian operations against Persia were limited to the
collection of tribute from the Greek cities of Asia. On the one hand, that the Athenians
deprived Tissaphernes of considerable sources of revenue meant that the satrap had fewer
resources available which could be used to suppress Amorges’ rebellion. On the other hand,
it is not out of the question that the Athenians thought that as long as the Persians were
preoccupied with Amorges, the consequences of their limited encroachment would not be
severe. One can hypothesize that the Athenians deemed their actions as parallel to those
staged by Pissuthnes in the 420s BC, and may have thought that Darius would send an
embassy to protest rather than initiate an alliance with Sparta.1034 The Athenians
miscalculated and instead of a peaceful diplomatic resolution of a dispute over tribute, they
watched as their old and new enemies joined forces.

6.3 The Appeal to Sparta as a Satrapal Initiative
Satrapal Competition at Sparta
It is widely held that it was King Darius himself who instructed Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus to reassert Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to assist
the Spartans in their war against Athens.1035 Presumably, in the wake of the Athenian
disaster at Sicily the Great Persian King, driven by lust for vengeance due to Athens’
collaboration with Amorges, saw an opportunity to strike. The seemingly unanimous
assumption that Darius was the driving force behind the alliance with Sparta is imprecise.
The inception and execution of this initiative, I argue, was satrapal through and through.
First, the alliance with the Spartans was clearly Tissaphernes’ brain child. Thucydides
recounts two specific instructions Tissaphernes received from King Darius: (1) pay the
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arrears of tribute and (2) to apprehend Amorges. The intention to do damage to the
Athenians by joining forces with the Spartans is presented by Thucydides not as a direct
royal directive but as a consequence of it.1036 In other words, there was no change in royal
policy. The satrap received notice that he was failing at fulfilling his satrapal duties, and
that he was expected to renew the flow of tribute and to pacify his satrapy. As we have
seen, collecting the tribute and maintaining the peace were the first and foremost duties of
any given satrap. But the notification regarding the necessity to capture Amorges should
be viewed as an applied royal directive, which is defined by Waters as an order issued by
the King which allowed the satrap to figure out how to accomplish it within the means at
his disposal.1037 Accordingly, while Darius knew that Amorges was still causing trouble
and may have been informed that the Athenians were the cause for the disruption in the
flow of tribute, he was content with sending a notice rather than replacing Tissaphernes or
supplying him with funds or soldiers. Therefore, it is clear that Darius was confident that
Tissaphernes, who had already proven his capabilities by successfully suppressing
Pissuthnes’ revolt, was up to the task, and that the manner in which these issues were to be
resolved remained at the satrap’s discretion. The appeal to Sparta, then, was Tissaphernes’
own solution to the troubles in his satrapy.
Second, the Persian envoys who came to Sparta represented particular regional
interests rather than proper royal ones.1038 When Artaxerxes I wished to induce a war
between Sparta and Athens in the early 450s BC, he dispatched an embassy to Sparta with
an offer to finance a Spartan invasion to Attica. This was clearly not the case in the winter
of 413/12 BC. Not one but two delegations arrived at Sparta. The satrap of Lydia was
represented by an anonymous ambassador who accompanied Chian and Erythrian
delegations,1039 while the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia was represented by two Greek
exiles, a Megarian named Calligeitus son of Laophon and Timagoras son of Athenagoras
from Cyzicus. Both satraps invited the Peloponnesians to send their fleet to their respective
satrapies with an offer to pay the wages of the sailors. Moreover, Thucydides states that
Pharnabazus “was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as
Tissaphernes”,1040 an articulation which suggests that Pharnabazus approached the
Spartans only after learning about Tissaphernes’ initiative and that he hoped to receive
credit for affecting an alliance with the Spartans at the expense of his Sardian colleague.
With the two offers set before them, the Spartans negotiated separately (χωρίς) with each
satrapal delegation and a keen contest (ἅμιλλα) ensued. Eventually, the Spartans accepted
the proposition of Tissaphernes.1041 If Darius himself desired to use the Spartans against
the Athenians, we would have expected the arrival of a single royal embassy headed by a
Persian dignitary who would have carried with him a letter bearing the King’s seal and
which contained the King’s proposition. Instead, we hear of two separate embassies which
hailed from Sardis and Dascylium and that at least one of them was headed by Greek
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envoys.1042 Furthermore, the competition between the satrapal representatives serves as a
clear indication that the satraps were not following a uniform policy dictated by the Persian
King but were acting independently within the boundaries of their office.1043
Lastly, Thucydides reports that the anonymous representative of Tissaphernes came
to Sparta and the same time when envoys from Chios and Erythrae informed the Spartans
that the Chians and Erythrians were prepared to revolt against Athenian rule. It should be
emphasized that the decisive factor which led to the Spartan decision to choose the Ionian
option was not the promise of Persian gold but the possibility of procuring the powerful
fleets of Chios and Erythrae.1044 Tissaphernes knew that the war between Athens and
Sparta had been renewed and was aware of the growing unpopularity of Athens in Ionia.
Accordingly, the satrap probably concluded that under such circumstances the best course
of action would be to procure the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet and assumed that
the Spartans would not refuse a promise of financial aid coupled with the prospect of
considerable local support. In short, Tissaphernes’ appeal to Sparta was opportunistic in
nature.
All of the above considerations indicate that the appeal to Sparta was a satrapal
initiative. The Great Persian King expected his satraps to fulfill their responsibilities and
gave them considerable leeway to devise a plan by which they were to live up to the King’s
expectations. As we shall see, Tissaphernes had the ultimate authority to determine,
execute, and reconsider Persian policies regarding the war against Athens while the Persian
King continued to play a secondary role.

6.4 Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians
The First Treaty
The alliance between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians became official in the summer
of 412 BC when the first of a series of three treaties had been concluded.1045 The first treaty,
which is defined by Thucydides as an alliance (συμμαχία) between the Great King and the
Spartans, was concluded by Tissaphernes and the Spartan nauarch Chalcideus. The terms
of the agreement stipulated that both parties were (1) to join forces in the war against
Athens, (2) to brand those who might revolt from the King or from the Peloponnesian
League as enemies, and (3) to hinder the Athenians from exacting funds or anything else
from the territories and cities which belonged to the King.1046 While it seems highly
unlikely that anyone expected Persian forces to be deployed against a rogue member of the
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Peloponnesian League, there is little doubt that the clause regarding insubordinate allies
refers to Amorges.1047 Moreover, there is no mention of Persian financial aid, but the efforts
to hinder the Athenians from extracting resources from Asia Minor were a necessary
preliminary step aimed at enabling Tissaphernes to reassert his authority over the Greek
cities of Asia.1048 Thus, the terms of the first treaty correspond closely with the objectives
of Tissaphernes.
Soon after the conclusion of the first treaty, Tissaphernes deployed his own cavalry
and mercenary contingents and fought alongside the Peloponnesians against the Athenians
near Miletus.1049 Though the Athenians emerged victorious, the satrap demonstrated his
commitment to his Peloponnesian allies. Not long after, the Peloponnesians demonstrated
their gratitude when, at the request of the satrap, they attacked Iasus and captured Amorges
and handed him over to Tissaphernes.1050 We do not hear of Amorges again though it is
certain that Tissaphernes informed Darius about his recent success.
The First Reduction of the Wages
Early in the winter of 412/11 BC Tissaphernes fulfilled his promise by paying the wages
of the Peloponnesian sailors at a rate of one drachma a day per sailor. The satrap, however,
informed the Peloponnesians that future payments would be made at a rate of three obols,
i.e. half of the previous rate,1051 and explained that giving a full drachma was pending on
royal approval.1052 It has been argued that Tissaphernes was actually bluffing due to his
reluctance to spend his own money,1053 and that he was in a position to renegotiate the
terms of the treaty because Amorges had already been captured. 1054 While these
observations might be true, Tissaphernes was in need financial relief. We should not forget
that Tissaphernes was already in arrears before he approached the Spartans. The
commencement of the Ionian campaign meant that Tissaphernes was required to pay the
wages of his own soldiers, including mercenaries, and provisioning the Peloponnesian
fleet, which must have accumulated into a considerable financial expenditure.1055
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when Tissaphernes approached the Spartans in
the winter of 413/12 BC he was of the opinion, which was prevalent throughout the Greek
world, that the Athenians were at the brink of defeat due to the catastrophe in Sicily and
that they would capitulate in the following summer.1056 But the determination of the
resilient Athenians prolonged the war. Therefore, since the end of the war was not in sight
and the Peloponnesian fleet kept growing in numbers, Tissaphernes was faced with
unexpected expenses, which must have put a strain on his dwindling financial resources.1057
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Realizing that his financial reserves were not sufficient to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet
for long at a rate of one drachma, Tissaphernes decided that the wages had to be reduced
until he received a reply to his request for financial aid.
More importantly, Tissaphernes’ reply sheds light of the King-satrap relations in
regard to policy-making in the west. The satrap clearly reported to the King about his
agreement with the Spartans and requested for financial assistance. Thus, Tissaphernes’
reply indicates that the satrap had little to no doubt that the King would sanction his
agreement with the Spartans, but that the prospect of receiving financial relief was not
certain. In other words, the Lydian satrap seems to have had the authority to forge an
alliance with the Spartans, or any other foreign entity on that matter, in order to protect
Persian interests.
In any case, the Peloponnesians were not pleased to hear about the reduction of
their wages, and after a push back a compromise was made. Tissaphernes agreed to pay
thirty talents for fifty five ships, which equals to a rate of a little over three obols a day per
sailor.1058 The fact that a compromise was reached suggests, on the one hand, that the
Peloponnesians believed Tissaphernes and that the new rate was sufficient, while on the
other, that Tissaphernes was willing to show flexibility in order to see that the collaboration
with the Peloponnesians continues.
The Second Treaty
After Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians agreed upon a reduced rate operations resumed.
The satrap of Sardis sent Tamos, the hyparch of Ionia, to assist Astyochus, the new Spartan
nauarch, in a Peloponnesian attack on Clazomenae.1059 Soon after Tissaphernes himself
went to Cnidus and instigated a revolt against Athens.1060 Thucydides then reports that
although the Peloponnesian fleet was sufficiently provisioned,1061 the Peloponnesians
thought that the agreement Chalcideus made with Tissaphernes was defective (ἐνδεής) and
asked Tissaphernes to renegotiate the terms of the alliance.1062 The second treaty,
concluded by Tissaphernes and Therimenes, included several alterations: (1) the Great
King and his sons were mentioned as participants in the treaty, (2) the Spartans were
explicitly forbidden from exacting tribute from the territories and cities which belonged to
the King, and (3) Darius’ responsibility to pay the wages of the troops who were operating
in Persian domain had been stipulated.1063 But in spite of the fact that the King’s financial
liability became formal, no hard figures are provided.1064 Thus, it seems reasonable to
assume that Tissaphernes, although authorized to negotiated the clauses of the treaty, had
yet to receive news from Susa about Darius’ willingness to furnish the funds needed for
provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet, and therefore it was preferable to refrain from
including fixed rates until the satrap received further instructions.
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The Alliance under Crisis
The harmony, however, was soon disrupted. A delegation of eleven Spartan commissioners
arrived at Cnidus and notified Tissaphernes that they demand to renegotiate the treaty he
concluded with Therimenes.1065 Tissaphernes was infuriated by the Spartan protest and
departed without settling anything.1066 As noted above, Tissaphernes reported to the King
about his dealings with the Spartans, which was presumably framed as a means to resolve
the problem with the flow of tribute and Amorges’ rebellion. Therefore, Tissaphernes’
reaction shows that he was fed up with Spartan indecisiveness, 1067 which compelled the
satrap, who probably had sent the first and second treaties to be ratified by the King, to
explain why the deal with the Spartans kept getting worse.1068
After the breakdown of the negotiations at Cnidus, both parties seem to have
thought that the alliance was over. The Peloponnesians sailed to Rhodes with the intention
of instigating a Rhodian revolt and procuring provisions from the Rhodians, thus ending
their dependency on Persian money.1069 Tissaphernes, presumably at the instigation of
Alcibiades,1070 began negotiating an alliance with the Athenians, who wanted to secure the
satrap’s financial aid for their own purposes.1071 An Athenian delegation travelled to
Cnidus to negotiate with the satrap, but despite the fact that the Athenians were willing to
make considerable concessions, inter alia acknowledging the Great King’s claim over the
whole of Ionia,1072 the talks never came to fruition. Thucydides recounts a tradition
according to which Alcibiades sabotaged the talks by making unacceptable demands in the
name of Tissaphernes.1073 Alcibiades allegedly suspected that the satrap had no intention
of concluding an alliance with the Athenians due to his fear of a Peloponnesian
retaliation.1074 Yet, since Thucydides himself states that at this point the Athenian fleet was
still superior in comparison to his Peloponnesian counterpart,1075 Thucydides’ claim
appears less than persuasive.

1065

The main point of contention was the clause which stipulated that Darius had claim over all the territories
that belonged to his ancestors (Cf. Thuc. 8.18.1, 37.2). Lichas, the only Spartan commissioner who is
mentioned by name, pointed out that such a clause meant that the Peloponnesians and their allies recognized
Persian suzerainty over the island of the Aegean, Thessaly, Locris, and Boeotia, which were briefly occupied
by Xerxes during his Greek campaign.
1066
Thuc. 8.43.2-4.
1067
Cawkwell 2005, 151.
1068
Nỳvlt 2014, 42. Aidonis (1996, 100) suggests that Tissaphernes grew tired of being treated as a mere
treasurer and wanted to remind the Spartans that his financial support should not be taken for granted.
1069
Thuc. 8.44.
1070
Thuc. 8.46.1-3.
1071
For the negotiations between Tissaphernes and the Athenians, see: Thuc. 8.47-54, 56.
1072
Thuc. 8.56.4.
1073
While the Athenians were willing to accept most the demands presented before them, they refused to
allow the King’s fleet to sail along the coast of western Anatolia with no restrictions whatsoever.
1074
Thuc. 8.56.2-4. See also: Thuc. 8.48.4, 52, 56.2-3. Tissaphernes’ fear of a Peloponnesian backlash due
to shortage of resources came true shortly before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to the Hellespont (Thuc.
108.4-109).
1075
When Thucydides (8.57.1) attempts to explain why Tissaphernes sought to repair his relations with the
Peloponnesians after the negotiations with Athens miscarried, the Athenian historian notes that the satrap
feared a scenario in which the Peloponnesians, due to lack of provisions, would decide to engage the

158
An alternative explanation has been offered by Lewis, who postulates that
Tissaphernes may have been reluctant to conclude an alliance with the Athenians because
he was unenthusiastic to explain to Darius such a dramatic change in policy. 1076 Although
such an argument seems compelling, it fails to consider the advantages of such a policy.
Yes, the King would not have been pleased to hear about the rift between Tissaphernes and
the Peloponnesians. Nevertheless, the King’s anger would have been mitigated when
hearing that Tissaphernes made an agreement with the Athenians according to which they
acknowledge Persian claim to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. We should not forget that
the Athenians maintained diplomatic relations with Darius and his predecessor Artaxerxes
I, and that Darius himself may have agreed to ratify the truce with the Athenians early in
his reign. Moreover, the satrap must have been aware of the Spartan liberation
propaganda1077 and may have thought that an alliance with the Peloponnesians would
become a liability in the long run.1078
In short, Thucydides’ assertion that Tissaphernes never meant to switch sides is
nothing more than guesswork. Hence, as noted by several scholars, we cannot exclude the
possibility that the satrap was genuinely thinking about concluding an alliance with the
Athenians.1079 Consequently, the notion that Tissaphernes could apply a shift in policy
serves as another indication that the satrap had the liberty to decide which course of action
would be most beneficial to Persian interests in the west.
The Third Treaty: Enter Darius
Immediately after the talks with the Athenians came to a dead-end, Tissaphernes sought to
improve his relations with the Peloponnesians. The satrap travelled to Caunus and supplied
the Peloponnesians with their wages. Consequently, a third and final treaty was concluded
between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians.1080 In this instance the involvement of the
Persian central authorities is evident. In contrast to the previous treaties, the terms of the
agreement are preceded by a prescript which states the date in which the treaty was
concluded, namely in the thirteenth regnal year of Darius II, when Alexipippidas was ephor
in Sparta. Moreover, the list of Persian participants includes not only Darius and
Tissaphernes but also Hieramenes, Darius son-in-law,1081 and the sons of Pharnaces, a
phrase which almost definitely refers to the aforementioned Pharnabazus.1082 That
Pharnabazus, the governor of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Hieramenes, a
Athenians and as a result would suffer a decisive defeat. It seems, therefore, that at this point the Athenians
still posed a greater threat to Persian domain.
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member of the Achaemenid household and possibly the Great King’s representative,1083
were involved in the conclusion of the treaty indicates that Darius had finally gave his
approval to the alliance with the Spartans. In addition, while Caunus seems to be the
location in which Tissaphernes met the Peloponnesian representatives, 1084 the treaty was
actually concluded in the plain of the Meander.1085 Accordingly, it has been argued that
while negotiations took place in Caunus, the official conclusion of the treaty occurred in
the plain of the Meander after the terms of the treaty had been ratified by Darius and the
Spartan authorities.1086 Lastly, the clearest indication that the King was involved in the
conclusion of the third treaty is the clause which stipulates that Tissaphernes was obligated
to provision the Peloponnesian ships which were presently in Ionia until the arrival of the
King’s fleet. Once the Persian armada had arrived at the scene, the Peloponnesians were
expected to use their own resources to maintain their fleet or, if they wished, to receive
funds from Tissaphernes which would be considered as a loan to be paid back at the end
of the war. There is no doubt that Tissaphernes had to obtain royal approval before
committing the King’s fleet to the war against the Athenians.1087
All in all, I am inclined to accept the widely held conclusion that the first two
treaties were in fact drafts, which constituted “a preliminary working arrangement between
the forces on the spot,”1088 and that only the third treaty was properly sanctioned by Darius
and the Spartan authorities.1089 But in spite of clear royal involvement in the conclusion of
the third treaty, the last clause states that Tissaphernes, together with the Spartans and their
allies, shall carry on the war against Athens jointly and in the manner which they deemed
best. The satrap was even given permission, pending on Spartan consent, to make peace
with Athenians.1090 In other words, Tissaphernes received full and complete mandate to
carry out the war against the Athenians as he saw fit.
The Alliance in Crisis
Thucydides states that following the conclusion of the third Treaty the Peloponnesians
were confident that Tissaphernes would bring up the Phoenician fleet and fulfill his other
promises, presumably the payment of the wages.1091 But the satrap proved to be a bad
paymaster by providing insufficient funds irregularly. The satrap also hindered the
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Peloponnesian fleet, which was mooring at Miletus, from engaging the Athenians by
claiming that they should wait for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet. Short of provisions
and forced to remain inactive, the disgruntled Peloponnesians sailors began accusing the
Spartan nauarch Astyochus of conspiring with Tissaphernes to ruin the fleet and demanded
to engage the Athenians. Astyochus finally caved under pressure and ordered the fleet to
sail to Samos with the purpose of coercing the Athenians to fight. But after learning that
Athenian reinforcements had arrived from the Hellespont, the Peloponnesian fleet returned
to Miletus.1092
The satrap’s alleged misconduct, however, was not without consequences. In light
of Tissaphernes’ failure to fulfill his obligations, the Peloponnesians decided to send forty
ships to the Hellespont to assist Pharnabazus.1093 This decision was not surprising since the
Hellespontine option had never been taken off the table. According to Thucydides, after
the Spartans accepted Tissaphernes’ proposition, the representatives of Pharnabazus, the
above mentioned Calligeitus and Timagoras, remained in Sparta in hopes of convincing
the Spartans to send another expedition to the Hellespont. Accordingly, the Spartans
resolved to send a fleet first to Chios, then to Lesbos, and lastly to the Hellespont.1094 Then,
in the winter of 412/11 BC, twenty seven Peloponnesians ships sailed to Ionia with the
aforementioned commissioners, who were authorized to direct as many ships as they
thought necessary to the Hellespont.1095 Yet, Tissaphernes’ efforts to repair his relations
with the Spartans seem to have led the commissioners to order the fleet to remain in Ionia.
Nevertheless, in the summer of 411 BC Dercylidas, a Spartiate, marched by land with a
small force and instigated revolts in Abydos and Lampascus. 1096 Eventually, the Spartan
commissioners decided that it was time to send a portion of the fleet to the Hellespont.1097
This decision was made not only because Tissaphernes proved to be unreliable but also
because Pharnabazus’ offer to provision the fleet was still open and because the Byzantines
informed the Spartans that they were eager to rebel against Athens.
Things got worse for Tissaphernes once the Peloponnesians who remained in
Miletus learned about Alcibiades’ recall. They believed that the satrap was conspiring with
the rogue Athenian general in order to undermine the Peloponnesian war effort. 1098 The
crews of the ships threatened to desert, unless they received their pay, and rumors that
Tissaphernes had bribed Astyochus began to circulate to the point that the Spartan nauarch
was almost lynched by his own men.1099 Matters escalated even further when the Milesians
captured a fort which was built by Tissaphernes in Miletus and expelled its garrison. 1100 At
this point, when the Peloponnesians camp was in a state of disorder, Astyochus was
succeeded by Mindarus as the new nauarch. Soon thereafter, Tissaphernes informed the
Peloponnesians that he was about to go to Aspendus to bring up the Phoenician fleet. But
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while the Peloponnesians were waiting for Tissaphernes provisions were not supplied by
those Tissaphernes left in charge. Finally, after receiving another invitation from
Pharnabazus and a report that the Phoenician fleet was still mooring in Aspendus, Mindarus
decided to sail with the rest of the fleet to the Hellespont.1101
It seems that the last straw was Tissaphernes’ failure to bring up the Phoenician
fleet. The Peloponnesian disappointment was probably predicated on the belief that
together with the Phoenician vessels they would be able to defeat the Athenians and win
the war.1102 As noted above, although the Peloponnesians amassed a sizable fleet in Ionia,
they still refused to engage the Athenian fleet after it received reinforcements,1103 and they
must have been even more reluctant to face the Athenians in battle after forty
Peloponnesians ships were redirected to the Hellespont. Therefore, it was clear to all that
without the Phoenician fleet there could be no Peloponnesian victory, and the seemingly
empty promises made by Tissaphernes earned him nothing but the hatred and suspicion of
the Spartans and their allies.

6.5 Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet
In contrast to the phantom Phoenician fleet which caused Pericles to sail with sixty ships
to Caria during the Samian revolt, there is little doubt that a sizable Phoenician fleet was
present as Aspendus in the summer of 411 BC. Thucydides claims with full confidence
that 147 Phoenician vessels sailed as far as Aspendus.1104 But we need not rely solely on
the authority of Thucydides. Before Tissaphernes departed to Aspendus he invited Lichas
to accompany him so that the Spartan could personally witness the preparations of the
fleet.1105 In light of Tissaphernes’ growing unpopularity among the Peloponnesian sailors
such an invitation should be viewed as the satrap’s attempt to demonstrate to the Spartan
high command that he was doing his very best to hasten the arrival of the Phoenician
armada. In response to the satrap’s invitation a Spartiate named Philip was dispatched with
two triremes to Aspendus.1106 While confirming that the Phoenician fleet was in fact in
Aspendus, Philip reported that the ships, presumably at the instigation of Tissaphernes,
remained inactive.1107
The Explanations of Thucydides
The fact that the Phoenician fleet was never deployed is puzzling. Even Thucydides was
unsure why Tissaphernes had not returned with the fleet from Aspendus. The Athenian
historian recounts, in a Herodotean fashion, four explanations that he was aware of for
Tissaphernes’ motives on this matter.1108 Thucydides begins by stating that some think that
Tissaphernes was merely pretending to be earnest about deploying the Phoenician fleet and
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that he actually wanted to force the Peloponnesians to exhaust their own resources. That
this was the intention of the satrap, Thucydides continues, is verified by the fact that Tamos,
Tissaphernes’ viceroy who was in charge of paying the Peloponnesians while the satrap
went to Aspendus, proved to be an even worse paymaster than the Sardian satrap.1109
The second explanation also casts Tissaphernes as a liar who never intended to
deploy the fleet, but the impetus was economic rather than strategic. Thucydides notes that
there are those who assert that Tissaphernes’ ultimate goal in bringing the Phoenician fleet
to Aspendus was to extort money from the sailors in exchange for their discharge. Such a
hypothesis, however, is highly problematic. Although Tissaphernes must have looked for
additional sources of revenue due to his financial stringency, it is hard to believe that that
satrap asked the King to mobilize a fleet, a costly enterprise, just to make a profit.1110 Such
a course of action is based on the assumption that Tissaphernes had decided to disregard
completely the King’s Interest,1111 which would have certainly angered Darius and may
have been followed by royal sanctions.
According to the third hypothesis, it was the Spartan hostility toward Tissaphernes
which motivated the satrap to demonstrate to his allies that he was living up to his promises.
But while it explains why Tissaphernes wanted to bring the fleet, it fails to explain why he
was unable to do so.
The fourth and final explanation, which is considered to be true by Thucydides,
rejects any explanation which assumes that Tissaphernes was sincere in his intention to
fulfill the Persian promise to deploy the Phoenician fleet. The Athenian historian asserts
that Tissaphernes never intended to bring the fleet because he was determined to weaken
both Athenians and Peloponnesian by protracting the war. The promise to bring up the
Phoenician fleet and the journey to Aspendus were all a ploy meant to deceive the
Peloponnesians and to force them to waste away their resources.
Keeping Both Sides Equal?
Thucydides’ explanation for the Phoenician fleet conundrum, which is accepted by several
modern commentators,1112 fits well with his overarching assumption that Tissaphernes,
allegedly through the influence of Alcibiades, decided to do whatever it takes to prolong
the war in order to allow the Athenians and Spartans to exhaust each other. The first
appearance of this hypothesis occurs in chapter 46 when Thucydides breaks the diachronic
sequence of events with a flashback to an earlier point in the narrative. According to
Thucydides, sometime after the battle of Miletus Alcibiades, having been condemned to
death by the Spartans, fled to the court of Tissaphernes and became the satrap’s trusted
advisor. The rogue Athenian general, Thucydides claims, persuaded Tissaphernes that his
best course of action was to force Athens and Sparta to exhaust each other through
continuous fighting. Accordingly, in order to keep both sides equal and prevent a
Peloponnesian victory, Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to reduce the wages of the
Peloponnesians sailors, to pay irregularly, to evade contributing to the defense of Ionian
1109
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cities which revolted from Athens, and to refrain from deploying the Phoenician fleet,
which was still being equipped at this point in the narrative.1113
On the basis of this hypothesis, Thucydides asserts that (1) Tissaphernes never
intended to conclude an alliance with the Athenians,1114 that (2) he concluded the third
treaty with the Spartans in order to hinder a rash Peloponnesian assault which could have
ended with an Athenian victory,1115 and (3) that the satrap never intended to deploy the
Phoenician fleet.1116 But what is the evidence Thucydides employs in order to substantiate
his theory? It has been argued that one of Thucydides’ main sources for book 8 was
Alcibiades himself1117 or members of his entourage.1118 Therefore, it is possible that
Alcibiades or one of his confidants informed Thucydides that this was Tissaphernes’
intention and that the originator of such a policy was Alcibiades. Conversely, it has been
argued that the entire conversation between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes constitutes a
hypothetical reconstruction of Thucydides,1119 which was, as the Athenian historian
himself admits, predicated solely on the subsequent actions of Tissaphernes. 1120 In any
case, while Thucydides expresses his critique about the motives of Alcibiades for urging
the satrap to adopt such a policy,1121 he still believed that he had sufficient evidence, i.e.
the actions of Tissaphernes, to conclude that Tissaphernes had in fact adopted Alcibiades’
advice. In addition, Thucydides rejects the excuse Tissaphernes used to justify the
inactivity of the Phoenician fleet, namely that the number of ships that had been fitted was
less than Darius had ordered, and asserts that Tissaphernes would have enhanced his
reputation in the eyes of Darius by accomplishing his objectives with a smaller fleet, since
it would have reduced the King’s expenses.1122
On the whole, Thucydides’ entire theory about the satrap’s design to wear out both
sides is ultimately predicated on Alcibiades’ word and the acts of Tissaphernes. But while
the reliability of Alcibiades is questionable, the actions of Tissaphernes can be used to
substantiate an alternative interpretation, one which takes into consideration the satrap’s
immediate objectives as well has his financial constraints.
Thucydides’ determination to impose his preexisting theory on the matter of the
Phoenician fleet exposes several critical flaws. First, it has been pointed out that
Tissaphernes could not have expected to maintain the equilibrium between Athens and
Sparta by making the Peloponnesians completely hostile to him.1123 By the time
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Tissaphernes went to Aspendus the Peloponnesians had already dispatched forty ships to
the Hellespont, and the satrap must have known that he was at the brink of losing the entire
Peloponnesian fleet to Pharnabazus. Since it is difficult to believe that the satrap failed to
see that such a policy, if there was such a policy, was becoming detrimental to his
overarching objectives,1124 it seems likely that Tissaphernes had done whatever he could
to bring up the Phoenician fleet in order to appease his disgruntled allies.
Second, the protest of Lichas at Cnidus may have convinced Tissaphernes that he
could not rely on the fickle Peloponnesians.1125 Accordingly, the arrival of the Phoenician
fleet would have freed Tissaphernes from depending on Peloponnesian naval power and
which would have allowed the satrap to dictate the manner in which the war was to be
conducted.1126 Third, Athens’ success against all odds may have led Tissaphernes to
question the effectiveness of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the satrap probably thought that
the deployment of the Phoenician fleet became a strategic imperative in the war against
Athens. Fourth, as noted above, Tissaphernes was using his own resources to provision the
Peloponnesian fleet. But according to the third treaty, the arrival of the Phoenician fleet
meant that Tissaphernes would have been relieved of his financial liability to the
Peloponnesians. Therefore, with every day that the Phoenician ships remained at
Aspendus, Tissaphernes’ financial resources were being further exhausted.1127 It is evident,
therefore, that the deployment of the Phoenician fleet aligned perfectly with the interests
of Tissaphernes.
Redeeming Tissaphernes
At this point I would like to offer an alternative explanation for the reason behind
Tissaphernes’ deficiencies as a paymaster and his failure to deploy the Phoenician fleet.
The fact that the earliest instance in which Tissaphernes is accused of being a bad
paymaster occurred only after the conclusion of the third treaty has been largely ignored.
We have seen that from the onset of the campaign against the Athenians Tissaphernes was
using his own financial resources to provision the Peloponnesian fleet as well has his own
operations. Once the satrap began to realize that the war was to be longer than expected,
he reached a compromise with the Peloponnesians which kept both parties satisfied. The
capture of Iasus probably supplied the satrap with considerable financial relief,1128 and soon
after we are told that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned,1129 which suggests that
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the conclusion of the second treaty had nothing to do with the issue of wages.1130 Similarly,
the objections of Lichas in regard to the treaties concluded by Chalcideus and Therimenes
were about the territorial definition of the Persian Empire rather than the funds supplied by
the satrap.1131
The ambiguity regarding the exact time in which Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes
to reduce the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors and to pay irregularly had spawned two
conflicting interpretations. There are those who argue that the first (Thuc. 8.29) and second
(Thuc. 8.46) reductions of wages were in fact the same.1132 Others, however, have pointed
out the discrepancies between the two reductions and concluded that these were two
distinct events.1133 But whether there was one reduction or two, the Peloponnesian sailors
began complaining about their wages only after the conclusion of the third treaty.1134
With all things considered, it seems more probable that Tissaphernes began paying
insufficiently and irregularly because of the unexpected duration of the war rather than a
sophisticated strategy instigated by Alcibiades.1135 To our best knowledge, the Persian
central authorities provided Tissaphernes with neither financial nor military assistance,
which indicates that Tissaphernes had limited resources at his disposal. 1136 Keen suggests
that Thucydides may have misinterpreted the intentions of Tissaphernes because of “his
prejudices about Persian satraps’ wealth,” and therefore failed to consider the possibility
that the satrap had finite financial reserves.1137 In other words, the satrap used his own
resources to finance the Peloponnesian fleet and other operations for over a year. Since we
know of numerous instances dated to the fourth century in which Greek cities and generals
paid their soldiers irregularly due to financial difficulties,1138 Tissaphernes’ failure to
furnish sufficient funds should not be deemed as different.1139
It is not out of the question that Alcibiades may have overstated his influence over
Tissaphernes. Accordingly, the Athenians general may have fabricated a story in which he
urged the satrap to deprive the Peloponnesians of Persian gold. In this way Alcibiades
depicted himself as an Athenian hero who made sure that his countrymen were given
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enough time to recover from the Sicilian expedition.1140 We cannot exclude the possibility
that Tissaphernes was aware of the long term strategic benefits of allowing Sparta and
Athens to waste away their resources by extending the war. Nevertheless, as noted above,
by the time Tissaphernes went to Aspendus his alliance with the Peloponnesians was
hanging by a thread and his financial resources were probably close to exhaustion. More
importantly, the Great King’s interest should not be overlooked. The satrap had no new
achievements to show for, and we can safely assume that the expensive campaign did not
allow Tissaphernes to pay the arrears for which he received a notice from the King in the
winter of 413/12 BC. Hence, it seems reasonable that by the summer of 411 BC
Tissaphernes was eager to end the war and collect the tribute as he was ordered by the
King.1141 In summary, since the cost of provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet was constantly
on the rise, the end of the war was not in sight, and the Persian central authorities had yet
to supply financial relief, Tissaphernes was forced to pay irregularly and below the agreed
upon rate in order to postpone the complete exhaustion of his financial resources.
Solving the Phoenician Fleet Conundrum
If deploying the Phoenician fleet would have solved almost all of Tissaphernes’ problems,
one wonders why it remained inactive at Aspendus. Several arguments have been made in
favor of Tissaphernes’ claim that the delay in bringing up the Phoenician fleet was because
the number of ships mobilized was still lower than the figure the King dictated. For
instance, Grote has pointed out that according to Diodorus the Phoenician fleet at Aspendus
consisted of 300 ships.1142 Accordingly, Grote suggests that the standard size of a given
Persian fleet was 300,1143 and that Tissaphernes had to wait for the fleet to reach this figure
before he received clearance to deploy it.1144 A supplementary explanation is provided by
Lateiner, who argues that past naval engagements have proved that the Athenian fleets
were vastly superior in comparison to their Persian counterparts, even in instances when
the Persians had considerable numerical advantage. Lateiner concludes that the Phoenician
fleet’s inferior fighting capacity led the King to order the admiral of the fleet not to engage
the Athenians before the fleet was in full strength.1145 It is apparent that Tissaphernes had
yet to receive direct command over the fleet, and even if he did the satrap was aware of the
poor track record of the Phoenician fleet when engaging Greek fleets and must have
dreaded a scenario in which the Phoenician fleet was prematurely deployed and defeated
by the Athenians. If such a scenario had transpired, Tissaphernes would have faced dire
consequences.1146
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Phoenician fleet was never deployed? An explanation is provided by Diodorus, who reports
that the Phoenician fleet was redirected to Egypt due to a rebellion,1147 a claim which is
corroborated by several contemporary documents which mention unrest in Egypt.1148
Several scholars have accepted the developments in Egypt as the reason behind
Tissaphernes’ inability to bring up the Phoenician fleet.1149 Others, however, have argued
that Thucydides would have mentioned an important event as an Egyptian uprising and
therefore reject Diodorus’ account as a fourth century invention.1150 But basing an
argument on Thucydides’ silence on this issue is precarious. The general principal which
Thucydides seems to follow is that events which occurred elsewhere in the Persian Empire
and had no direct impact on the war between Athens and Sparta could be glossed over.
Such a principal is understandable, but if Thucydides was inclined to ignore the problems
the Persian central authorities grappled with beyond the Aegean, we should be careful of
using his silences to automatically reject reports which are not narrowed to the boundaries
of the Greek world. Furthermore, we should not forget that Thucydides believed that
Tissaphernes was doing everything in his power to protract the war and that he deemed the
satrap as ultimately responsible for the inactivity of the Phoenician fleet. Consequently, the
centrality of Tissaphernes and his own motives in the narrative may have rendered Persian
imperial considerations as secondary in Thucydides’ view.1151
As we have seen, the conduct of Artaxerxes I in the context of the Athenian alliance
with the Egyptian rebels in the early 450s demonstrates that Egypt was more important to
the Persian royal authorities in comparison to western Anatolia, and it seems to be
considered as such in 411 BC. Therefore, we can conclude that Tissaphernes was willing
to deploy the Phoenician fleet, but while the satrap was patiently waiting for enough ships
to be mobilized, the Persian central authorities decided against him and redirected to fleet
to Egypt.1152
It is also important to note that even if the Phoenician fleet was never made
available to Tissaphernes, the fact that Darius intended to send a fleet to western Anatolia
suggests that the King was willing to make a considerable investment, in funds and
manpower, in the western frontier. Yet, under the assumption that the third treaty was
ratified by Darius, even if the Phoenician fleet had been deployed in Ionia, the Persian
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admirals would have answered not to the King but to Tissaphernes, to whom the mandate
to pursue the war against Athens was explicitly granted in the third and final treaty.

6.5 War in the Hellespont
Pharnabazus and the Peloponnesians
Upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed to the Hellespont, Tissaphernes
rushed from Aspendus to Ionia, seeking to explain his actions.1153 But it was too little and
too late. Pharnabazus finally managed to snatch the Peloponnesian fleet from his colleague
and rival. But Pharnabazus’ collaboration with the Spartans was far from a success.
Preceded by minor skirmishes,1154 the Peloponnesians engaged the Athenians near Point
Cynossema. The Athenians not only defeated their enemies but also regained the
confidence which they had lost following the debacle in Sicily. 1155 Immediately after, the
Athenians captured Cyzicus,1156 while Mindarus sent envoys to Sparta to ask for
reinforcements.1157 A few months later, in the winter of 412/11 BC, two naval engagements
ended with an indecisive outcome,1158 though in the latter engagement the Peloponnesians
were saved by Pharnabazus, whose cavalry squadrons prevented the Athenians from
cutting down the retreating Peloponnesians.1159
The Athenian string of military victories continued in the following year. At the
battle of Cyzicus, the Athenians managed to completely annihilate the Peloponnesian fleet
and to defeat the land forces of Pharnabazus.1160 Soon after, the Athenians asserted their
control over a number of cities in the region1161 and even established custom houses in
Chrysopolis with the intention of exacting a ten percent tax on all vessels sailing from the
Black sea. 1162 The desperate position of the Peloponnesians in the aftermath of the battle
of Cyzicus is succinctly described in a letter sent by the Spartan vice admiral Hippocrates
to Sparta, which was intercepted by the Athenians: “Ships gone. Mindarus dead. The men
are starving. We don’t know what to do.”1163 Surprisingly, it was Pharnabazus who tried to
lift the spirits of the Peloponnesian sailor by promising to provide the materials and funds
needed for the construction of a new fleet. The satrap even supplied each man with a cloak,
weapons, and two months’ pay.1164 After his exhortation speech, Pharnabazus went to help
the Chalcedonians against the Athenians.1165
In next campaigning season, that is the summer 409 BC, the Athenians dispatched
Thrasyllus with a new fleet to assume command over the Athenian forces in the
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Hellespont.1166 Thrasyllus first sailed to Ionia and began ravaging the countryside in the
vicinity of Ephesus. The Athenians then mounted a direct assault on Ephesus, but
Tissaphernes gathered a large army and defeated the Athenian forces.1167 After the setback
in Ephesus, Thrasyllus joined the rest of the fleet in Sestos and then moved to Lampascus,
where the Athenians spent the winter. 1168 Throughout the winter the Athenians repeatedly
plundered the Persian King’s territory and even took over Abydos after they vanquished
the forces of Pharnabazus which marched against them.1169
In the spring of 408 BC the Athenians resumed operations. A portion of the fleet
besieged Chalcedon while the rest laid waste to the territory of Pharnabazus.1170 The
Spartan garrison in Chalcedon, reinforced by a detachment sent by Pharnabazus, launched
an abortive attack against the Athenian besiegers.1171 After seeing his forces being defeated
by the Athenians again and again, Pharnabazus resorted to diplomacy. The satrap offered
the Athenians twenty talents in exchange for breaking off the siege and promised to
personally escort an Athenian embassy to the King.1172 After a truce had been established
with Pharnabazus, the Athenians lifted the siege and began operations against
Byzantium.1173 In the meantime, Pharnabazus met the Athenian envoys at Cyzicus, from
which they continued to Gordium where they spent the winter of 408/7.1174 The string of
military setbacks may have compelled Pharnabazus to bribe the Athenians to accept a truce,
but his offer to escort an Athenian embassy to the Persian court suggests that he had no
authority to negotiate a peace treaty with the Athenians. This can be explained by the fact
that in the third treaty the mandate to conduct the war is given to Tissaphernes rather than
Pharnabazus. The Athenians, on their part, probably aimed at persuading the King to order
his satraps to pull out of the war, which would had doubtlessly crippled the Peloponnesian
war efforts.
The Embassy of Boeotius
But the Athenians and Pharnabazus were in for a surprise. When the Athenian envoys and
Pharnabazus were en route they encountered a Peloponnesian embassy, led by a certain
Boeotius, which was returning from the Persian court accompanied by Cyrus the Younger,
the Great King’s son.1175 The Spartan ambassadors boasted that “the Spartans had won
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from the King everything they asked for,”1176 and that Cyrus, who was to be appointed as
the general of all those by the sea who fought alongside the Spartans, intended to fight
together with the Spartans .1177 In addition, Xenophon notes that Cyrus was carrying a letter
bearing the King’s seal, in which Darius proclaimed that he was sending down Cyrus as
the κάρανος, i.e. commander-in-chief, of all those who muster as Castolus.1178 While it is
generally agreed that Boeotius and his colleagues did not conclude a new treaty with
Darius,1179 the arrival of Cyrus entailed a considerable administrative reorganization of the
western satrapies which had considerable implications on the trajectory of the Ionian War.
Cyrus superseded Tissaphernes as the satrap of Lydia but the administrative district under
the Persian prince’s authority was expanded to include Greater Phrygia, and
Cappadocia.1180 Tissaphernes was demoted to a lesser position,1181 while Pharnabazus, who
continued to preside as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had to answer directly to
Cyrus.1182
Why was Tissaphernes replaced?
It is evident that the main impetus for the appointment of Cyrus was the failure of
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in the war against Athens. Darius must have been displeased
to learn that the Peloponnesian fleet proved to be as ineffective as his Phoenician
counterpart, and that his senior officials in the west were unwilling to collaborate against
the Athenian menace. But why was Tissaphernes removed from office while Pharnabazus
was allowed to continue governing his satrapy? It has been suggested that Darius sent
Cyrus to the west as a way to mitigate the forthcoming succession struggle in the
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Achaemenid court.1183 This hypothesis seems to be corroborated by the fact that Darius
reorganized the administrative structure in western Anatolia in order to allow Cyrus to rule
over a domain suitable for a prince. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that Tissaphernes
was held as responsible since, according to the third treaty, he was ultimately in charge of
the war against Athens. In addition, the Spartan’ complaints against Tissaphernes may have
contributed to the decision to remove him from office. Under the aegis of Pharnabazus we
hear of no complaints concerning the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors while the satrap
personally fought alongside his Greek allies on numerous occasions. We can assume that
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus sent reports to the royal court, in which each satrap
reproached the conduct of his colleague. Therefore, it is possible that the accusations issued
against Tissaphernes by Boeotius and he colleagues may have served as a tie breaker.1184
Moreover, if Darius wanted to use the Peloponnesians against the Athenians, and there is
no reason to think that he did not, replacing Tissaphernes became a necessity. Thus, by
demoting Tissaphernes and assigning considerable executive powers to Cyrus the Great
King repaired the relations with the Spartans, neutralized the satrapal competition which
became detrimental to Persian interests in western Anatolia, and may have reduced
dissension in the royal court.

6.6 Turning the Tide
Cyrus and the Peloponnesians
Cyrus pursued the war against the Athenians with impressive rigor and zeal. His first action
was to order Pharnabazus to arrest the Athenian envoys he was escorting to the King.1185
According to Xenophon, Cyrus wanted to prevent news of his arrival reaching his enemies.
At the same time, the new satrap of Lydia may have been determined to block any Athenian
diplomatic initiative which could have jeopardized his prestigious appointment. Soon after,
Lysander, the new Spartan nauarch, arrived at Ephesus and hurried to Sardis to meet
Cyrus.1186 Lysander spoke against the actions of Tissaphernes and beseeched Cyrus to be
earnest in the war against Athens.1187 The Persian prince responded by stating that Darius
had ordered him to do just that and even provided 500 talents to subsidize Spartan
operations. Cyrus even expressed his willingness to use his own funds if necessary.1188 We
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are also informed that the King ordered Cyrus to pay thirty minae per month to each ship,
i.e. a daily pay of three obols to each sailor, though there was no limitation on the number
of ships the Persians agreed to provision.1189 Lysander, however, was able to convince
Cyrus to increase the pay to a rate of four obols, as the extra obol came from Cyrus’ private
coffers.1190 Consequently, the aforementioned 500 talents could support the Peloponnesian
fleet for a limited period,1191 but the fact that at the end of the war Lysander brought to
Sparta a surplus of 470 silver talents, procured from Cyrus’ φόροι, makes it evident that
Persian prince was true on his promise and that he committed the resources which were at
his disposal for the Peloponnesian war effort.1192
The Athenians, on their part, tried to see Cyrus, but he refused to give them
audience.1193 Thus, with the generous financial support of Cyrus, Lysander led the
Peloponnesians through a series of victories.1194 But the collaboration with Cyrus
encountered an obstacle when Lysander was superseded by Callicratidas.1195 Nevertheless,
in spite of being reluctant to provision the Peloponnesian fleet due to his disapproval of
Callicratidas,1196 Cyrus eventually transferred the funds.1197 Then, in the campaigning
season of 405 BC, following the bitter defeat at Arginusae, 1198 at the behest of the
Peloponnesian allies and Cyrus, Lysander returned to western Anatolia as vice admiral.1199
In a similar fashion to his first tour in Ionia, Lysander went to Sardis to ask Cyrus for funds.
Cyrus informed his Spartan friend that the funds provided by the King had ran out, but he
still gave Lysander money. Furthermore, Lysander was also informed that the Persian
prince was about to depart for the royal court due to his father’s illness. Nevertheless, Cyrus
made arrangements which ensured that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned
during his absence: he gave to Lysander the tribute generated by unspecified cities which
were considered to be Cyrus’ personal property.1200 Not long after, Lysander managed to
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annihilate the Athenian navy as Aegospotami.1201 Consequently, the Athenians had no
choice but to surrender.1202
A Change in Policy?
According to Thucydides, the funds furnished by Cyrus allowed the Peloponnesians to
emerge victorious in their long war against the Athenians.1203 The omission of Tissaphernes
and Pharnabazus suggests that Thucydides deemed their contribution to the final outcome
of the war as secondary in comparison to that of Cyrus. In the same vein, it has been argued
that Cyrus’ arrival marked a change in Persian policy in the west, i.e. that Darius decided
to abandon Tissaphernes’ strategy aimed at wearing out the Greeks by prolonging the war
and ordered his son to provide unqualified assistance to the Spartans.1204
It seems likely that the string of Athenian victories in the Hellespont, especially
those which led to Athenian forays against Persian territory,1205 convinced Darius that the
Athenians were the true obstacle to Persian rule in the west.1206 Moreover, the King may
have thought that the Peloponnesians, after they had lost their entire fleet at the battle of
Cyzicus, would be more amenable to fulfill their promise to acknowledge Persian rule over
all of Asia, as stipulated in the third treaty.1207 Even so, the assertion that the appointment
of Cyrus as the new satrap of Lydia signaled a dramatic change in Persian policy is not
convincing.
I have demonstrated above that Tissaphernes probably turned into a bad paymaster
not due to a long-term strategy set to exhaust the Greeks but due to an unfortunate outcome
of his limited financial resources. In contrast, Cyrus came to the west with a substantial
grant from the King and had access to far greater resources in comparison to his
predecessor. Consequently, Cyrus was perceived as a true ally of the Peloponnesians while
Tissaphernes was branded as deceitful and unreliable by the Spartans. Therefore, it seems
reasonable that Cyrus was instructed to uphold the terms of the third treaty, i.e. to pursue
the war against Athens in tandem with the Peloponnesians, which is exactly what
Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had been doing up to this point only with lesser resources.
Interestingly, when Tissaphernes sailed to the Hellespont in the summer of 411 BC, as he
sought to explain why he failed to bring up the Phoenician fleet, he was visited by
Alcibiades. But the satrap imprisoned his former advisor and claimed that he received
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orders from the King to make war on the Athenians.1208 Plutarch claims that Tissaphernes
turned his back on Alcibiades because he feared lest the Spartan accusations against him
would jeopardize his standing with the King and therefore sought to reconcile his
disgruntled allies. But even if Plutarch is right, his explanation does not exclude the
possibility that Tissaphernes had received explicit order from the King to support the
Spartans. The likeliest point in which the Athenian option was abandoned is the conclusion
of the third treaty, which was ratified by the King. The alliance with Sparta became official
and the subsequent Athenian incursions against Persian domain only emphasized the
necessity to collaborate with the Peloponnesians.
Thus, the only apparent difference between the conduct of Cyrus and Tissaphernes
is the fact the former had the financial resources to fulfill the promises made by the King
in the third treaty.1209 Moreover, the embassy of Boeotius, as noted above, probably did
not result in a new treaty between Darius and the Spartans. Even still, since the Spartans
claimed to have received all they asked from the King, one can speculate that the terms of
the third treaty remained valid, while Darius, as compensation for failing to deploy the
Phoenician fleet as promised, agreed to allocate 500 talents for the Peloponnesian war
effort, gave Cyrus access to greater resources so as to be able to bankroll the Peloponnesian
fleet after the 500 talents had been spent, and obliged the Spartans by removing
Tissaphernes from his position as the satrap of Lydia. There was no new policy, but merely
a change in personnel coupled with an administrative restructuring of the western satrapies.
That there was no dramatic shift in Persian policy in the west is corroborated by the
fact that the appointment of Cyrus and the allocation of 500 talents sums up Darius’
intervention in the war. Indeed, Darius had sent his own son to deal with the troubles in the
west, but we should not forget that Cyrus was not the crown prince and, as suggested above,
the removal of Cyrus from the royal court had allowed Artaxerxes II to establish himself
as the successor without interferences. In addition, Cyrus was given money and authority
over additional local military forces, but Darius never sent additional land or sea forces.1210
The King, so it seems, was confident that the alliance with the Spartans would suffice to
bring the Athenians to their knees and that the military expenses would be financed by the
tribute extracted from the recovered territories.1211 In sum, King Darius, just like his
predecessors, intervened in the affairs of western Anatolia in a limited fashion. It is true
that a pro-Spartan policy became considerably more conspicuous after the arrival of Cyrus,
but such a development was the outcome of Cyrus’ own ambition and the greater resources
which were at his disposal.
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Conclusion
The relative wealth of information on the deeds and exploits of Tissaphernes and
Pharnabazus in the context of the Ionian war is illuminating. We have seen that the satraps
had the leeway to formulate, change, and execute policies not only within their satrapies
but also beyond the borders of the Persian Empire. The limited role of the Great Persian
King in the course of this conflict serves as another indication that the Persian central
authorities expected the satraps of western Anatolia to resolve the problems created by the
mainland Greeks. Since Tissaphernes miscalculated the time frame and costs of the war
against the Athenians, Darius had to intervene. But the acts of the Great King were limited
to financial assistance and administrative reshuffling. Yes, Darius intended to deploy the
Phoenician ships in the western frontier, but the fact that the fleet was eventually redirected,
presumably to Egypt, indicates that the situation in western Anatolia was not considered a
crisis which demanded immediate royal intervention.
In contrast to the predominant assumption in modern scholarship, I find it hard to
believe that the Athenian disaster in Sicily had a profound impact on Darius’ attitude
toward the western fringes of his kingdom. Are we to believe that news about a naval
engagement which occurred in faraway Sicily drove the Great King into action? That he
was driven by lust for vengeance and that he himself ordered his satraps to retake a few
coastal cities which were of little importance to the stability and security of the Persian
Empire? To me the answer is clearly no. From Darius’ standpoint, trouble in the west
probably manifested itself through lighter shipments of tribute. Hence, the King’s primary
interest was to see that the tribute kept on flowing and that his authority remained
unchallenged. The satraps were expected to fulfill their duties, and were given considerable
leeway to do so, and when they did not, the King would notify them that they performance
was inadequate. The King did not, and I believe that he was unable to, dictate to each and
every satrap the manner in which they were to resolve problems which prevented them
from fulfilling their satrapal duties. Only in times of crisis, e.g. when a local rebellion got
out of hand, was a royal army mobilized, and only then would the Great King or one of his
trusted lieutenants assume command. The actions of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus and
those of Darius provide a clear demonstration that this principle determined the interactions
between the Great Persian King and his satraps.
Tissaphernes, who was evidently well informed when it came to Greek politics,
sought to use Sparta as an instrument to weaken the Athenians. But while the satrap was
able to effect an alliance with the Spartans and to win the Great King’s approval, his
inability to anticipate Athenian resilience resulted in the failure of a sound and prudent
strategy. As the war continued Tissaphernes saw his financial resources waste away along
with the Great King’s patience. After Pharnabazus provided a similar unsatisfactory
performance, Darius, prompted by Spartan complaints, intervened and appointed his son
Cyrus as the overlord of the western satrapies. The events which led to the decision to
appoint Cyrus highlight the complexity of the diplomatic interaction between Greeks and
Persians while demonstrating the key role of the satraps, who facilitated the exchange of
embassies between the Persian royal court and the Greek mainland.
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CONCLUSION
The tendency of both ancient authors and modern scholars to cast the Great Persian Kings
as the originators of Persian policy in the west is convenient but misleading. Closer
observation from the satraps’ viewpoint reveals that though royal and satrapal interests
overlapped they were by no means identical. Therefore, a different model has been offered
in the present study, one which aims to highlight the central role of the satraps in the
interactions between Greeks and Persians.
The Great King’s Viewpoint
The notion that the Great Persian Kings were especially attentive to Greek affairs is not
convincing. The depiction of an Achaemenid King sitting on his throne in one of his
capitals, his gaze constantly turning to the west, eager to receive news regarding events
which took place beyond the western borders of his vast empire seems improbable if not
farfetched. Such an image is clearly the outcome of the Hellenocentric vantage point of the
ancient Greek authors. But modern historians should not allow the predominance of the
Greek literary traditions to obscure the fact that the Great Persian Kings had an enormous
empire to rule, defend, and administer. Accordingly, envisioning Greco-Persian relations
as a direct interchange between the Persian King and the various Greek polities is too
simple. Such an image fails to reflect the agency of the satraps, who were the true driving
force behind Persian policies in the west. A preferable model is based on the assumption
that the satraps had the authority, the means, and the will to use the extensive prerogatives
of their office to fulfill their duties. Thus, when necessary the governors of the satrapies
were authorized to formulate, execute, and reformulate foreign and domestic policies.
Satrapal Independence
The difficulties Darius I experienced during his rise to power had consequences. The
multiple rebellions and the audacity of Oroites made it evident that further measures were
needed in order to ensure obedience and loyalty. Accordingly, the primary aim of Darius’
grand reform was to tighten the control of the Persian royal authorities over the satrapies.
Through the presence of officials of royal status in the satrapies, yearly inspections, and an
informal network of spies, Darius was able to monitor the provinces and to respond to
subversive activities and any other issues which may have required the Great King’s
attention.
Royal oversight, however, did not discourage the satraps from acting
independently. There is no doubt that the institutions and protocols established or expanded
by Darius I enabled an early detection of satrapal misconduct or lacking performance. This
does not mean that the enhanced royal supervision deterred the satraps from showing
initiative. On the contrary, it seems that a satrap who exhibited resilience and ingenuity
was more likely to gain royal favor. The actions of Pissuthnes in the context of the Samian
rebellion and the Archidamian War suggests that the satrap of Lydia wished to demonstrate
his value by exploiting opportunities to further Persian interests in Ionia. Similarly, the
impetus for the competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus over Sparta’s
friendship at the onset of the Ionian War was the eagerness of the satraps to impress the
King.
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But ambition was not the only motive for satrapal resourcefulness. Instances in
which the King issued an applied royal directive encouraged the satraps to act. For instance,
while Darius II instructed Tissaphernes to apprehend the rebel Amorges, he did not dictate
a particular course of action which would bring an end to Amorges’ rebellion. Tissaphernes
was shrewd enough to take advantage of the declining popularity of Athens in Ionia and
the enmity between the Athenians and the Spartans for his own purpose. It is evident,
therefore, that Tissaphernes was given a mission but that the manner in which this mission
was to be accomplished was at the satrap’s discretion.
None will deny that the satraps received unlimited authority. The satraps had to
follow royal directives when such were issued, were required to obtain of royal approval
when they wished to use royal resources or when they concluded a binding agreement with
foreign political entities. In other words, while the satraps were aware to the fact that the
King was watching and knew that they should refrain from transgressing the boundaries of
their office, they still had the discretion to decide which course of action served Persian
interest best even and perhaps especially when explicit royal instructions were lacking.
The Circumstances in Western Anatolia
The satraps of western Anatolia operated under extraordinary Circumstances. The
transition from a policy of expansion to a policy of entrenchment in the wake of Xerxes’
Greek campaign had profound impact on the attitude of the Persian Kings toward the
western satrapies. As we have seen, royal intervention in the west was limited to diplomatic
interchange, the removal (Megabates) or demotion (Tissaphernes) of satraps, the allocation
of funds (500 talents), and administrative reorganization (the expanded satrapy governed
by Cyrus the younger). The limited extent of Persian retaliation to Greek aggression in the
northern Aegean, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Cyprus suggests that the Persian central
authorities were not alarmed by Athenian operations against Persian domain and were
confident that the satrapal authorities were up for the challenge. Such policy was
reasonable since Athens was a maritime superpower and as such it lacked the capacity to
truly undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean. With the exception of the
northern Aegean, the impact of the campaigns of the Delian League in Asia Minor and
beyond the Aegean was only ephemeral. Thus, since there is no evidence for the revival of
Persian imperialistic aspirations in the west, a grand mobilization of troops and ships for
the purpose of containing what was viewed by the King as a nuisance was neither
financially nor strategically sound. The conclusion of a détente in 449 BC brought the war
between Athens and Persia to an unofficial end, but political strife in several Ionian citystates contributed to the friction between Athens and Persia. Therefore, since the western
satrapies were exposed to incursions staged by the European Greeks, Artabazus,
Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and Cyrus the Younger were compelled to find a
way to fulfill their satrapal duties while managing a continuous low-scale conflict with
Athens and its allies.
The Impact of Satrapal Independence
In light of the above, it is evident that the satraps played a decisive role in Greco-Persian
relations in the fifth century BC. In an ongoing effort to fulfill their duties, the satraps often
acted on their own accord, seeking to capitalize on Greek infighting, both in Asia Minor
and European Greece, with the purpose of furthering their interest. To some degree, each

178
satrap constituted an independent political unit, whose interests were framed by the
necessity to govern the satrapy in a manner which pleased the Great King while at the same
time determined by competition with other satraps and developments in mainland Greece
which could have implications on the state of affairs in western Anatolia.
So What?
One question remains: does the conduct of the satraps of western Anatolia reflects the
overarching nature of King-satrap relations in the Persian Empire? As I have noted above,
the circumstances in western Anatolia were particular. But it is highly unlikely that the
challenges the satraps of the western satrapies faced were unique. Though the Persians
demonstrated impressive administrative flexibility as they absorbed preexisting institutions
and practices to facilitate a peaceful establishment of Persian rule in various regions, the
responsibilities that came with the office of satrap were probably identical regardless of the
region which the appointed satrap governed. Thus, the case of the western satrapies
provides us with a viable model for the problems and difficulties Persian governors of
frontier satrapies faced and the attitude of the central Persian authorities toward trouble in
the periphery. There is no doubt that in times of relative peace royal intervention in the
provinces, whether on the frontier or not, was redundant since the duties and
responsibilities assigned to the satraps already centered on the King’s demand for tribute
and obedience. All the while, the satraps had the discretion to decide, especially when royal
policy on a certain matter was lacking, which policies would safeguard and promote the
King’s interest. The Great King may have prioritized certain regions over others. It is not
out of the question, for instance, that Persian responses to news about dissent in the Persian
heartland or wealthy Babylonia might have been more assertive. We know of numerous
instances in which the Persian Kings sent armies to suppress local rebellions. To name a
few, a major investment in resources and manpower was made in order to preserve Persian
rule in Egypt, Media, Syria, Bactria, and probably other regions as well. Athens’ limited
capacity to undermine Persian rule in the west never provoked the full wrath of the Persian
Kings. Yet, the participation of a Persian fleet at the battle of the Eurymedon River and the
Phoenician fleet as Aspendus demonstrate that the Persian central authorities were willing
to divert significant forces for the protection of Persian interests in the west. A late but
forceful demonstration of Persian determination to safeguard Persian rule in Asia Minor
occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century, when the Persian response to Alexander’s
invasion showed that Asia Minor was as viewed as an integral and important part of the
Persian Empire. In summary, in spite of the particular challenge brought about by the bond
between the Asiatic and European Greeks, the interaction of the satraps of western Anatolia
can and should be viewed as a case study which reflects the true nature of King-satrap
relations not only in the west, but in other satrapies which were located on the fringes of
the Achaemenid Persian Empire.
Prosthesis
The events of the fifth century BC constitute only half of the story. The fourth century BC
proved to be even more tumultuous for Greeks and Persians alike. The political
fragmentation in mainland Greece exacerbated while several large-scale rebellions, some
of which led by local satraps, impaired the authority of Persian King in the west. It is
evident, therefore, that the extent of satrapal independence and the inner workings of the
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Persian Empire in this pivotal period of crisis merits reinterpretation. The result of such
study could strengthen the conclusions offered in this study and shed additional light on
the nature and character of the Achaemenid Persian Empire.
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“La Version Élamite de La Trilingue de Behistun: Une Nouvelle Lecture.”
Journal Asiatique 282: 19–59.
Grote, George. 1846. A History of Greece IV. New York: AMS Press.
———. 1850. A History of Greece VIII. London: John Murray.
———. 1852. History of Greece IX. London: John Murray.
Gruen, Erich S. 2011. Rethinking the Other in Antiquity. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press.
Habicht, Christian. 1961. “Falsche Urkunden Zur Geschichte Athens Im Zeitalter Der
Perserkriege.” Hermes 89 (1): 1–35.
Haebler, Claus. 1982. “Κάρανος. Eine Sprachwissenschaftliche Betrachtung Zu Xen.
Hell. I 4, 3.” In Serta Indogermanica: Festschrift Für Günter Neumann Zum,
edited by J. Tischler and G. Neumann, 81–90. Innsbruck: Institut für
Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Innsbruck.
Haillet, Jean. 2001. Diodore de Sicile: Bibliothèque Historique Livre XI. Paris: Les Belles
Lettres.
Hall, Edith. 1989. Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1996. Aeschylus: The Persians. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.
Hall, Jonathan M. 1997. Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity. Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
———. 2002. Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Hallock, Richard T. 1960. “The ‘One Year’ of Darius I.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies
19 (1): 36–39.
———. 1969. Persepolis Fortification Tablets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hamilton, Charles D. 1979. Sparta’s Bitter Victories: Politics and Diplomacy in the
Corinthian War. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Hansen, Mogens H., and Thomas H. Nielsen. 2004. An Inventory of Archaic and
Classical Poleis. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Harmatta, János. 1971. “The Literary Patterns of the Babylonian Edict of Cyrus.” Acta
Antiqua 19: 217–31.
Harris, Edward M. 1999. “IG I3 227 and the So-Called Peace of Epilykos.” Zeitschrift
Für Papyrologie Und Epigraphik 126: 123–128.
———. 2000. “The Authenticity of Andokides’ De Pace: A Subversive Essay.” In Polis
& Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History, edited by E. Flensted-Jensen, T. H.
Nielsen, and L. Rubinstein, 479–505. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Harrison, Cynthia M. 1982. “Coins of the Persian Satraps.” Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania.
Hart, John. 1982. Herodotus and Greek History. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Harvey, David. 2014. “Herodotus Becomes Interested in History.” Greece and Rome
(Second Series) 61 (1): 1–6.
Hatzfeld, Jean. 1951. Alcibiade: Étude Sur L’h̕istoire d’A̕thènes À La Fin Du Ve Siècle.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

193
Haubold, Johannes. 2012. “The Achaemenid Empire and the Sea.” Mediterranean
Historical Review 27 (1): 5–24.
Hegyi, Dolores. 1966. “The Historical Background of the Ionian Revolt.” Acta Antiqua
Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 14: 285–302.
Heitsch, E. 2006. “Der Vertrag Des Therimenes: Von Den Schwierigkeiten Einer
Thukydides-Interpretation.” Hermes 134 (1): 26–43.
Heitsch, Ernst. 2007. Geschichte Und Personen Bei Thukydides: Eine Interpretation Des
Achten Buches. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Henkelman, Wouter F. M. 2008. The Other Gods Who Are: Studies in Elamite-Iranian
Acculturation Based On the Persepolis Fortification Texts. Leiden: Nederlands
Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten.
Henkelman, Wouter F. M., and Kristin Kleber. 2007. “Babylonian Workers in the Persian
Hearthland: Palace Building at Matannan During the Reign of Cambyses.” In
Persian Responses: Political and Cultural Interaction with (in) the Achaemenid
Empire, edited by C. J. Tuplin. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales.
Henkelman, Wouter F. M., and Amélie Kuhrt, eds. 2003. Achaemenid History XIII: A
Persian Perspective: Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg. Leiden:
Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten.
Herrenschmidt, Clarisse. 1976. “Désignation de L’empire et Concepts Politiques de
Darius Ier D’après Ses Inscriptions En Vieux-Perse.” Studia Iranica 5 (1): 33–65.
Herzfeld, Ernst E. 1937. “Xerxes’ Verbot Des Daiva-Cultes.” Archäologische
Mitteilungen Aus Iran 8: 56–77.
———. 1938. Altpersische Inschriften. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag.
———. 1947. Zoroaster and His World I. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
———. 1968. The Persian Empire: Studies in Geography and Ethnography of the
Ancient Near East. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
Higgins, William E. 1977. Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and
the Society of Polis. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Hinz, Walther. 1973. Neue Wege Im Altpersischen. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz
Verlag.
Hirsch, Steven W. 1985. The Friendship of the Barbarians. Hanover: University Press of
New England.
Hofstetter, Josef. 1978. Die Griechen in Persien: Prosopographie Der Griechen Im
Persischen Reich Vor Alexander. Berlin: Reimer.
Holladay, A. James. 1977. “Sparta’s Role in the First Peloponnesian War.” The Journal
of Hellenic Studies 97: 54–63.
———. 1986. “The Détente of Kallias?” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte 35 (4):
503–507.
Holtz, Shalom E. 2009. Neo-Babylonian Court Procedure. Leiden and Boston: Brill.
———. 2010. “‘Judges of the King’ in Achaemenid Mesopotamia.” In The World of
Achaemenid Persia: History, Art and Society in Iran and the Ancient Near East,
edited by J. Curtis and S. J. Simpson, 481–89. London: I.B. Tauris.
Hornblower, Simon. 1982. Mausolus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
———. 1987. Thucydides. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

194
———. 1991. A Commentary on Thucydides I: Books I-III. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 1992. “The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War, Or, What
Thucydides Does Not Tell Us.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 94: 169–
197.
———. 1994. “Asia Minor.” In The Cambridge Ancient History VI: The Fourth Century
B.C., edited by D. M. Lewis, J. Boardman, S. Hornblower, and M. Ostwald,
Second Edition, 209–233. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1996. A Commentary on Thucydides II: Book IV-V.24. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
———. 2003. “Panionios of Chios and Hermotimos of Pedasa (Hdt. 8. 104-6).” In
Herodotus and His World: Essays from a Conference in Memory of George
Forrest, edited by P. Derow and R. Parker, 37–57. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
———. 2008. A Commentary on Thucydides III: Book V.25-VIII. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press.
———. 2011a. The Greek World 479–323 BC. New York: Routledge.
———. 2011b. Thucydidean Themes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
How, Walter W., and Joseph Wells. 1912. A Commentary on Herodotus. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hughes, George R. 1984. “The So-Called Pherendates Correspondence.” In Grammata
Demotika: Festschrift Für Erich Lüddeckens Zum 15. Juni 1983, edited by H. J.
Thissen and K. T. Zauzich, 75–86. Würzburg: Zauzich.
Hunt, Peter. 2010. War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes’ Athens. Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hyland, John O. 2004. “Waiting for Tissaphernes: Athens and Persia in Thucydides
VIII.” Syllecta Classica 15 (1): 71–101.
Immerwahr, Henry R. 1966. Form and Thought in Herodotus. Cleveland: The Press of
Western Reserve University.
Isaac, Benjamin H. 1986. The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian
Conquest. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Jacobs, Bruno. 1994. Die Satrapienverwaltung Im Perserreich Zur Zeit Darius’ III.
Wiesbaden: L. Reichert.
———. 2010. “Herrschaftsideologie Und Herrschaftsdarstellung Bei Den
Achämeniden.” In Concepts of Kingship in Antiquity: Proceedings of the
European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop, Held in Padova, November
28th-December 1st, 2007, edited by G. B. Lanfranchi and R. Rollinger, 107–13.
Padova: S.A.R.G.O.N. Editrice e Libreria.
———. 2011. “Achaemenid Satrapies.” Encyclopcedia Iranica Online, Updated: July
21, 2011; Retrieved: February 17, 2017.
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/achaemenid-satrapies.
Jacoby, Felix. 1926. Die Fragmente Der Griechischen Historiker II/C: Kommentar Zu
NR. 64-105. Berlin: Weidmann.
Japhet, Sara. 1982. “Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel—Against the Background of the
Historical and Religious Tendencies of Ezra-Nehemiah.” Zeitschrift Für Die
Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 94 (1): 66–98.

195
Jeffery, L. H., and Paul Cartledge. 1982. “Sparta and Samos: A Special Relationship?”
The Classical Quarterly (New Series) 32 (2): 243–265.
Jeffery, Lilian H., and A. Morpurgo-Davies. 1970. “ΠΟΙΝΙΚΑΣΤΑΣ and
ΠΟΙΝΙΚΑΖΕΝ: BM 1969. 4–2. 1, A New Archaic Inscription from Crete.”
Kadmos 9: 118–54.
Joannès, Francis. 1982. Textes Économiques de La Babylonie Récente. Paris: Editions
Recherche sur les civilisations.
———. 1989a. Archives de Borsippa: La Famille Ea-Ilûta-Bâni: Étude D’un Lot
D’archives Familiales En Babylonie Du VIIIe Au Ve Siècle Av. J.-C. Genève:
Librairie Droz.
———. 1989b. “La Titulature de Xerxès.” Nouvelles Assyriologiques Brèves et
Utilitaires 2: 25.
———. 1990. “Pouvoirs Locaux et Organisations Du Territoire En Babylonie
Achéménide.” Transeuphratène 3: 173–189.
Johnson, Janet H. 1994. “The Persians and the Continuity of Egyptian Culture.” In
Achaemenid History VIII: Continuity and Change, edited by H. SancisiWeerdenburg, A. Kuhrt, and M. C. Root, 149–159. Leiden: Nederlands Instituut
voor het Nabije Oosten.
Jones, Christopher P. 1999. Kinship Diplomacy in the Ancient World. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Junge, Peter J. 1941. “Satrapie Und Natio.” Klio-Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte 34: 1–55.
———. 1944. Dareios I, Königs Der Perser. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz.
Jursa, Michael. 1999. Das Archiv Des Bēl-Rēmanni. Istanbul: Nederlands HistorischArchaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul.
———. 2007. “The Babylonian Economy in the First Millennium BC.” In The
Babylonian World, edited by G. Leick, 224–235. New York: Routledge.
———. 2010. Aspects of the Economic History of Babylonia in the First Millennium BC:
Economic Geography, Economic Mentalities, Agriculture, the Use of Money and
the Problem of Economic Growth. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
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